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Abstract 
  For centuries, Syria has been home to Armenians in cities such as Kessab, Damascus, and 
Aleppo. Armenians have contributed significantly to the military, economic, industrial and 
cultural development of Syria, yet as a result of the current conflict in Syria, more than half of 
the Armenian population has been dispersed. Like millions of other Syrians, their communities 
have been severely damaged by crossfire and direct attacks from armed opposition groups. Yet 
efforts to assess attitudes towards redress and reconciliation of Syria’s minority community, 
including the Armenians, have not been abundant. As there are efforts currently being 
undertaken to prepare potential transitional justice interventions in post-conflict Syria, the 
Armenian perspective on redress is a critical piece of the narrative.  
 
Herein I examine the attitudes of Syrian-Armenians towards justice and redress in post-
conflict Syria. Through two human rights theoretical lenses, that of minority rights and 
transitional justice, I aim to provide the foundational backdrop against which an analysis of the 
opinions and attitudes expressed by the informants in this study can take place. I use interviews 
and survey responses with Syrian nationals (of Armenian ethnicity) currently resettled in 
Armenia from a March 2019 research trip, in addition to archival material, reports, and other 
publically available secondary sources, to assess what Syrian-Armenians might feel justice and 
repair should entail in a post-conflict Syria.  
 
I conclude that three general themes appear across the majority of collected responses 
that can help indicate what this community might prioritize for redress. The three themes are: (1) 
Ensuring safety and stability, (2) Protecting the rights and liberties of all citizens, and (3) 
(Re)creating a unified Syria. In presenting these themes, I argue that they must be assessed 
against the backdrop of the past century’s history and its repercussions on the minorities in Syria. 
I attempt to demonstrate that the multiple oppressive acts against this people: the legacy of the 
genocide, the suppression of their diverse identities in the 1950s and 60s, and now the 
destruction of their homes and cultural/religious/ethnic centers, all influence their notions of 
what redress and justice can and should look like in post-conflict Syria.
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I. Introduction:1  
“It’s tough answering this question, ‘what does justice mean to you?’ being an Armenian and a 
Syrian on top, because you’ve never really had justice. You’ve never really had justice in any 
way or form before…” - Syrian-Armenian Interviewee, 23 years old, March 20192  
 
In September of 2013, Angel Ajemian’s husband and father in-law were kidnapped by 
ISIS. For four months she awaited the news that they were alive. Instead, she received a phone 
call that they were killed. Justice for her was to have the bodies returned for a proper burial. That 
wasn’t possible so, instead, she settled for the bodies being buried in a separate grave, as 
opposed to alongside the other 50 killed. Back in Aleppo, she carried out a church funeral service 
with photos instead of bodies.  
 In 2015, Hagop and Linda Atikian’s kids were kidnapped by Islamic extremists who 
stopped the bus they were on as they traveled home from Beirut to Aleppo. After 12 days they 
were reunited only to barely escape death when a missile fell on their house while they were all 
inside. Although they are now living safely in Armenia, their son often sleepwalks in the middle 
of the night, “running around like crazy, all while asleep. He would hold a pen and pretend it was 
a gun, a napkin, a spoon, anything. He wanted to learn to use a weapon and protect us from 
danger.” 3 For Hagop and Linda, justice is to return to a normalcy of human interaction. In an 
interview with me in Armenia, Hagop shared, “My spirit is already totally different. I meet 
people, for example, I am so happy to sit down with you, imagine just sitting and talking to you. 
I have almost forgotten how to have conversations. It’s enough that people listen to you; it’s 
enough that people share your pain. We didn’t have those things there, we had lost it all.”4  
In 2016 Mikael Mikaelian (pseudonym) escaped from his mandatory Syrian military 
service after being held and tortured in Syrian prison by his own government for four months due 																																																								1	These are all testimonies from the Rerooted Archive, an archive of 100+ Syrian-Armenian refugee testimonies. They are excerpts from 
interviews that I have conducted.  2	Survey	Respondent,	Interview,	March	2019.	3	“Rerooted,”	accessed	October	16,	2018,	http://www.rerooted.org/.	4	“Rerooted.”	
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to an accidental documentation mix-up. Justice for him is memorialization, establishing ways to 
publicly remember the best friends he lost who fought with him in this war but who were not as 
lucky as he feels he was to survive. After remembering, justice is to forget, to put it all in the past 
and live a new life in Armenia, what he calls, his homeland. 
These are just a few horrors that members of what was once Syria’s strong 100,000+-
person Armenian community have faced.5 While these experiences were not the norm, (as many 
Syrian-Armenians fled the conflict early, or benefitted from government support in its shielding 
of Aleppo, or suffered property damage/loss as opposed to kidnappings, torture, and death as 
expressed above), stories of these experiences influenced perceptions and this contributed to less 
optimistic views for justice in Syria. As they are beginning new lives in Armenia, many Syrian-
Armenians have largely given up on any notion of justice for Syria’s now 8-year long conflict. 
However, whether or not they are hopeful for it does not prevent them from forming expectations 
about what justice might look like in a post-conflict Syria. The majority of my survey 
respondents (41/52) still have family that lives in Syria and for whom they referenced they hope 
there will be justice. Thus, it is important for studies like these to acknowledge what different 
communities might anticipate an eventual justice to be. Transitional Justice (TJ) efforts in Syria 
are unlikely and difficult and we are currently unable to answer the question of what eventual TJ 
will look like in Syria. However, we can assess attitudes towards justice from different Syrian 
community members by asking questions like, “What does a post-conflict Syria look like for 
you? What do you hope for the people who stayed in Syria or for your own children who might 
want to return one day? What would it take for you to return?” These are questions we can get 
answers to, and that was largely the aim, and results, of the research at hand.   																																																								5	“70,000	Syrian	Armenians	Have	Fled	during	the	War,	and	Few	Will	Return,”	World	Watch	Monitor	(blog),	June	27,	2018,	https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2018/06/70000-syrian-armenians-have-fled-during-the-war-and-few-will-return/.	
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II. Objective & Significance 
Q: “Do you think there will ever be adequate justice for what happened in Syria?”  
A: “Look at this scar on my hand. Feel it. Do you feel how it is still raised? The damage done in 




Since March 2011 Syria has been afflicted by war.7 By May of 2018, more than half of the 
total Syrian population had been displaced, and about 13 million people were estimated to be in 
need of humanitarian assistance.8 As of September 2018, the actors in the conflict included: the 
Syrian government, Syrian rebel/jihadist forces, Islamic State group, Syrian-Kurdish forces, the 
Iraqi government, and less directly, the governments of Turkey, Russia, and the United States.9 
With their diverse interests, these actors prolong the conflict and make it less likely the war will 
come to an end any time soon.10 Nevertheless, although bombs are still falling, efforts to assess 
Syrian attitudes towards redress and justice in Syria are ongoing. 
This study aims to assess the attitudes of Syrian-Armenian refugees in Armenia toward 
redress, reconstruction, and justice in post-conflict Syria. It is situated within existing efforts to 
interview different segments of Syrian society to ultimately create a representative view of 
satisfactory justice and redress mechanisms in a post-conflict Syria. Thus, the main objective of 
this study is to elicit information from this community of Syrian-Armenians regarding preferred 
redress mechanisms for the conflict in Syria to help inform reconciliatory and reparatory efforts 
when the war ends.  
This goal is inspired by the many scholarly criticisms that the field of transitional justice 
lacks voices from the ground regarding satisfactory redress mechanisms.11 This study seeks to 																																																								6	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	7	“Why	Is	There	a	War	in	Syria?,”	February	25,	2019,	sec.	Middle	East,	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229.	8	Ibid.	9	Ibid.	10 Ibid. 11	Phuong	Pham	and	Patrick	Vinck,	“Empirical	Research	and	the	Development	and	Assessment	of	Transitional	Justice	Mechanisms,”	
International	Journal	of	Transitional	Justice	1,	no.	2	(July	1,	2007):	237.	https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijm017.	
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begin to fill that gap with at least one population.12 More specifically than filling a gap in general 
TJ literature, this study seeks to inform TJ efforts for the Syrian context. Most of the current 
scholarly research, writing, and policy on post-conflict Syria has not explicitly addressed the 
views of minority populations, neglecting to fully take into account their potentially differing 
opinions regarding what redress might look like in Syria. Although 80% of Syria is Muslim, it is 
“home to one of the largest Christian populations in the Middle East.”13 The Syrian-Armenians 
are a part of that Christian population and many of the anxieties they face within this conflict 
come from their minority status. While many of the Christian minorities have left their homes 
and have been directly affected by the conflict, many of the efforts to document the history, 
views, and conditions that would facilitate refugee return to Syria do not include minority 
populations and one resulting danger is that their presence could be further marginalized.14 
Significance 
This study is important for two central reasons. First, while there is presently no transitional 
justice in the foreseeable future in Syria (as it is likely President Assad will remain in power), it 
is important for the effort of collecting opinions on the ground to take place now, as they will 
help inform other efforts that will be undertaken in a post-conflict Syria, such as reconstruction, 
reversing what one expert refers to as, demographic engineering,15 and imposing other structural 
changes. Each of these efforts would benefit from communication with all members of society.16 
Additionally, documentation efforts are important at all times to capture a snapshot of the current 
moment in history. The further removed we become from the time of the damage of the conflict, 																																																								12	Melissa	Williams,	Rosemary	Nagy,	and	Jon	Elster,	Transitional	Justice:	NOMOS	LI	(New	York,	UNITED	STATES:	New	York	University	Press,	2012):	219	http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/columbia/detail.action?docID=865431.	13	“Syria	Population	2019	(Demographics,	Maps,	Graphs),”	accessed	May	7,	2019,	http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population/.	14	“Home,”	Syria	Justice	&	Accountability	Centre,	accessed	May	7,	2019,	http://syriaaccountability.org/.	15	This	is	a	term	used	by	experts in the field, who express the idea that Syria is undergoing a type of “demographic engineering,” in that the war 
is negatively affecting the demographics in Syria and this is something for which they believe there should be reparations, or at least more 
attention paid it in the reconstruction process.	16	Damascus	Center	for	Human	Rights	Studies	representative,	Phone	Conversation,	December	2,	2018.	
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the less accurate narratives and accounts may be that would inform future transitional justice 
efforts.17 
Second, the Armenians are an ethnic and religious minority group in Syria that largely has 
not joined the factions of the opposition in Syria. As justice should be inclusive and 
comprehensive, their opinions will be important additions to the narratives of abuses committed 
by those other than the Syrian government.18 Many experts emphasize that the Syrian-Armenian 
community is one they have little information about, or contact with.19 Given that “since each 
transitional context is unique, it is not possible to make valid generalizations about the 
effectiveness of specific institutional devices,” this study is important because it looks at a 
specific context in order to help those within that community.20 
While the goals above contribute to more local and immediate results, this study can also 
contribute to an understanding of justice on a more general level. This is because of this 
community’s unique ability to provide perspectives for justice in the context of two different 
mass atrocities where justice has not yet been served: the Armenian genocide and the conflict in 
Syria. Hence it has a potential to help fill a gap in our understanding of satisfactory redress 
mechanisms in post-conflict contexts, and how that may change as more time elapses from the 
time of violence.21 This study has documented attitudes toward different justice mechanisms for 
both the current Syrian conflict and the Armenian genocide, which may help to influence policy 
initiatives in the future. James Ron writes that, since the transitional justice literature “does not 
provide policymakers with the empirical foundations necessary for making informed decisions 																																																								17	IIIM	contributor,	Phone	conversation,	April	9,	2019.	18	Mona	Rishmawi,	“Transitional	Justice	in	the	Arab	Countries:	Opportunities	and	Challenges,”	in	Proceedings	of	the	ASIL	Annual	Meeting,	vol.	106	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2012):	499.	19	Phone	and	email	conversations	with	representatives	from	these	organizations:	The International Center for Transitional Justice, Syrian 
Justice and Accountability Center, and the Arab Reform Institute	20	Hugo	Van	der	Merwe,	Victoria	Baxter,	and	Audrey	R.	Chapman,	Assessing	the	Impact	of	Transitional	Justice:	Challenges	for	Empirical	
Research	(US	Institute	of	Peace	Press,	2009):	43.	21	Jane	E.	Stromseth,	“Peacebuilding	and	Transitional	Justice::	The	Road	Ahead,”	in	Managing	Conflict	in	a	World	Adrift	(McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2015):	573.	pp.	571–92,	https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1jktrcf.38.	
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about when, where, and how to promote TJ in countries emerging from war on authoritarianism, 
surveys and focus groups will give us a better sense of how pro-TJ and anti-TJ constituencies 
emerge in countries of interest.”22 It is my hope that the surveys and interviews I conducted will 
help contribute to this understanding of TJ in post-war countries and contexts, by learning from 
the experiences of the past (Armenian genocide) to help influence policy in the future (post-
conflict Syria). However, it is important to acknowledge that one cannot fully understand the 
perspectives and positions of this minority group, or any for that matter, without greater context 
regarding their position within Syrian society and their history there. One of the most important 
aspects of understanding the opinions of the Armenian community in Syria is understanding their 
arrival in Syria, how the genocide and its repercussions affected Armenian identity in Syria, and 
Syrian policy and attitudes towards Armenians over time. So, before discussing TJ in Syria and 
analyzing what the Armenian community there might prefer, a large section will be dedicated to 
understanding the history of Armenians in Syria through the lens of minority “rights,” and the 





III. Theoretical Framework 1: Armenians as Minorities 
It is important to explore the responses of the Syrian-Armenian community through two 
lenses: 1. The fact that they have not yet gotten justice for the Armenian Genocide. 2. The fact 
that they are a minority in Syria, especially one that has been persecuted before, and had their 
rights limited in Syria, and how this influences their desires to remain as protected as possible in 
Syria. Both the literature on transitional justice and the history of the Armenians in Syria as 
minorities are important foundations for understanding the presently expressed opinions. It is 
only possible to make sense of this survey taking into account not just the future but also the 
past, and that is the historical context of the refugee experience.   
 Historical Background 
“There were lots of difficulties for my parents. They left their homes and everything and… they 
got to Aleppo, with nothing there for them. There was nothing. They even had to live in places 
next to animals. They lived in a tiny room like this with two or three families. After that they 
started building houses out of wood. Then they started building houses out of stone. My father 
built his house in 1935 or 1936 with his own hands. They had one room built and he saw how it 
was done and then after work he would come and build the other rooms with my mother.”23 
 
a. Armenians in Syria before 1915 
 The Armenian people have geographically and historically been tied to the region 
between Eastern Anatolia and the Southern side of the Caucuses. However, invasions by large 
empires that repeatedly swept across historic Armenia led migration and displacement to be a 
“distinctive feature of Armenian history from old to modern times.”24 Substantial emigration 
waves in the 14th, 16th, and 17th centuries brought Armenians to the Levant and enabled them to 
establish communities for themselves where they became important traders and craftsmen. 
Aleppo was the most important Armenian settlement in the region as it was the major Armenian 




Alexandretta. The next big wave of Armenian migration to Syria was a result of the genocide 
against the Armenians committed by the Ottoman Empire. The chart below (table 1) 
demonstrates the shift in population size after the genocide.  
Table 125  
b. The Armenian Genocide and the mass influx of Armenians to Syria 
“Armenians are builders. They have done it before and they will do it again.”26  
As is clear from the table above, the number of Armenians in Syria dramatically 
increased as a result of the genocide. It also demonstrates that, with the exception of Aleppo and 
Latakia, most of the Armenian communities in Syria formed as direct consequences of the 
genocide. Thus, it is important to address this historical event to understand how the memory of 
the genocide impacted Syrian-Armenian activity and sense of identity within Syria across the 
span of the last 100 years.  
The first way in which the memory of the genocide had a direct impact on Syrian-
Armenian life was in promoting reconstruction and rejecting assimilation. As refugees, the 
“Armenians worked hard to reconstruct and keep alive an Armenian world in exile… Armenian 																																																								25	Ibid.,	24.	26	“Rerooted.”(Interview	with	Adelina	Keheian)	
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politics focused mostly on the interests and problems of the Armenian people, both at the level of 
the Syrian-Armenian community and at the wider, international level.”27 Armenians built 
churches, opened new schools, managed their own political parties amongst themselves and 
within the greater diaspora, and even began to disseminate information by creating printing 
presses, publishing periodicals, and preserving culture through theatre. The Armenian refugees 
displaced to Syria after the genocide “had initially no title and no ambition to get involved in 
public affairs in the post-Ottoman Levant. They remained a foreign, temporarily hosted 
community at the margin of society,”28 and this did not pose any problems for them. As seen in 
the table below, schools were one of the institutions, among others, they instilled relatively easily 
and expansively. 
Table 2:29 Armenian schools and students in Armenian schools in Syria, 1929  
 
 
Preservation of Armenian identity was very strong in Syria. One of Rerooted’s narrators 
who wished to be called, Artsakh, a 56-year-old woman from Aleppo, says:  																																																								27	Nicola Migliorino, “‘Kulna Suriyyin’ ? The Armenian Community and the State in Contemporary Syria,” Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de 
La Méditerranée, no. 115–116 (December 31, 2006), 6. https://doi.org/10.4000/remmm.3020.	28	Migliorino,	(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,	71.	29	There	are	36	more	schools	on	this	list,	which	you	can	find	on	page	72	of	Migliorino’s	book	cited	above.	
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“Sultan Abdul Hamid said there will only be enough Armenians to put in museums…. We 
proved that wrong by prospering...and preserving our Armenian letters and creating 
schools. Wherever Armenians went they started schools, and those schools are the 
reasons Armenians preserved and protected their language, culture, nation, and 
beliefs.”30 
As can be inferred from the above quote and tables, “among the traits of Armenian 
politics that had appeared from the early days of the diaspora was a strong predominance of 
Armenian, communal and national concerns over Syrian concerns.”31 This predominance of 
Armenian concerns over Syrian concerns could potentially stem from the ongoing repression of 
denial being the “unacknowledged victims of the Turkish nationalist venture” and the desire to 
change that. Memories of the genocide generate “politically conformist discourse among the 
Syrian-Armenian establishment and community at large,” and ultimately, it has been argued that 
in the Syrian-Armenian memory, “1915 is seen as a decisive event, a violent ending, but also as a 
new beginning, and a new period of struggle in a hostile and foreign setting.”32 It is common that 
in a dramatically different environment, where locals speak a different language, refugees tend to 
rely on each other to “look for, or try to reproduce, the traditional communal procedures in 
dealing with crisis. As part of this, the refugees regard dispersion as a threat to their security and 
prefer to remain concentrated.”33 So while the genocide and denial play a large role in these 
sentiments, it is important to note that they are also common effects of being a refugee. This 
strong non-assimilatory, communal solidarity is encapsulated in one narrator’s reflection on his 
childhood:  
“In my childhood years, we never interacted with Arabs. Why? Because all the 
Armenians were living at the same place. Everything was Armenian, the shopkeeper, the 
baker, the cobbler, the tailor. We did not need anything else. Armenians were living 
collectively, with each other...At the school, when the Arab teacher used to come and say, 																																																								30	“Rerooted.”	(interview	with	Artsakh)	31	Migliorino,	(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,	96.	32	Seda	Altug,	“Syrian-Armenian	Memory	and	the	Refugee	Issue	in	Syria	under	the	French	Mandate	(1921–46),”	The	Armenian	Weekly,	July	5,	2012:	2.	http://armenianweekly.com/2012/07/05/syrian-armenian-memory-and-the-refugee-issue-in-syria-under-the-french-mandate-1921-46/.	33	Migliorino,	(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,	46.	
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"This is an Arabic Country." We didn't understand, what does it mean? What is that 
‘Arabic country?’”34  
 
As is demonstrated by Dr.Toronian’s quote, Armenian religious and communal 
institutions continued to rule autonomously in Syria, and this was largely thanks to the leniency 
of the French Mandate in Syria. The mandate allowed for the preservation of Armenian religion 
and culture, and ultimately gave the Armenians space to rebuild their communities in the wake of 
dramatic loss. Although the French mandate did not reduce religious institutions to entities 
completely separated from the state, it did secularize the state by not adopting an official national 
religion. In introducing the modern, secular, nation-state to Syria, the French essentially 
facilitated the creation of the notion of “minorities,” and with that, came protections, but not for 
the sake of preserving diversity, but rather, as a manipulation of political interests. This setting 
will be the focus of the next section to help foster a better understanding of conditions for 
Armenians in Syria throughout the last century, as well as a foundation for comprehending how 
and why protecting the rights of minorities in Syria is such a critical necessity in achieving 
“justice” for Armenians in Syria today.   
c. The Birth of the Concept of the “Minority” in the Levant 
It is commonly believed that the emergence of minorities in the Levant came with the 
creation of the modern nation-state. As White suggests, “the nation state form creates the 
objective conditions in which people begin to consider themselves as majorities and minorities; 
however, these remain subjective categories.”35 Interesting though is that the common 
conception of what it means to be a minority still did not exist as late as 1914. In its modern 
sense, minorities are “a group distinguished by common ties of descent, physical appearance, 
language, culture or religion, in virtue of which they feel or are regarded as different from the 																																																								34	“Rerooted.”	(Interview	with	Dr.	Toros	Toronian,	a	93-year-old	from	Aleppo)	35	Benjamin	Thomas	White,	Emergence	of	Minorities	in	the	Middle	East	(Edinburgh	University	Press,	2012):	1.	
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majority of the population in a society – a distinction usually understood to have political 
significance.”36 This political significance is critical to understanding the impact that being a 
minority had on Armenians in Syria throughout the last century.  
 The mass influx of Armenians escaping Ottoman Turkey happened concurrently with, 
(and greatly contributed to), the birth of the concept of minority in the Levant. As minorities 
became a political tool, the Armenians vacillated between being an important group and an 
unimportant one. Starting in the French mandatory period, the Armenians were used for 
religious, economic, and strategic reasons to further French goals of controlling Syria through 
the mandate.37 Then, once the French left, new Syrian leaders recognized that if they wanted a 
successful development of Arab nationalism, they could not solely rely on one group for their 
support, rather, they had to cut across cleavages of religion, language, and ethnicity that 
comprised both majority and minority communities in Syria. As White explains, “a numerical 
majority of the inhabitants of the new state were Sunni Muslims, but that majority was divided 
by language; a numerical majority were Arabic-speakers, but that majority was divided by 
religion. Sunni Muslim Arabic-speakers – sharing both language and religion – were a numerical 
majority, but a much smaller one.”38  Thus, it became clear that nationalism would need to 
appeal beyond this group to achieve a solid base in Syrian society. As the state claimed to 
represent the population, they also created the objective conditions within which Syrians could 
see the demarcations of majorities and minorities in their communities. However, how these 
groups were defined, and what political implications were drawn from their definition, remained 
subjective, and this, arguably, was (and is) the greatest danger for the Armenians. The fact that 
their status was malleable, and their worth to the larger society subjective, meant that they had no 																																																								36	Ibid.	21	37	Daniel	Neep,	Occupying	Syria	under	the	French	Mandate:	Insurgency,	Space	and	State	Formation,	vol.	38	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2012):	27.	38	Ibid.	1	
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guarantees, and thus were subject to the consequences of sudden policy and regime changes. 
This has direct implications for their perspectives on post-conflict Syria today and will be 
discussed in greater depth in section six. 
d. Armenians in Syria and Attitudes towards them: Changing policies 
 
While the predominance of Armenian concerns over Syrian ones was tolerated during the 
French mandate period, as nationalist Syrian elite took control of the government in the mid 
1940s, the narrative shifted and the perceived predominance of Armenian concerns gave rise to 
recurrent accusations of “non-commitment insincerity, if not disloyalty, from sectors of the 
Syrian political spectrum.”39 The first two decades of Syrian independence after the French 
departure were the hardest for the Armenians, as ethno-cultural diversity, language, religion, 
class, and ideology all served as barriers to political integration and thus to participation in policy 
making.  The emerging discourse was largely Pan-Arabist, while the experiences lived, and 
memories of, the genocide were still intricately tied to Syrian-Armenian action and discourse. 
This is an essential lens for understanding Armenian life in Syria over the last century, because 
their resistance to decades of national ethno-cultural policy and success in avoiding attempts at 
assimilation or the erasure of cultural diversity through policies of Pan-Arabism, was due in 
large part to their need for preserving whatever elements they could of their cultural, ethnic, and 
religious identities, all of which were almost eradicated by the Ottomans just some years before 
these policies. In this section I will outline the repressive policies towards the Armenians and 
other minority groups throughout the different governmental regimes in Syria and explain how 
this history contributed to the current political situation in which Armenians are generally 
regarded as a marginal, trusted, Christian minority of the Assad regime.  
																																																								39	Ibid.	93	
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During the French mandate period, religious minorities felt very protected.  In Aleppo, 
the Syrian city with the largest immigrant population, Christians made up 35% of the population. 
It became increasingly clear that the French were using the minority groups to their advantage to 
remain in power. For example, many Muslims felt that in the 1926 elections the French used 
Armenians to “counter the nationalist vote and gave them two representatives in elections even 
though their population was not sufficient for one.”40 For many, it seemed that minority 
communities, like the Armenians, were willingly collaborating with the French, and this caused 
anti-Armenian sentiments to grow.  These sentiments intensified when many Muslims began to 
accuse the government of purposefully forcing more Christians into the vote by giving the 
Armenians citizenship in 1924/5. Then, in an anti-French uprising Armenian-French soldiers 
fought against the Syrian anti-French rebels, and this demonstrated to many the Armenians’ 
“proven unfaithfulness [by] fighting against those in whose lands they are camping.”41 This 
furthered the notion that Armenians were not a true part of the society, and that this was not their 
home, which ultimately would harm the efforts of pan-Arabism and contribute to the willingness 
of the Armenians to accept whichever government did welcome and include them. The 
implications of this can be seen today in the Armenians’ general allegiance to the Assad regime.  
Among Syrian Arab nationalists the ‘refugee problem’ was a hotly debated issue since its 
rise in Syria. It was as much a political issue as it was a social and economic problem. In Syria, 
the flow of refugees into the region spanned the 1920s, yet since it lacked consent from local 
Syrians, “it evoked a lack of agency because of a sovereignty deficit in the Syrian national 
self.”42 This explanation of why refugee groups might have been seen as problematic is in line 
with Agamben’s notions that “the refugee unhinges the old trinity of state-nation-																																																								40	Altug,	“Syrian-Armenian	Memory	and	the	Refugee	Issue	in	Syria	under	the	French	Mandate	(1921–46):”	4.		41 Ibid.  42	Ibid.	3	
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territory…[and] that…brings a radical crisis to the principles of the nation-state.”43 That this 
happened in Syria is demonstrated by accounts indicating that a new influx of refugees “caused 
extreme alarm and anxiety among the Arab nationalists, [and this was] expressed in a new 
framework of: harmful strangers vs. outraged Syrians.”44 The Armenians attempted to reassure 
the Syrian Arab nationalists that they would not attempt to found an Armenian state in Syria, 
claiming “we only have one homeland; that is Armenia.”45  However, despite these efforts, their 
minority status still conjured images of political dissidents among Arab Syrian nationalists who 
denied the diversity of other cultures and ethnicities in stating that “the ex-refugees of the 1920’s 
have integrated and become like us, thus they should not be asking for special treatment.”46 This 
persistent negative perception of refugees led to further discriminatory and oppressive policies 
towards minorities and thus to “a retreat of Armenian society to themselves and out of the public 
realm of Syria.”47 This uninvolved/uninterested sentiment was echoed by many Syrian-
Armenian respondents who explained in interviews that they do not follow Syrian politics too 
much, they do not speak Arabic too well, and that the majority of their extracurricular activities, 
friends, and focuses in Syria were Armenian.48 This can stem from their identity as refugees who 
were not truly in their proper homes, but it was also surely exacerbated by the restriction of 
communal autonomy of the Armenians in the 1950s and 60s under the authoritarian regimes, 
which damaged the Armenian ability to preserve their culture.   
 
 
																																																								43	Giorgio	Agamben,	“Beyond	Human	Rights,”	Journal,	No.	L	1	(1943):	77.	44	Altug,	“Syrian-Armenian	Memory	and	the	Refugee	Issue	in	Syria	under	the	French	Mandate	(1921–46):	4”	45 Ibid. 5 46 Ibid, 5.  47	Migliorino,	“‘Kulna	Suriyyin’ ?,”	6	48	Rerooted.	
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Table 3:49 Names of five Armenian schools in Aleppo before and after 1965 
 
 




From 1946 until 1967 the appearance of Arabism as one of the components of Syrian 
identity affected much of the way the Armenian community functioned. As seen above in tables 																																																								49	Migliorino,	(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,.	50	Migliorino.	
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3 and 4, during this time frame, Armenians had to change the names of many of their cultural 
and religious institutions to Arabic titles, they suffered the shutdown of their media and news 
sources, they were unable, or severely limited, to teach Armenian language and history in 
schools and instead were mandated to teach the official history distributed by the Syrian 
government, many of their cultural icons fled to Lebanon, and they were stripped of their 
representation in the political sphere.51 As a result of the problematic relations between the state 
and minorities, the neutral ideology of “we are all Syrians”52 was adopted. Armenians were 
made to de-emphasize their cultural distinctiveness, yet they found ways to maintain and 
continue what elements they could privately. However, this suppression of diversity undeniably 
diminished their ability to preserve Armenian identity. As one Armenian teacher from Syria puts 
it, “the old generation used to think in Armenian; the new generations think in Arabic and write 
in Armenian.”53  
After the authoritarian regimes, the Assad regime, like the French who had used the 
Armenians for political gain (often with their willing participation), used them again, capitalizing 
on their restricted situation and offering them a relaxation of such restrictions in return for their 
implicit promise to be a politically trustworthy community that supported his regime. This tacit 
agreement lifted the previous oppressive policies against minorities and allowed for “the 
recovery of Armenian communal autonomy and a restoral of Armenian institutions to their full, 
flourishing, capacities.”54 This sentiment is echoed by Ani Avakian, a 51-year-old Armenian 
teacher from Aleppo who explains the importance of Armenian education in Syria and being 
																																																								51	Migliorino,	6.		52	Ibid.	53	Ibid,	12.		54	Ibid.	
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allowed the freedom to discuss Armenian cultural topics, something that wasn’t as possible 
during her childhood in Syria.  
“Armenian education in the Diaspora has a big responsibility. You should not only teach 
Armenian reading and writing or grammar and literature. You have to familiarize them 
[students] with the nation’s values and the nation’s individuals who display them, so that 
they can feel proud and grounded...If the teacher can dive into cultural topics, especially 
because our culture is so beautiful, then you can make the classes more interesting and 
make the students more connected to the subject. I tried to do that as an Armenian 
teacher for 10 years.”55 
 
Ms.Avakian’s ability to infuse Armenian culture into the curriculum was largely a result of the 
tacit agreement with the Assad regime. Unfortunately however, the tacit agreement that has 
protected Armenian values has also created a dangerous situation in the conflict today. Aleppo is 
known as “Haleb Al-Assad,” or, “Assad’s Aleppo,” and the protection the Armenians received 
for being a minority group has now indirectly led the regions in which they live to be targets of 
opposition violence in Syria. This background will help guide an understanding of what has 
shaped the attitudes of Syrian-Armenians toward TJ in Syria, as one cannot understand the 
present without looking at the past.  
e. Syrian-Armenians and the Syrian conflict today: 
While it is difficult to conceptually divide the Syrian-Armenian experience in the conflict 
today from the Syrian experience in general, as they are so intertwined, it is possible to expand 
upon the physical destruction done to particular Armenian communities, thereby damaging their 
institutions and ultimately, the strength of their communities.  Due to the fact that documentation 
efforts are still ongoing for all aspects of the Syrian conflict, what follows is by no means a 
comprehensive account of all that the community has experienced. However, what it aims to 
																																																								55	Rerooted	
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show is how “the devastation of the war in Syria has shattered the fabric of community life,” and 
how this has particularly been true for the Armenians.56    
Until the beginning of the conflict in Syria, the number of Syrian-Armenians in Syria was 
estimated to be between 70,000 - 100,000 Armenians.57 As of 2018, according to Armenia’s 
Ministry of Diaspora, approximately 25,000 Syrian-Armenians have moved to Armenia, with 
about 3,000 leaving for other destinations, or returning to Syria.58 Other estimates, for example 
from the UNHCR office in Armenia, maintain there are approximately 15,000 Syrian-Armenians 
left in Armenia, also as of 2018.59 Estimates for Syrian-Armenians seeking refuge in countries 
besides Armenia are less comprehensive than those within Armenia, however, as of 2015 it was 
estimated that about 25,000 Syrian-Armenians had left for Jordan, Lebanon, and other western 
states.60 In the past four years that number has risen, and although the estimates of the number of 
Syrian-Armenians currently remaining in Syria vary greatly, they are somewhere between 
15,000-30,000. The most conservative estimate using the figures above would amount to 40,000 
Syrian-Armenians at the very least who have left their homes and communities behind to start 
new lives in new countries with new languages, cultures, and many other obstacles, (though most 
estimates surpass this, claiming that between 50-70,000 Syrian-Armenians have fled Syria).61 
Effectively, more than half of the population has been dispersed which many perceive as a threat 
to their history and traditions.62 This can be tangibly seen in the physical destruction endured.  
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The Armenian community, throughout Syria, was undoubtedly harmed in the conflict.63 
Armenians were targeted by extremist groups like the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, who 
kidnapped and murdered Armenian community members.64 One NGO in Armenia, the Aleppo 
Compatriotic Charitable Organization (Aleppo NGO), has kept a record of the Syrian-Armenians 
who have been in direct contact with their office, typically for aid in resettling in Armenia. While 
not at all comprehensive, their records document that between 2011 and 2016, 148 Syrian-
Armenians were killed, and 38 Syrian-Armenians were kidnapped or detained.65  
The Islamic State also destroyed important Armenian sites across Syria, perhaps most 
notably the Chapel and Monument to the Victims of the Armenian Genocide at Der Zor.66 In 
2014 it was destroyed,67 in 2016 the area was liberated by the Syrian armed forces,68 and most 
recently in 2019, President Assad promised to rebuild the church.69 However, besides the 
Armenian Catholic Church of the 40 Martyrs which was destroyed in 2015,70 but which was 
recently restored and held its first mass in April 2019, the majority of Armenian churches have 
not yet seen such support, and remains destroyed. Of Aleppo’s 17 Armenian churches, only 
seven survived the war – the others were destroyed or burnt down. More specifically, it is known 
that the St.Rita Tilel Armenian Church in Aleppo was bombed by ISIS, and the Armenian 
Church of the Holy Cross in Tal Abyad was torched by ISIS as well.71 In the Armenian 
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Evangelical church in Kessab, “fire destroyed the library, floor tiles were smashed, and the pews 
and cushions all incinerated.”72 It should be noted though that this is a non-exhaustive list of the 
churches affected. 
Armenian communities in cities like Aleppo were also decimated by shelling that turned 
tight communities of homes, churches, and schools, to rubble.73 (See image A below of one 
Rerooted narrator’s apartment in Aleppo).74 Armenian residential areas, cemeteries, shops and 
factories were damaged and looted.75 Armenian education has also been affected across the 
country, “11 Armenian schools were destroyed, among them the Karen Jeppe secondary school 
in Aleppo...which before the war had 1,300 students; now there are only 300.”76 
 
Image A:   
As this section was meant to demonstrate, the Armenians in Syria have seen many of the 
institutions that have held them together over the past century deteriorate and grow weaker. As 
preservation of Armenian identity in Syria was, and is, a necessary component of Armenian 
longevity in Syria, it is clear that the devastation suffered by Armenian institutions and the 
community in Syria will play a major role in the individual’s calculations of whether or not to 																																																								72	“Syria	Video	Dispatch:	Kessab	Churches	Burned	and	Graves	Destroyed,”	January	4,	2015,	https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11324061/Syria-video-dispatch-Kessab-churches-burned-and-graves-destroyed.html.	73 Ibid. 74	Rerooted	75	“70,000	Syrian	Armenians	Have	Fled	during	the	War,	and	Few	Will	Return.”	76	ibid.	
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return to a post-conflict Syria. Another factor that will weigh heavily in such calculations is the 
notion of Armenia being the “homeland.” As the population of Syrians in this study are currently 
residing in Armenia, their views on what would be necessary to facilitate their return to Syria 
may be very different from what other Syrian-Armenians feel who fled to countries other than 
Armenia. The reasons for this will be explored in the following section, however, it likely has to 
do with the notion of Armenia feeling like a second (or for some, first) home, while other 
countries do not have that significance for Armenian refugees from Syria. Another potential 
reason that perspectives might differ is because “the Armenian government grants citizenship 
and employment rights to Syrian refugees who can prove their Armenian lineage,”77 whereas in 
other destination host countries they are granted refugee or temporary residency status. 
 It seems that Armenia has made the greatest effort to welcome Syrian-Armenians (likely due 
to their shard ethnicity) and this often allows a greater connection to the land and a desire to stay. 
Armenia has welcomed a greater number of Syrian-Armenians than any other country, and they 
have established programs that help Syrian-Armenian refugees integrate.78 In response to the 
influx of Syrian-Armenian refugees to Armenia, the Armenian diaspora alongside the Armenian 
government “set up various non-profits to provide everything from food to vocational training. 
Next, Syrian children were allowed to join Armenia’s public schools and the ministry of diaspora 
set up a fast-track system so refugees could apply for nationality.” 79 The Armenian government 
grants Syrian-Armenians citizenship, there is a handbook for frequently asked legal questions for 
Syrian-Armenians produced by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,80 and the Syrian-
Armenians are seen as “an opportunity to reduce migratory deficit and generate jobs,” which is 																																																								77	Dorian	Geiger,	“The	Syrian-Armenian	‘Refugee’	Jewellers	of	Yerevan,”	accessed	May	7,	2019,	https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/syrian-armenian-refugee-jewellers-yerevan-190206080955913.html.	78	“This	Country	Doesn’t	Want	Its	Syrian	Refugees	to	Leave.”	79	ibid.	80	“Handbook	Of	Frequently	Asked	Legal	Questions	For	Syrian-Armenian,”	accessed	May	7,	2019,	https://www.mfa.am/en/handbook-of-frequently-asked-legal-questions-for-for-syrian-armenian/.	
25		
contrary to how Lebanon and Jordan have often referred to their refugees, which is as “economic 
burdens.” 81  While a comparative analysis is not presently possible as I did not interview Syrian-
Armenians in countries other than Armenia for this study, the notion of the dual-homeland offers 
yet another factor to consider in the assessment of Syrian-Armenian attitudes towards redress 
and justice in post-conflict Syria. 
f. Two Homes  
“Armenia is like your father, who gave you your name. And Syria is like your mother who took 
care of you for years.” - Sevan Torosian, 40, Aleppo  
 
The existence of Armenians in Syria depended at all times on their ability to preserve 
their Armenian identity—to be allowed to freely be both Syrian and Armenian. At least from the 
last great influx of Armenians during the genocide to the present day, creating and maintaining 
institutions that would preserve Armenian identity was a priority and a constant concern for 
Syrian-Armenian communities. Syria was a temporary home where they could be Armenian, but 
nevertheless, still a home. Interestingly, some scholars maintain that the notion of a temporary 
home came with the confident belief that the Armenians would soon return to their historic 
homelands. Sanjian writes, “The élite saw the condition of exile as temporary and expressed 
confidence that it would ultimately end with a return en masse to the liberated homeland in 
Eastern Turkey under future, more favourable, political conditions.”82 As the Armenian 
institutions in Syria were the ones preserving the Armenian communities (either forever or just 
until it was “their time” to go back) it is understandable then that the main source of indignation 
for many Armenians were the oppressive restrictions on these institutions. Migliorino posits that 
this focus is due to the fact that institutions like Armenian political parties “connect the 
community internally and with the external, transnational Armenian world, providing for some 																																																								81	“This	Country	Doesn’t	Want	Its	Syrian	Refugees	to	Leave.”	82	Ara	Sanjian,	“The	Armenian	Minority	Experience	in	the	Modern	Arab	World,”	Bulletin	of	the	Royal	Institute	for	Inter-Faith	Studies	3,	no.	1	(2001):	149–179.	
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of its needs. By the continuing sense of affiliation, it refers to the feeling of belonging to an 
Armenian cultural sub-world.”83 Armenians were allowed to live in both worlds when there was 
not a repressive government, and this can help explain their favorable dispositions toward the Al-
Assad regime, beginning in the 1970s.  
Starting with Hafez Al-Assad and continuing with current President Bashar Al-Assad, the 
regime maintained a policy of communal solidarity instituting a liberal interpretation of the 
restrictive rules. Liberties were granted, such as blurring the distinction between weekly periods 
dedicated to religion and Armenian language, unrestricted exposure to Armenian music and 
culture, and non-intrusive, tolerant, principals who oversaw the schools. This involvement of the 
Armenians in wider diaspora activities in addition to their freedoms within their own 
communities was arguably the most the regime could allow “without undermining [its] main, 
formal, legitimizing political discourse.”84 Required to follow nationalist curriculums, while also 
allowed to maintain elements of Armenian culture, the Syrian-Armenian community created 
many ways to survive, and thrive, at this intersection. Some tangible representations of this dual 
identity could be seen in Armenian schools. For example, while Syrian symbols like flags are 
necessary, Armenian symbols are tolerated as well. In one Armenian classroom, a portrait of 
Assad hung next to Tigran the Great (a first century Armenian king).85 Another example is that 
at school performances, students sing both the Syrian and Armenian national anthems.86 
Impressionistic and anecdotal material collected through my interviews suggests that striking this 
balance was essential for the Syrian-Armenians while they were in Syria, but also as a condition 
for return today. Different people seemed satisfied with varying levels of striking this balance, 
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and this affected whether or not they felt that Syria was a true home for them, which in turn 
affected their level of desire to return.  
For those who did feel a satisfactory balance was struck, Syria tended to feel more like 
home. Many of these people stated that they were happy to live a publicly Syrian life but a 
privately Armenian one because of the gratitude they felt towards Syria. As Migliorino explains, 
for many years, “the approach of the Armenian nationalist parties towards Syria was generally 
one of sincere loyalty, combining a sense of gratitude towards the countries and peoples which 
had in some way provided a new home to the Armenians and an interest of maintaining a system 
of institutions that offered a number of advantages for Armenian communal life.”87  As the quote 
above demonstrates, people felt that Syria was a home for them, while still maintaining 
allegiance and loyalty to Armenia. The quote at the beginning of this section, in which Sevan 
calls Syria a “mother” who cared for and raised her, as well as the quote below, seem to suggest 
that the loyalty and love for Syria that many Armenians hold stem from Syria’s past care and 
protection of the Armenians. These people seemed to be more interested in justice in post-
conflict Syria, mentioning that it was still a home for them, a home that took care of them 100 
years ago that they now need to preserve a century later. For many, like Vicky, whose quote is 
below, considering Armenia a homeland did not detract from the allegiance they felt to Aleppo. 
“For me I feel like I have come back to our homeland, although I miss Aleppo a lot. Not 
Syria because Syria is just a country to me. Aleppo is my birthplace and I miss it a lot...At 
the beginning I didn’t feel like Yerevan was home. But when I went out of Yerevan and 
came back, I knew that this is home too. Now I have two homes, Aleppo and Yerevan.”88 
Vicky Masrie, 25, Aleppo 
 
However, not everyone felt this way and for many other interviewees in this study, the 
idea that they were “home” in Armenia had a visible effect on many of their responses for what a 
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post-conflict Syria could or should look like. For many, this lead to detached suggestions for 
rebuilding Syrian society because they either, a) never felt that Syria was fully their homeland to 
begin with, or felt that they didn’t fully belong, or b) they do not anticipate returning because 
they feel there is nothing left for them there and are living fulfilled, communal lives in Armenia. 
These results will be expanded upon in section six, however, here it is important to briefly 
discuss the concept of “exilic nationalism” and how it affected Syrian-Armenian identity. While 
the Armenians have participated in the nationalist agenda of Syria, “these experiences have not 
eroded the strong communal solidarity that binds them.”89 In fact, there were at least two times 
in the past century which encouraged a “phase of resurgence of Armenian nationalism”90 and 
“contributed to the reshaping of their contemporary Syrian-Armenian identities.”91  
The first event was in 1965 when Soviet Armenia, on the 50th anniversary of the start of 
the Armenian genocide, allowed the first authorized public commemoration of the genocide. 
They also subsequently allowed the construction of the Tsitsernakaberd genocide memorial, and 
a monument commemorating the significant 1918 battle of Sardarabad that stopped Ottoman 
advances into Eastern Armenia.92 This signaled to Armenians in the diaspora that Armenia had 
not been entirely consumed by Soviet nationalism and it allowed for new levels of engagement 
between Armenia and the diaspora. It marked a strong turning point for many in the Armenian 
diaspora community in Syria in that they “began   to be regarded as parts of a permanent 
diasporic Armenian transnation, rather than splinters of a nation in exile.”93 This prospect of a 
permanent diaspora community in Syria was undoubtedly strengthened by the fact that the Assad 
regime that came to power five years later allowed for Armenian engagement in transnational 
																																																								89	Migliorino,	(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria.,	190	90	Ibid.,	149	91	Ibid.,	181	92	Ibid.,	149	93	ibid.,	149	
29		
diasporan networks. The favorable policies towards the Armenians from the Assad regime that 
began on the heels of decades of repression helped the Armenians in Syria feel that they truly 
could live at this intersection of being Syrian and Armenian. Assad’s policy of “Kulna 
Suriyyn,”94 (we are all Syrian) strengthened their allegiance to their Syrian identity (by removing 
it from the more restrictive pan-Arab ideology) and also allowed them to engage in these new 
spheres where transnational Armenian activity was newly occurring.  However, the next event 
gave Armenians in Syria a chance to see what life would be like from within Armenia, and this 
contributed to the shift toward feelings of exilic nationalism.  
This second event was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the independence of 
the Republic of Armenia, and also raised the question of Karabakh and its independence.95 These 
events led to the availability of TV broadcast from Armenia, created more inviting circumstances 
for diasporans to visit, and increased the level of diasporan engagement with, and a desire for, 
being involved in the development of the country. There was a renewed connection with the 
Armenian world outside Syria and it seemed that for the first time, Armenians felt they had a 
home they could “go back to.”96 This notion that Syrian-Armenians were members of a nation in 
exile has surfaced in a number of Rerooted interviews, as well as surveys for this research, and I 
think it is perhaps one of the strongest reasons for why many of those who believe they are “back 
home” in Armenia did not fully engage with the questions regarding repair or justice for a post-
conflict Syria. One of the responses that captures this sentiment is the following:  
“If it was Armenia instead of Syria, I maybe wouldn’t have left. But Syria does not belong 




While many chose not to fully engage with these questions because they did not anticipate 
returning to Syria since they were now “home,” others chose not to engage deeply for another 
reason. These people did not feel their responses were worthy of being counted as ‘Syrian’ or 
representative of what ‘Syrians’ might want. One respondent says:  
 “There cannot be justice, at least not for us—it is not our country, we were refugees 
there and we are refugees here, we’ve just gone from being one refugee to another, this is 
not our justice to attain.” - March 2019 interviewee, 24 years old 
 
This was one of the most interesting type of responses because most of the people 
expressing this sentiment were born in Syria, as were their parents, and they lived their whole 
lives in Syrian communities. Yet, the fact that they still feel removed from this society and thus 
undeserving of something like justice for abuses of war crimes that have affected them and their 
families, is striking. What does that say about ideas of rootedness and identity and how those 
perceptions impact the rights we believe one deserves? Aside from notions of rootedness, this 
kind of response toward justice might also be explained by the belief that Armenians were not 
truly victimized in this conflict. From table three of annex C, it is evident that the majority of 
informants believed that themselves, their family, and/or, the Armenians of Syria had been 
victimized during the conflict in Syria. However, upon elaboration, the common understanding 
of being “victimized” within the Syrian conflict largely had to do with having to relocate. Many 
expressed they felt they, and the Armenians at large, did not really suffer (“at least not to the 
same extent as others did or as their ancestors did in the genocide”97) in this conflict, and thus 
that influenced their perceptions of adequate redress and justice in post-conflict Syria. This can 
be seen in the quote below: 
“The Armenians suffered the least. Justice should not be different for them than for other 
groups in Syria just because they are minorities. We can add that Syria was not our pure 
home as much as it was for the Syrian people, so I think it was easier for us to just 																																																								97	Rerooted	
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abandon our homes, but it wasn’t as easy for the Syrians, the Arabs, the Kurds…” - 
March 2019 Interviewee, 23 years old   
 
While the idea of Syria being home could provoke nostalgia and a sense of gratitude and desire 
for justice in Syria, it is evident that the notion of Syria being “home” was rejected by many and 




IV. Theoretical Framework 2: Transitional Justice99 
Foundational Literature on Transitional Justice: 
In order to understand what kind of transitional justice mechanisms could be feasible in 
Syria, or desired by the Syrian-Armenian community, it is important to comprehend what the 
goals of transitional justice are, what mechanisms currently exist for attaining it, and its 
weaknesses and areas for improvement. This is also critical for understanding the efforts studied 
or carried out thus far for transitional justice regarding the Armenian Genocide.  
There are different definitions of Transitional Justice (TJ) however scholars mostly agree 
that transitional justice refers to “measures that are implemented in order to redress the legacies 
of massive serious crimes under international law.”100 Neil Kritz argues that the four basic 
objectives of any TJ program are: “(1) Determining the truth by establishing a record of human 
rights abuses, (2) Obtaining justice, (3) Ensuring meaningful democratic reform, entrenchment of 
the rule of law within society, and building a society with institutions that ensure that the kinds 
of abuses being dealt with will not recur, and lastly, (4) Achieving durable peace with assurance 
that a return to violence is fairly unlikely.”101 He argues that these are the standards by which all 
TJ policies should be evaluated. This study has used these goals as a baseline and has attempted 
to determine whether or not they are reflected on the ground when members of the Syrian-
Armenian community are asked what they feel the goals or end-outcomes of justice and redress 
should be in Syria. It has also attempted to distinguish which mechanisms are preferred. 
There is a multiplicity of theories and proposals for transitional justice mechanisms, however 
the literature mostly agrees on certain central categories. Typically, TJ mechanisms seek to 
																																																								99 It is important to note that although I am referencing the transitional justice literature in this section, it is difficult to know if this will be the 
outcome for Syria post-conflict because it is possible there is no governmental or official transition. For that reason throughout this piece I have 
been using the term “justice” instead of “transitional justice.”   100	Pablo	De	Greiff,	“Transitional	Justice	and	Development,”	2013,	p.	67.	101	Merwe,	Baxter,	and	Chapman,	Assessing	the	Impact	of	Transitional	Justice,	p.	48.	
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promote reconciliation, which can be done using methods such as public education, community 
level initiatives, use of rituals, development of new symbols and images, and recommendations 
for future activities, typically influenced by the attitudes of perpetrators and beneficiaries.102 The 
two main debates in this sphere regard the difference between peace and justice, and similarly, 
between restorative and retributive justice. Mechanisms such as national criminal procedures and 
the creation of international tribunals feed a more retributive sense of justice; however, the 
search for truth and for peaceful co-habitation of previously conflicting groups prescribes a need 
for mechanisms like truth commissions (see section seven for the Syrian-Armenian context). The 
give and take between goals of peace and justice is reflected in the decision of which TJ 
mechanisms to use. The debate is by no means settled nor will it be settled by this study. While 
some scholars point to the importance of restorative justice, which concentrates on the “healing 
of the victims and the rehabilitation of the perpetrators, [where] the aim is not to punish but to 
repair crimes and ultimately to reconcile victims and perpetrators,” those same scholars admit 
that, “contrary to the idea that trials are centered on perpetrators only, experience shows that 
most of the time, victims of war crimes strive for justice in its retributive sense: this speaks in 
favor of the symbolic importance of trials.”103 The survey in this study included options for both 
types of justice using different mechanisms; while there was no conclusive evidence that one was 
preferred over the other, in sections six and seven I elaborate upon the mechanisms the 
participants chose most often, and their anecdotal explanations for not choosing the others. In the 
case of the Syrian-Armenians, many of these categories are relevant and, as will be discussed in 
section six, a vast range of mechanisms were selected as desired for achieving justice in both the 
Genocide and Syrian conflict cases.  																																																								102	Audrey	R.	Chapman,	“Approaches	to	Studying	Reconciliation,”	Assessing	the	Impact	of	Transitional	Justice:	Challenges	for	Empirical	
Research,	2009,	143–172,	p.	152.	103	“Justice,	Transitional,”	in	The	SAGE	Encyclopedia	of	War:	Social	Science	Perspectives,	by	Hecker	Joelle	(2455	Teller	Road,	Thousand	Oaks,	California	91320:	SAGE	Publications,	Inc.,	2017):	5,	https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483359878.n353.	
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In addition to the different goals and mechanisms of TJ, there are also different types of 
justice that result from achieving those goals. Gibson writes that the four different types of 
justice are: distributive, procedural, retributive, and restorative.104 He draws an interesting 
conclusion, suggesting that whether a person tolerated amnesty in South Africa depended in part 
on whether other forms of justice were present.105 This is important for the present study because 
certain types of justice, like retributive, are no longer feasible for the Armenian Genocide and 
this lack of accountability for those responsible for the crimes committed against their ancestors 
seem to have impacted the study participants’ attitudes towards justice in Syria, especially with 
the accountability climate that is so prevalent today. How the lack of justice for the genocide 
impacted responses in the present study will be discussed in section 6, however, back to 
Gibson’s point, this historical context is important to analyze because different types of justice 
can interact with one another to define what is desired in a post-conflict transitional justice 
situation. Since retributive justice is highly unlikely for the genocide, Armenians may only be 
able to achieve a form of “rough justice” in which they settle for whatever justice can be done, 
albeit imperfect, as opposed to allowing injustice to remain unaddressed.106 This is the case in 
many transitional justice efforts in post-atrocity societies because the repair can never be 
proportional to the harm done. As Barkan notes, “redress is always symbolic relative to the level 
of destruction and to the resources available to the country.”107 In most cases it can only ever be 
symbolic because the harm is too great to ever afford any type of satisfactory repair, thus leaving 
victims in a position to accept a ‘rough justice.’ Furthermore, any type of delayed justice is likely 
to be more symbolic than reparative because the longer justice is denied, the less likely it is to be 
																																																								104	James	L.	Gibson,	“Truth,	Justice,	and	Reconciliation:	Judging	the	Fairness	of	Amnesty	in	South	Africa,”	American	Journal	of	Political	
Science	46,	no.	3	(2002):	546.	540–56,	https://doi.org/10.2307/3088398.	105 Ibid., 547. 106	Williams,	Nagy,	and	Elster,	Transitional	Justice,	6.	107	Elazar, Barkan. Historical Justice and Memory. (University of Wisconsin Press, 2015): 8. 
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attained.108 This is due in part to some of the very real limitations like the inability to try 
perpetrators in court because they have died, or the inability to elicit first-hand testimony 
because there are no more witnesses or victims. Including questions that could reflect upon this 
scholarly literature regarding mechanisms that facilitate justice, albeit delayed, was important for 
me. Within my population it seemed for many that being denied certain types of justice 100 
years ago led them to assess justice differently in the present context, as will be described in 
section six. This finding is supported by other TJ work with populations that have gone through 
multiple conflicts without justice and where the lack of justice for the first conflict made the 
participants less demanding for justice in the second context.109 
While for some of my participants justice for the genocide was more pressing than justice for 
the conflict in Syria, others felt the opposite was true. This could be explained by Williams’ 
argument that, “the moral weight of claims for redress may fade over time, because the class of 
people harmed by an injustice eventually recovers or because more pressing claims of justice 
have since emerged.”110 Section six will present more in depth findings on this matter, analyzing 
the truth of these trends for this population. However, the answers are inconclusive. For some, 
the damage done to Syrian-Armenians during the conflict in Syria constituted more pressing 
claims for justice. The urgency of the current conflict contributed to some focusing their 
attention on the present day and not thinking as much about the genocide. For others, it reminded 
them of that past injustice, further fueling indignation.  
One last important piece of literature upon which to situate this study is that on the factors 
that affect attitudes toward transitional justice. In general, this literature suggests that there are 
three types of determinants of attitudes towards TJ: 1) individual factors, 2) socialization, and 3) 																																																								108 Ibid., 8 109	Joan	Barceló,	“The	Emotional	Underpinnings	of	Attitudes	toward	Transitional	Justice,”	Political	Studies	66,	no.	2	(2018):	480–502;	490.	110 Williams, Nagy, and Elster, Transitional Justice, 11. 
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contextual factors.111 In this study, it is across these factors that comparisons will be made and 
analyses drawn. Individual factors refer to elements such as, education level, gender, age, 
religion, ethnicity, and an ideological connection to the past regime. Elements of socialization 
refer to victimization, early politicization, and family ideology. A survey conducted by the 
Center for Sociological Investigations in Spain (CIS) included many of these factors such as 
victimization of the respondent during the Franco regime and preferences toward different forms 
of TJ. One question for example reads: “The authorities that violated human rights under the 
Franco regime should be brought to justice.”112 The respondent is then asked to select if they are 
in agreement, neutral, or in disagreement with the statement. Other questions touch on different 
aspects of transitional justice, such as memorialization, which asks, “There should be a 
monument dedicated to all the victims of the Civil War,”113 with the same answers as choices.  
The CIS survey is exemplary in that it addresses different attitudes towards transitional 
justice while also taking into account all the features of the determinants 1-3 listed above through 
background questions at the beginning of the survey. This study aims to replicate something 
similar to gauge the differences between Syrian-Armenians in their responses towards 
transitional justice in Syria and what redress might look like for them. Much of the present study, 
including the survey tool, was inspired by the CIS survey and study. The third determinant will 
be of critical importance in the context of the Armenians in that it addresses contextual factors 
such as whether a person lives in a conflict zone or not, or whether they belong to previously 
repressed identities or not. Importantly, the author notes, “whether citizens belong to previously 
repressed ethnic identities seem to play a fundamental role in predicting one’s attitudes toward 
																																																								111 Joan Barceló, “The Emotional Underpinnings of Attitudes toward Transitional Justice,” Political Studies 66, no. 2 (2018): 485. 112	“·CIS·Centro	de	Investigaciones	Sociológicas·Ficha	Del	Estudio,”	accessed	October	15,	2018,	http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=9220.		(My	translation)	113 Ibid. 
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TJ mechanisms.”114 There is further support that overall, victimization leads to support for 
reparation policies.115 This was critical for the Armenians and their attitudes towards TJ as they 
have been victims of past repression due to their ethnicity, in both Syria and the Ottoman 
Empire, and this is something that must be incorporated into any type of questioning conducted 
for this study. Ultimately, as the focus of transitional justice is the “repair of prior wrongs” which 
can be achieved through both retributive and restorative justice, 116 section six will delve into an 
analysis of the mechanisms selected by participants in an attempt to understand how support for 
certain types of justice are influenced by demographic, contextual, and social factors. 117  
Transitional Justice in Syria: 
In the early years of the conflict in Syria, many organizations, both international and 
national, focused on drafting transitional justice proposals and creating roadmaps to help lay the 
groundwork for a new Syria.118 However, this was pursued under the expectation that there 
would be a government transition in Syria after the conflict. These approaches assumed that the 
future political arrangement would not include President Assad. Now that such a governmental 
shift is an unlikely outcome of the war, scholars and activists are reorienting their efforts toward 
new goals, which makes it even more important to work with local communities so their views 
can inform the new efforts. The remainder of this section will outline some of the more 
prominent recommendations for justice in a post-conflict Syria. I will then return to these 
suggestions within my own analysis of whether the Armenian community thinks similarly. 
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) has recently produced a report 
outlining how, in the absence of any foreseeable TJ, documentation efforts can help potential 																																																								114 Barceló, “The Emotional Underpinnings of Attitudes toward Transitional Justice,” 490. 115	Paloma	Aguilar,	Laia	Balcells,	and	Hector	Cebolla-Boado,	“Determinants	of	Attitudes	Toward	Transitional	Justice:	An	Empirical	Analysis	of	the	Spanish	Case,”	Comparative	Political	Studies	-	COMP	POLIT	STUD	44	(October	9,	2011):	1397–1430,	https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011407468.	P.	1399	116 Barceló, “The Emotional Underpinnings of Attitudes toward Transitional Justice,” 153.  117 Ibid., 581.  118	“ICTJ-Briefing-Syria_Documentation-2018.pdf,”	accessed	May	7,	2019,	https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-Syria_Documentation-2018.pdf.	
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future TJ processes. The examples they provide are representative of what might be important 
indicators of “justice” in a post-conflict setting. Many of the questions in the ICTJ’s qualitative 
surveys aim to elicit opinions, which are centered on conditions for return, resettlement, and 
rebuilding of communities. This was the result of the ICTJ adapting to the reality that most 
displaced Syrians are concerned with restoring security before attaining criminal justice (which 
is similar to what my respondents felt as we will see in section six). In attempting to determine 
what security might entail, the ICTJ has focused its efforts on asking those Syrian refugees on 
the ground what a post-conflict Syria should look like, while simultaneously working to 
strengthen the roles of different accountability mechanisms at the international level. As one 
example, property issues typically came up as a critical concern for feeling safe in a post-conflict 
Syria and wanting to return. The report states, “recent studies have shown that [resolving] 
housing, land, and property issues are seen as a key condition for return among [Syrian] refugees 
in Lebanon, while civil documentation, like birth registration, could help to ensure that 
repatriation processes are easier to implement.”119 It is important for groups like the ICTJ to 
advance on initiatives like these, acting on the seeming priorities of victims. In addition to their 
own teams, they also have a range of tools at their disposal through international mechanisms to 
achieve justice and security. 
These international mechanisms include the International Criminal Court (ICC), the principle 
of universal jurisdiction, the UN’s 2011 Commission of Inquiry (COI- created to investigate all 
alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab 
Republic) and the General Assembly’s 2016 International, Impartial, and Independent 
Mechanism (IIIM) to assist in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for serious 
crimes in Syria. Their simultaneous focus on strengthening such mechanisms while broadening 																																																								119	“ICTJ-Briefing-Syria_Documentation-2018.pdf.”	
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the concept of justice for victims of human rights violations beyond criminal justice is what I 
hoped to replicate in my own study—determining what types of justice are desired and how the 
international community can work alongside civil society to deliver them.  
Other groups like Human Rights Watch (HRW) are also contributing to transitional justice 
efforts in, and for, Syria in different ways, with a large emphasis on criminal justice for Syria. 
The International Justice (IJ) division of HRW works with the regional researchers for Syria and 
takes their research to lobby government officials or diplomats to project those research findings 
into the media and highlight the recommendations that they, and others, are making to provide 
some kind of redress. This may be in the form of criminal justice, sanctions of some type, travel 
bans, arms embargoes, or something as simple as asking for a condemnation from the UN.120 
HRW pushes for particular justice solutions to address the needs and desires that are being 
documented by researchers in Syria, organizations like the ICTJ, reports from the 
aforementioned UN mechanisms, and efforts like this study. The IJ division is mostly focused on 
criminal accountability for atrocity crimes: crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, 
where the international community has agreed there must be accountability for them.121  
In an informal conversation, a member of the IJ department shared that  
“For a long time we were pressing the Security Council to give the ICC a mandate in 
Syria, but that wasn't possible because of the dynamics in the council. Russia has really 
blocked many efforts to allow scrutiny of the situation and because of that we turned our 
sights to the UN General Assembly (GA) where we pressed for the GA to establish a 
team of investigators so that at the very least there could be something in place that 
would be investigating these crimes at a criminal standard to avoid a lot of the evidence 
of the abuses being lost, memories fading, etc., and to analyze them so they could act as a 
foundation for prosecutors who may be looking into these crimes now, or for some future 
date when the political picture allows for a court to be set up.”122  
 																																																								120	International	Justice	Employee	at	Human	Rights	Watch,	Phone	Conversation,	March	27,	2019.	121	“Defining	the	Four	Mass	Atrocity	Crimes:	Global	Centre	for	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,”	accessed	May	7,	2019,	http://www.globalr2p.org/publications/688.	122	In	conversation	with	HRW	IJ	employee	March	2019	
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The same researcher I spoke with from the IJ department expressed that criminal accountability 
in Syria is important because it can yield many benefits such as restoring the dignity of victims, 
providing a channel for condemnation, and possibly deterring future violations. Such 
documentation and advocacy efforts for criminal accountability can also contribute to the 
historical record that can protect against revisionism for those who want to deny that certain 
atrocities have been committed. This effort can also include institutional reform, reparations, and 
more, all working in combination to hopefully move the society forward.  
In another informal conversation, a Syria researcher at HRW described the essential 
elements for a workable post-war Syria as follows: (1)Ensure refugees and all other displaced 
have a home to return to, (2)Reveal what happened to the disappeared, and (3)Progress on 
justice.123 In terms of the last point, the researcher says that many institutions are still intact that 
allowed crimes in Syria to happen, so structural changes to the institutions will help ensure these 
violations are not repeated. The three generalized recommendations above were created from 
consultations with Syrian society members regarding whether or not the Syrian respondents they 
interviewed wanted to return to Syria, and if so, what was stopping them. They also looked at 
what kinds of accountability efforts interviewees wanted to see, particularly for detentions and 
disappearances. This documentation also included asking if respondents have experienced some 
of the major human rights violations that have characterized the conflict, such as torture inside 
prisons, loss of a loved one, being displaced because of the violence, airstrikes, shelling, and the 
use of prohibited violence, just to name a few. This study has taken a similar approach, 
especially in trying to understand, for example, Syrian-Armenian attitudes towards criminal 
accountability (see table 10 in annex C). 
																																																								123	Phone	Conversation	with	Human	Rights	Watch	Syria	Researcher,	April	5,	2019.	
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Another in depth piece written by Radwan Ziadeh, founder of the Damascus Center for 
Human Rights, outlines many efforts towards transitional justice and recommendations for the 
new Syrian regime and the international community in the process of reparation.124 Ziadeh 
proposes general courses of action and then details five key avenues of transitional justice to 
ultimately create a comprehensive national reconciliation program that can help Syria navigate 
the post-conflict arena. The author notes that Syrians, not foreigners, should be making the key 
decisions, and this is in line with suggestions in other literature that a legitimate policy will be 
one that is “adopted with full cognizance of past human rights violations and through a body of 
democratically elected representatives, or by other means reflecting the sovereign will of the 
nation.”125 In addition to prescribing certain actions, the author describes two branches of efforts 
carried out by the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies that are dedicated to achieving 
justice and redress in post-conflict Syria.126 One is the Association for the Defense of Victims of 
the Syrian Revolution, “which will serve as the voice of justice of the conflict,” and the other is 
the National Preparatory Committee for Transitional Justice, “which will develop programs, 
perceptions, and policies necessary for the future transitional justice phase.”127 Each of these 
initiatives run by different organizations is important because they bring the voices of different 
communities into the discussion for justice and help create a more comprehensive post-conflict 
plan for redress.  
The latter branch is of particular importance in this study because by delineating the 
mechanisms of transitional justice proposed by policy makers and other officials, it allowed me 
the opportunity to present these same options to my participants on the ground to assess if their 
																																																								124	Radwan	Ziadeh,	“Transitional	Justice	and	National	Reconciliation,”	PRISM	4	(2014):	94–109,	p.98.	125	Jose	Zalaquett,	“Balancing	Ethical	Imperatives	and	Political	Constraints:	The	Dilemma	of	New	Democracies	Confronting	Past	Human	Rights	Violations,”	Hastings	LJ	43	(1991):	1431.	126 Ziadeh, 98. 127 Ibid.,98	
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preferences are in line with what is being recommended. In their broadest senses, the five general 
realms are: 1) Fact Finding and Commissions of Inquiry; 2) Filing Lawsuits; 3) Compensation; 
4) Institution Building for the Future; and 5) Memorialization.128 Since this seems to be the way 
the justice efforts for Syria have been delineated thus far in the past few years, my work uses 
these categories to add the Armenian perspective, so that their attitudes can be more readily 
incorporated into larger national and international efforts.  
Lastly, the policy suggestions and TJ efforts for Syria that explicitly distinguish between 
desired and effective redress for minority populations and for majority population are very 
important for my research. In his, Post-Assad Syria, Serwer emphasizes the attention that should 
be paid to minorities.129 Importantly, Serwer includes concern for the minorities in saying that 
the groups that provide the forces required for international aid and peacekeeping must not be the 
Arab League or Turkish troops because “they will be overwhelmingly Sunni which will not 
reassure Alewites and other Syrian minorities.”130 This is an important point that I have 
incorporated in my interviews and surveys by asking which countries (if any at all) they felt were 
responsible for contributing to the severity and duration of the conflict in Syria. I followed up 
with questions about reconstruction in Syria, asking which countries (if any) should be a part of 
the effort to help rebuild Syria after the conflict, and which countries (if any) should provide 
compensation to the victims and/or financial aid to the reconstruction process. An analysis of 
these responses can be found in section six, under theme three. Responses varied but it was 
important to gauge whether members of the Syrian-Armenian community felt similar to the 
Alawites who Serwer hypothesized might not feel reassured with the presence of certain 
international actors. Commenting on the tensions expressed, my study can add empirical weight 																																																								128	Ibid.,99	129	Daniel	Serwer,	“Post-Asad	Syria,”	Prism:	A	Journal	of	the	Center	for	Complex	Operations	3,	no.	4	(2012):	3.	130 Ibid., 10. 
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to Serwer’s call for caution, and hopefully help ensure that the mechanisms put in place for post-
conflict Syria seem fair to all.  
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 V. Methodology  
a. Research Approach and Design 
 This study was conducted using a qualitative survey instrument, supplemented with semi-
structured interviews, and in five cases, in-depth oral history interviews. The survey (included in 
appendices A and B) captured demographic information as well as attitudes toward redress, 
justice, and securing stability in Syria. Much of the literature that looks at questions regarding 
determining attitudes towards transitional justice utilize a mixed methodology which include 
survey research supplemented by in-depth oral history interviews.131  Some of my survey 
questions were inspired by examples such as Lara Nettelfield’s book regarding attitudes in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,132 and the CIS survey regarding attitudes in Spain, towards transitional 
justice in their post-conflict contexts. 133 Other survey questions, particularly related to desired 
justice for the Armenian genocide, were inspired by the 2015 Reparations Report.134 The target 
size of this study was 60 Syrian-Armenian survey participants from a population of the 
approximately 17,000 Syrian-Armenians currently living in Armenia. The questionnaire includes 
questions about factors that can affect attitudes towards redress such as, contextualization 
factors, socialization factors, and individual factors. The semi-structured interview and oral 
history supplemental section included open-ended questions expanding upon the questions in the 
survey in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the attitudes expressed by the 
participants.135 Both of these methods (the semi-structured interview and the oral history life 
interview) are very useful for the type of research in this study because they allow a person more 
flexibility in the interview, and make it more likely that the narrator can speak about what is 																																																								131 “·CIS·Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas·Ficha Del Estudio”. 132	Lara	J.	Nettelfield,	Courting	Democracy	in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2010).	133	Joan Barceló, “The Emotional Underpinnings of Attitudes toward Transitional Justice,” Political Studies 66, no. 2 (2018): 485.	134	Henry	Theriault	et	al.,	“Complete	Report	of	the	Armenian	Genocide	Reparations	Study	Group,”	Armenian	Genocide	Reparations	Study	
Group	(blog),	March	24,	2015,	http://www.armeniangenocidereparations.info/?page_id=229.	135	Alan	Bryman,	“Interviewing	in	Qualitative	Research,”	Social	Research	Methods	2	(2004):	318–44.	
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important to them, empowering them more than other forms of storytelling.136 Furthermore, the 
type of responses that this study seeks to elicit are not easily captured in a multiple choice 
selection, or a one sentence elaboration beneath their answers. Thus, the explanation provided in 
many of these supplemental interviews were critical to analysis. 
The study was carried out between March 14th and March 25th, 2019, in Yerevan, 
Armenia. The study includes survey data from 52 Syrian-Armenian participants: 23 female and 
29 male. The average age of the participants is 37 years old, but ages ranged from 19 years old to 
92 years old. 41 participants come from Aleppo and the others are from Damascus, Kessab, and 
Latakia. On average, participants had been living in Armenia for about five years, leaving Syria 
around 2012. In terms of citizenship, 25 participants had Armenian citizenship,137 48 had Syrian 
citizenship, 9 had temporary residency status, and 5 had refugee status.     
 A timeline of my progress is as follows: I first reviewed primary sources published in the 
Rerooted Archive and other testimony I was able to gather through NGOs in Armenia (such as 
Aleppo NGO) that have collected some Syrian-Armenian interviews as well. 138  Then, once I 
began my interviews, I used the snowball sampling method which entails contacting new 
participants through word of mouth, or reference, from current participants, to find new 
participants for answering my questionnaires.139 For the semi-structured interviews, and oral 
history interviews, I determined who would participate in those based on who had time for a 
longer interview process (lasting most likely from 1-2 hours). I interviewed 15 people in the 




conduct the survey), and five people for the oral history interviews in addition to the surveys, 
lasting about 4-5 hours each in total.  
b. Researcher Reflection: My Positionality   
 As the researcher is the “primary instrument for data collection and analysis,”140 it is 
important to reflect upon how my prior fieldwork, ties to the community, education, and 
background might have influenced my assumptions, reaction to answers, and potential leading of 
participants to certain responses. For two summers prior to this research, I had been involved 
with the Syrian-Armenian community in Armenia collecting individual testimonies for the 
Rerooted Archive, a project I co-founded along with Ani Schug. Many of the survey participants 
were previous narrators for the Rerooted archive. Similarly, some of those who were not 
narrators in the past, were nonetheless Syrian-Armenians I had met in the previous two summers. 
Those who were not known contacts typically had some connection to someone I had known in 
the past. Additionally, I was able to recruit participants through phone lists provided by Aleppo 
NGO. The fact that I had already had in depth contact with this community helped me access 
research sites, find participants, and build trust within our interactions. Additionally, my 
background as a young woman, a student, my concentration in human rights, and the fact that 
this study was solely conducted for my own research and not in affiliation with any other 
organization or company, greatly helped participants to view me as non-threatening and 
increased their willingness to participate, I believe. Overall, I believe the power dynamic 
between the researcher and the participants was constantly balanced, even with the presence of a 
translator, often making it two people interviewing one, which has the potential to be 




conscientiously tried to balance the power dynamic by ensuring the participants that the entire 
survey is anonymous and that it is within their discretion which questions they’d like to answer 
and how they’d like to answer. I made sure they knew they could stop at any time and ask me to 
discard their results at any time. I also described the research topic and questions in depth, 
allowed the participants to choose the location sites and time for their interviews, and affirmed 
that the main intention of the research was to incorporate their voices into a greater analysis of 
different Syrian communities regarding what post-conflict Syria should look like. With this 
understanding, almost everyone I approached had no problem participating.  
I also believe that our shared cultural background as Armenians was advantageous to the 
study because the participants viewed me as an insider. However, I cannot deny that my 
background as an American (having been born in the US and having lived there 23 years, even 
though my parents and ancestors are all Armenian) might have hindered some honesty in the 
responses, even though the surveys were anonymous. I felt that each time someone wanted to 
place blame on the US for the current conflict in Syria, knowing that I was from the US 
influenced the answer. Some participants would directly tell me that “your country just needs to 
leave our people alone,” and from there the conversation would sometimes spiral into a 
complaint of the many times the US has intervened in other countries’ affairs. Other participants 
would tip-toe around the idea that the US had any responsibility in the conflict, worrying that 
they might offend or insult me by saying something. This is something I had not anticipated 
because it was not something that had ever happened before in my interviews, however, that 
might be because the interviews for the Rerooted archive do not delve into political questions as 
this survey did. 
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Another problem I encountered a few times was not being Syrian or Middle Eastern. 
Sometimes people would question my interest in this community, wondering why I was so 
curious about the experience of Syrian-Armenians. This set a bit of an uncomfortable tone in the 
midst of interviews, but in all such instances, when I explained the relevance of documenting 
Armenian experiences of the Syrian conflict for larger documentation efforts for Syria, and the 
relevance of such documentation for a community (the Armenians) who lack such official 
documentation of their past (i.e. the genocide), such tensions dissipated. The more common 
response from participants though, was that they were proud that an American-Armenian cared 
about this issue and were glad someone was including the Armenian perspective, amongst the 
larger narrative, ultimately because they were proud to be Syrian and didn’t want the Armenian 
history or perspective to be erased from that region, a place they call home.  All of this being 
said, I must acknowledge though that it is true—I am not an expert on Syria or the Middle East, 
nor am I an expert on justice or the law. Thus, I could not approach this study with the critical 
eye that someone deeply immersed in these fields could. However, as a graduate student with an 
academic background in atrocity crimes and two years of experience with oral history interviews 
regarding the conflict in Syria, I was able to approach this study, including data collection and 
analysis, with a strong background knowledge of the conflict from the Armenian perspective, 
and through the lens of human rights. Perhaps if an anthropologist or Middle Eastern Studies 
historian had conducted this study, the results and emphasis would have been different—there 
was surely enough rich information available for a different analysis and outcome emphasizing 
many different aspects of the Armenian experience in Syria. However, this study was 
approached through a more practical lens looking at tangible recommendations and expressed 
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perceptions of what a post-conflict Syria should look like and that is the priority of the analysis 
described in the subsequent sections.  
c. Challenges and Limitations:  
 The challenges and limitations I encountered during my research period can be 
categorized in two ways - technical/preparatory, and contextual. The technical limitations are 
ones I perhaps could and should have anticipated. For example, my sample size was limited 
because I did not anticipate that administering the survey would take over an hour in almost 
every instance. Additionally, I did not anticipate having to verbally administer the survey to 
many of the participants as well. This increased the amount of time spent with each participant, 
and limited the number of people I could reach. Another technical limitation was that some of 
my surveys were inconsistent. For example, the Armenian surveys asked people to rank their 
answers to some questions, whereas the English surveys asked others just to circle all the 
answers they felt were appropriate, without ranking. Because I was not administering the English 
surveys verbally (as those were often given to university age students who did not request my 
assistance), I did not notice this inconsistency until I returned and began inputting the data into 
my spreadsheet. Another limitation was that, for the surveys I did not conduct verbally, I did not 
read participants’ answers until after the interview was over, and it was apparent that some 
people had not understood the scope of the question. For example, when I asked what it would 
look like for Syria to be repaired, many people wrote, “I cannot picture it,” or when I asked what 
it would take for them to return, many people wrote, “I won’t return.” While these are important 
answers that give insight into the mindset of many community members, I wonder if I had been 
more closely following them while answering the questions, if I could have asked them to 
elaborate on these questions more, getting a more in-depth view into what is necessary for repair 
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even for those people who most doubt it will occur.  Lastly, question #47 on the Armenian 
survey version was translated to ask if people would “support a Syria-wide repatriation program 
regardless of ethnicity,” instead of what the English version asked which was, “a Syria-wide 
reparations program, regardless of ethnicity.” I only found this out in the middle of my 
interviews, by which time half of the participants in the overall study had answered the question 
with the understanding that I was asking about repatriation.  
In terms of context, I think one of the greatest limitations I faced was the great variety in 
the understanding and perceptions of the cause of the conflict, why the war is still ongoing, and 
what the government and different stakeholders in the conflict want/believe. It was difficult to 
find a common understanding or answer to these questions, and so I faced limitations in my 
analysis when trying to assess general attitudes toward, and desires for, a post-conflict Syria. 
Through a type of ethnographic field notes method of coding for themes,141 I was able to find 
commonalities, however, these differences in perception are perhaps data points in themselves 
demonstrating the lack of consensus in this conflict, and thus, the difficulties that lie ahead in 
reconstructing a unified Syria. There are also other conceptual concerns that I am not sure I can 
get the answer to at this point. For example, when I asked participants to circle the choices that 
would make them feel like there has been justice with regard to the Armenian Genocide, and 
then again with the Syrian conflict, how much of what they circled is what they actually wanted 
and believed would be helpful, and how many did they select just because it was there and it 
seemed like a fine idea?  Alternatively, some people only chose one option from those long lists 
of justice mechanisms, and I wonder if those people truly only believed that one mechanism 
would make them feel there was justice, or if they misunderstood and thought they were only 
																																																								141	Robert	M.	Emerson,	Rachel	I.	Fretz,	and	Linda	L.	Shaw,	Writing	Ethnographic	Fieldnotes	(University	of	Chicago	Press,	2011).	
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allowed to select one (even though the instructions say, please circle all which you think would 
contribute to this). Lastly, when administering the surveys verbally, and while conducting the 
semi-structured interviews, questions arose that I would have liked to ask all participants. For 
example, when I asked question 49 (4), regarding whether they felt there should be a tribunal 
created for anyone guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria, I only was able to 
ask those who did the supplemental interviews if they felt the tribunal should be created as a 
hybrid court, a solely international court, or a solely domestic court. The answers were 
enlightening and very practical, which could have been useful particularly in the 
recommendations section of a report like this. Another example is when I asked those who 
selected that they felt the world should know the truth about the conflict in Syria to elaborate on 
why they think knowing the truth is important. Answers to this question were enlightening as 
well and could be useful in understanding whether mechanisms such as truth commissions might 
be necessary. These are just a few examples of questions, which I did not anticipate when 
creating the survey tool and interview questions, and thus in asking them, I only attained 
incomplete data from a subsection of the already small sample group.  
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VI. Data Results and Analysis 
 This section presents three broad themes and sub-themes that encapsulate the attitudes of 
the 52 Syrian-Armenian participants in my study toward redress, reconstruction, and justice in a 
post-conflict Syria. These themes have been crafted through an assessment of responses to 
questions such as, “which of the following do you believe should currently have the Syrian 
government’s attention?” and “what types of conditions do you feel would be necessary for you 
to be able to return/integrate/resettle and begin to rebuild your life and community in Syria?” In 
line with the findings from the ICTJ that “most displaced Syrians are concerned with restoring 
security”142 before attaining any other type of justice (be it criminal or other), the priority for the 
Syrian-Armenian community members who participated in my study was just that: ending the 
war and ensuring safety and stability. The sub-themes included in ensuring that safety and 
stability include actions that provide returnees (and those who remained in Syria for the duration 
of the conflict) with the essentials for an adequate life, including housing, electricity, and water. 
It also includes rebuilding infrastructure, reopening community centers and above all, ending the 
war.  
The second theme is protecting the rights and liberties of all citizens. This was a 
commonly stated objective, but at the same time, participants’ elaborations of what this would 
look like differed greatly. Thus, the sub-themes in this section will include a necessary 
discussion of the rights denied to certain groups, the protections granted to other groups (with an 
exploration of the treatment of minorities), and the importance of a secular Syria. The third 
theme and most commonly stated desire was for Syria to be unified, where everyone respects one 
another’s ethnicity and religion with equality. The sub-themes contained within this section will 
include a discussion of how some believe the society has been divided, where perceptions of this 																																																								142	“ICTJ-Briefing-Syria_Documentation-2018.pdf.”	
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division come from, who the actors are that are responsible for this division, and the differing 
opinions regarding which actors should and shouldn’t be involved in post-conflict reconstruction. 
After elaborating upon these three themes, in section seven I will explain what I believe the 
implications of the study to be, and discuss how these findings can be incorporated in the larger 
picture of justice and post-conflict reconstruction for Syria.  
a. TJ Efforts for the Armenian Genocide: What is Desired and Why is it Important?  
“The present is given meaning in terms of that anticipated present we call the future, and the 
former present which we call the past.”143  
 
“For many Armenians, remembering the genocide comes to be acknowledged as one of the 
markers of Armenian identity.”144 
 
To understand the present Armenian sentiments toward the conflict in Syria we must 
understand how their past affects their present. Before delving into the three outlined themes 
regarding justice in Syria, an analysis of responses regarding justice for the Armenian Genocide 
is an important contextual precursor for understanding the opinions for justice in Syria.  
In the survey responses regarding the Armenian Genocide (see table 7 in annex C), the 
most desired reparation above all was official recognition of the genocide by Turkey. This is 
critical, as are its implications, because it powerfully demonstrates that, “acknowledgement and 
recognition of the harm and pain that victims have endured is, for many, a critical form of 
redress.”145 Before delving into the results, let us look at why transitional justice efforts, or the 
lack thereof rather, are an important part of understanding attitudes toward redress for the current 
conflict. I argue that Syrian-Armenian notions of redress are largely dictated by more than a 
century of systematic denial and feelings of ethical loneliness.  
																																																								143	Seda	Altug,	“Sectarianism	in	the	Syrian	Jazira:	Community,	Land	and	Violence	in	the	Memories	of	World	War	I	and	the	French	Mandate	(1915-1939)”	(PhD	Thesis,	Utrecht	University,	2011).	144	Ibid,	328	145	Stromseth,	“Peacebuilding	and	Transitional	Justice,	573.”	
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 In her book, Ethical Loneliness, Jill Stauffer coins the term in the title and defines it to 
mean “the experience of being abandoned by humanity, compounded by the cruelty of wrongs 
not being acknowledged.”146 Expanded upon, her theory of ethical loneliness is applicable to 
groups that have been abandoned by humanity in one sense by having grave crimes committed 
against them and their peoples without the world stepping in to stop the harm soon enough, and 
then they undergo a further abandonment through the injustice of not being heard—their plight 
unrecognized by the world, and their pain and loss unacknowledged by the perpetrators.  This 
theory of ethical loneliness can help one understand why the desire for this kind of reparative 
justice has been a fundamental element, and even end-goal, of so many TJ efforts of the past, 
including truth commissions and national trials.147 
For the Armenians, the desire for the truth has amplified as denial of the pain suffered by 
them and wrongdoings inflicted by the Ottomans has intensified over the past one hundred years. 
Cooper and Akçam explain how rampant Turkish nationalism has led to a stricter denial of the 
Genocide, including disseminating denialist propaganda and criminalizing any admission of guilt 
on the part of the Ottomans.148 Barkan adds further support to this in saying, “where the violence 
has stopped but its memory is not addressed, the animosity most likely will continue to 
fester.”149 Adding further emphasis to this point, Suny, Naimark, and Gocek claim that, “Denial 
is a continual source of injury to the Armenian community as a whole and ….one could argue 
that it also undermines the Turks’ ability to deal openly and frankly with their own historical past 
and present.”150 This sentiment is echoed, (and stressed here for emphasis of how important 																																																								146	Jill	Stauffer,	Ethical	Loneliness:	The	Injustice	of	Not	Being	Heard	(Columbia	University	Press,	2015),	https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/stau17150.	147	Phuong	N.	Pham,	Harvey	M.	Weinstein,	and	Timothy	Longman,	“Trauma	and	PTSD	Symptoms	in	Rwanda:	Implications	for	Attitudes	Toward	Justice	and	Reconciliation,”	JAMA	292,	no.	5	(August	4,	2004):	602–12,	https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.292.5.	p.	602.	148	Belinda	Cooper	and	Taner	Akcam,	“Turks,	Armenians,	and	the	‘G-Word,’”	World	Policy	Journal	22,	no.	3	(2005):	81–93.	149 Barkan, 11. 150	Ronald	Grigor	Suny,	Fatma	Müge	Göçek,	and	Norman	M.	Naimark,	A	Question	of	Genocide:	Armenians	and	Turks	at	the	End	of	the	
Ottoman	Empire	(Oxford	University	Press,	2011):	xiii.	
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recognition and reconciliation is, not just to the victims but to the perpetrators as well), by Teitel 
in her claim that “unresolved problems of transitional justice often have lasting implications over 
a state’s lifetime.”151 While these unresolved problems could have lasting implications for the 
perpetrating state, they could also affect the previously victimized state through perpetuated 
animosity that could hinder potentially positive economic and social relations, among other 
possible benefits. For these reasons, as well as the emotional-moral ethical loneliness reasons, 
official recognition by Turkey is the very first, and for some, the only, reparation they seek.  
For the Armenian Genocide, there are many different kinds of reparations that could 
comprise efforts of TJ. A report on reparations drafted by prominent scholars comprising a group 
called the Armenian Genocide Reparations Study Group lists four general areas of reparation 
that they believe should be mandated of Turkey. They are: 1) Recognition, Apology, Education, 
and Commemoration, 2) Support for Armenians and Armenia, 3) Rehabilitation of Turkey 
(meaning the promotion of respect for Armenians and non-Turkish groups, as well as removing 
any practices that are linked to genocidal ideology, e.g. article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code), 
and 4) The return of property and compensation for property, death, and suffering.152 Professors 
Taner Akçam and Belinda Cooper put forth some others that are worthy of consideration should 
Armenians ever receive justice and redress for the crimes committed against their ancestors over 
one hundred years ago. They include, a) historical dialogue, b) Turkey stopping the production 
of its anti-genocide propaganda, c) the decriminalization of the discussion of the Genocide, d) 
the restoration and preservation of the Armenian cultural heritage in Anatolia, and e) symbolic 
citizenship or special residency rights in Turkey for descendants of deported Armenians.153  
																																																								151	Ruti	G.	Teitel,	Transitional	Justice	(Oxford	University	Press	on	Demand,	2000):	9.	152 Henry Theriault et al., “Complete Report of the Armenian Genocide Reparations Study Group,” Armenian Genocide Reparations Study Group 
(blog), March 24, 2015, x. 153 Cooper and Akcam, “Turks, Armenians, and the ‘G-Word.’” 92.  
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It is clear that the Armenian global community has put a great deal of thought, effort, and 
time into notions of repair and justice, one might even go so far as to say that it has been a 
damaging all-consuming thought/effort at times, taking attention and mental energy away from 
focusing on more modern issues of injustice facing Armenian societies today. However, this 
course of action is understandable, as Montville explains that, “the refusal of aggressors to 
acknowledge the pain of the hurts inflicted on victims, and therefore the absence of remorse by 
the aggressors, creates an overwhelming sense of injustice in the victims.”154 The need to escape 
from the torture of ethical loneliness is a motivating factor for generations to continue fighting 
for what they believe they deserve. This has been very apparent in responses in the study at hand 
regarding how a lack of justice for the genocide impacts expectations for justice in Syria. Hayner 
explains that in the recent years of TJ’s rise it has become “widely believed that the legacy of 
these massive crimes cannot simply be buried, and must somehow be addressed.”155 The 
Armenian people over the past century have tried to address these crimes in various ways, as 
demonstrated through their efforts for accountability in trials in 1919, as well as their efforts of 
taking justice into their own hands, through the killing of the Ottoman minister of interior Talaat 
Pasha, the principal architect of the Armenian Genocide.156 However, none of these have truly 
produced the satisfactory redress that leaves many Armenian people feeling indignant and thus, 
living in the past seeking justice for a crime that was committed 100 years ago instead of the one 
they are living through today in Syria. While “time can attenuate people’s demands for justice, it 
can also exacerbate them,”157 and for many Armenians, the tendencies expressed in this study’s 
surveys seem to make clear that it has done the latter.  
																																																								154	Joseph	Montville,	“Justice	and	the	Burdens	of	History,”	Reconciliation,	Justice,	and	Coexistence:	Theory	and	Practice,	2001,	129–144,	p.	131.	155	Priscilla	B.	Hayner,	Unspeakable	Truths	2e:	Transitional	Justice	and	the	Challenge	of	Truth	Commissions	(Routledge,	2010):	8.	156	Eric	Bogosian,	Operation	Nemesis:	The	Assassination	Plot	That	Avenged	the	Armenian	Genocide	(Hachette	UK,	2015).	157 Joan Barceló, “The Emotional Underpinnings of Attitudes toward Transitional Justice,” Political Studies 66, no. 2 (2018): 486.	
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The Armenian Genocide still influences notions of identity for Armenians in Syria as can 
be seen in some responses to questions about Syria during Rerooted interviews.158 Take this 
anecdote for example from Dzovinar Yeretsian, a 59-year-old woman from Qamishli, Syria who 
is responding to a question about why memorialization is important in the Syrian conflict.  
 “In my grandfather’s life he never laughed. He never had a smile. We would say, “Dede, 
why don’t you laugh?” He said, “How could I laugh? When I was seven years old, I lost 
my seven siblings and saw my mother leave my baby brother behind in the desert. I will 
never be able to not see that.” He never laughed.... It is very good to tell these stories so 
that we as Armenians do not forget or lose them. Our generation and our kids' and their 
kids’ generations should know that Armenians still exist. Yes, we are few, but we are 
Armenian, and we will not forget it. It is the same for Syria.”159  
 
The preoccupation of the diaspora with recognition for the genocide has surely had an effect on 
the formation of Syrian-Armenian identity, as discussed in the historical background section, and 
it is this fact that leads me to raise the question of how a past denied justice for the Armenians as 
a whole might affect the notions of justice and avenues for redress that Syrian-Armenians see 
today for the violence and destruction in Syria. Along with the importance of TJ for the 
Armenian Genocide comes the implication of the importance of an absence of TJ for the harms 
committed. How does this absence of redress for a crime so far in the past affect notions of 
redress for a crime in the present?  While this study did not produce any significant causal 
relationships, nor concrete trends as there was a great deal of nuance, correlations were explicitly 
addressed in responses to the question: “if you believe Armenians have not gotten justice for the 
Armenian Genocide, how does that impact your expectations for justice for the Syrian conflict?” 
(Annex A, 48).  This section has demonstrated that the genocide affected views toward justice in 
Syria today and set the stage for a subsequent analysis of what constitutes justice and redress for 
																																																								158	Rerooted	159	ibid.		
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the Armenian Genocide in the eyes of most Armenians in this study so that we can understand 
how that might translate to the Syrian case.  
b. JUSTICE FOR THE GENOCIDE: 
“It is important that the divisions created between Syrians during the conflict are melded 
because otherwise it will become like Turkey-Armenia relations.”160 
 
This section will be divided into three sections. The first is an analysis of the responses to 
the question:  What would make you feel like the Armenian people have received justice with 
regard to the Armenian genocide?  Table 7 of Annex C shows the number of respondents who 
preferred each option presented to them (in question 39 of Annex A) for genocide reparations. 
The first section will assess those responses with reference to the aforementioned reparations 
report to determine which mechanisms for justice are most preferred on the ground by the 
study’s population.  
After exploring what the community desired for justice for the genocide, the second 
section will delve into the expressed differences between the Syrian conflict and the genocide. 
The third section will then focus on using the understanding from the previous two sections to 
better understand how, in this case, the past affects the present.  
Preferred Reparations: 
“It is a continuous genocide, the Armenian one, because our children do not preserve their 
identities.”161  
 
One of the most commonly cited reasons amongst my respondents for wanting 
reparations was identity. In different types of explanations, whether because it was a loss of a 
sense of identity that the Ottoman Turks inflicted upon the Armenian people by taking away 
their lands and homes and what they knew as normal, etc., or whether it was because of the 
																																																								160	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	161	Ibid.	
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repercussions of that displacement which led to a perceived weakening of Armenian identity in 
terms of language retention and increased assimilation for the younger generations as expressed 
in the quote above, the Armenian persecution (and subsequently, the struggle for reparations) 
became intricately tied to Armenian identity.  One scholar, Seda Altug, who writes about (post) 
memories of 1915 and the ways in which they affect Armenians today explains that these 
memories have become intricately tied to Armenian identity. She writes, “1915 functions as a 
symbol through which Armenians have knowledge about themselves and see themselves.”162 
She goes on to explain that “violence studies and trauma theory have demonstrated the 
relationship between memory, violence and structures of power. They have pointed to the 
centrality of the past trauma in the meaning-production and shaping of the present and future 
lives of the survivor, and acknowledge the extremely interruptive effect of the traumatic events 
in people’s lives, including the ways in which people make sense of and find meaning in their 
new lives. They emphasize the present-ness of the past traumas, and their role in shaping the 
present.”163 In many of my respondents’ answers, this mentality was evident, especially in the 
constant emphasis that this community expressed in not being able to forget the genocide, or 
forget their ancestors. One 93 year-old man says, “we can’t forget, we’ll never forget”164 when I 
asked if divisions between Armenia and Turkey were currently forgotten. The theme of 
forgetting raises an important point for memorialization and this tended to be an often-selected 
reparation mechanism. As explained above, the reparations study group listed four general areas 
of reparation that should be mandated of Turkey. They are: 1) Recognition, apology, education, 
and commemoration, 2) Support for Armenians and Armenia, 3) Rehabilitation of Turkey 
(meaning the promotion of respect for Armenians and non-Turkish groups, as well as removing 																																																								162	Altug,	“Sectarianism	in	the	Syrian	Jazira.	111”	163	Ibid.,	83	164	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	
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any practices that are linked to genocidal ideology, e.g. article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code), 
and 4) The return of property and compensation for property, death, and suffering.165 It seemed 
evident to me that almost all of the elaborations and answers selected fell within the first 
category.  
We have already discussed the importance of recognition and apology in the section 
above, and another very important demand for justice for the genocide is memorialization. In a 
sense, it’s one of the most realistic and attainable forms of justice for the genocide today, 
alluding back to Barkan’s discussion of a more attainable “rough justice” for the Armenians that 
is more symbolic than anything else.166 Aside from explicit mentions of the necessity for 
memorialization, one very powerful quote demonstrates the importance of memorialization by 
lamenting its absence. Harout Ghalbornian, 36 from Aleppo shares:  
“Every year we would commemorate the Genocide in our clubs. I was a member of 
Homenetmen. To commemorate, every year we go to Der Zor...We'd go, explain to them 
the history, show them the bones, take them to the churches, tell them the stories at a 
special place...We'd always remind them of what had happened. Many would be very 
touched. Some would look and cry after they'd heard the story. They would listen very 
carefully.... But we no longer do so, because the country is at war. The memorial at Der 
Zor is destroyed. They took out all that was possible to save, but the rest has been 
destroyed.”167  
Harout explains here the importance of genocide commemoration and the devastation that he, 
and the community, feels when the symbol that represented this in Syria was destroyed. This 
might help explain why the rebuilding of Armenian infrastructure in Syria, like churches, is such 
an important priority for Armenians in Syria, as will be discussed in section six. 
Another reparation mechanism that respondents often selected was land reparation—they 
explained that they wanted the lands in what is currently Eastern Armenia to become a part of 
Armenia, or to at least allow for Armenians who had historical ties to the land to go back, 																																																								165 Henry Theriault et al., “Complete Report of the Armenian Genocide Reparations Study Group,” Armenian Genocide Reparations Study Group 
(blog), March 24, 2015, x. 166	Elazar	Barkan,	“Introduction:	Historians	and	Historical	Reconciliation,”	The	American	Historical	Review	114,	no.	4	(2009):	899–913.	167	Rerooted	
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reclaim their homes, and be allowed to rebuild and live there. When I asked respondents to 
follow-up on why they wanted the land back, especially since many of them said they themselves 
would not go back to live there, they referenced the symbolic meaning the land has, once again 
tying it into category one above from the reparations report as a form of memorialization and 
recognition that Armenians were once there. We see this in Sosi Ohan’s quote demonstrating the 
longing for some type of physical connection to the past--whether actual or symbolic: 
 “My grandparents who survived the genocide would say, “If only we had some 
Armenian soil, we would want to put it on our graves.” That stays in my head until now. 
If I buy a vegetable or something here in Armenia and there is some soil in the bag, I 
cannot throw it in the trash. I throw it outside and let the soil go out. I cannot put it in the 
trash.”168 -Sosi Ohan, 57 from Qamishli, Syria 
 
The symbolic importance of Armenia for many of these respondents stems from the inability to 
connect with their homeland for over 100 years. While their “true” homeland are the lands of 
Eastern Turkey, in the absence of official recognition and memorialization in Eastern Turkey, 
Armenia has come to symbolize and represent all that they had hoped Eastern Turkey could 
represent. The same woman from above shares,  
“When I was sitting on the plane, of course we were upset because we were leaving our house 
and everything, but I did not plan to remain that long in Armenia. Then I saw Mount Ararat and 
I thought, everything about being Armenian was here. I started crying. I finished all my tissues 
and the person sitting next to me gave me theirs. I was really impacted. I don't know. I saw 
Mount Ararat and I looked at it [and saw] all my ancestors. I still feel that happiness 
and patriotism for Armenia today.”169 -Sosi Ohan, 57 from Qamishli, Syria 
 
From these responses, it seems that Altug’s previous explanation of trauma being present in the 
current day is ever-present for the Armenians. As another scholar puts it, Flora Keshgegian, “the 
trauma, even though it is not fully articulated or even recognized as trauma may become the 
guiding force of identity and meaning formation.”170 As the genocide has become a part of the 																																																								168	Rerooted	169	Rerooted	170	Flora	A.	Keshgegian,	“Finding	a	Place	Past	Night:	Armenian	Genocidal	Memory	in	Diaspora,”	Religion,	Violence,	Memory,	and	Place,	2006,	100–112.	
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identity of many Syrian-Armenians, and it’s lack of justice a source of indignation and sadness, 
it is important to explore how this has affected their perceptions of the current conflict in Syria as 
either similar or dissimilar to the genocide. 
Expressed Differences between the Conflicts 
“Our memories of our ancestors’ experience through the genocide impacted our decisions for 
leaving Syria because we were afraid it would be the same as the genocide.”171  
 
Upon elaborating on their explanations for choosing certain reparation mechanisms for 
the genocide, many respondents referenced the conflict in Syria, alluding to the idea that many 
felt this was a second genocide. However, there are important differences between the two 
contexts that must be acknowledged, namely the difference in reason for persecution (one based 
on religion and the other on political beliefs), the difference in the significance of the land they 
are leaving (in the genocide victims were living in their historic homelands and were pushed out 
by the governmental regime, versus the current situation in which the Armenians fled from what 
they felt was a mostly temporary home), and the difference between being on the side of, versus 
against, the government.  
Annex C, Table 6: Genocide and Syrian Conflict Connection 
  Do you feel that what you have 
experienced in Syria is similar to what 
your ancestors experienced in the 
genocide? 
Did your memories of your ancestors’ 
experience through the genocide 
impact your decisions for leaving 
Syria? 
Yes, a lot 19 8 
Somewhat 24 10 




As evidenced by the chart above, there aren’t any clear patterns in these answers, besides 
perhaps the highest number of respondents selecting the “somewhat” option. The factors that 
comprised the greatest differences people felt between the conflicts were typically grounds for 
maintaining that the Armenians had not suffered as much in the Syrian conflict as they had in the 
genocide. Alluding to the fact that the first was a targeted persecution against the Armenians, 
whereas in the Syrian conflict they were not the targeted victims (see table 3 of annex C for a 
results of perceived victimization), many respondents felt that justice in Syria was not theirs to 
obtain, making them less demanding of what they’d like to see as reparation mechanisms in the 
Syrian context.  Others felt that Armenians were victimized, and the main difference between the 
two conflicts was the differing technology. One respondent said, “Syria is the same as the 
genocide but we have guns now,” and another said, “it was a second genocide but this time we 
left on planes instead of by foot.”172 In general however, many believed that the conflicts were 
similar.  
One 19-year old respondent shares,  
 
“We were taught in school that the genocide was both our strength and weakness. The Syrian 
conflict is the same. In both conflicts you can see both strengths and weaknesses.”173 
 
While this is a positive outlook on the events, emphasizing the Armenian resilience in new 
destinations, finding strength from a situation that is ultimately negative, many others 
emphasized the similarities in the types of loss experienced, as evidenced by the quote below.  
“Yes, the conflict in Syria is mostly similar to the Armenian Genocide, considering the case of 
leaving everything we had there, as we did back in the 20th century when our ancestors hoped 
that they would eventually go back to their abandoned lands, home, farms, shops, stores, 
factories, etc. But they never had the chance. I think the same happened now as well.”174  
 																																																								172	Survey	Respondent.	173	Survey	Respondent.	174	Survey	Respondent.	
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So how do these distinctions impact respondents’ desire for justice in Syria? I discuss that next. 
What is the Lack of Justice for the genocide’s Impact on Syria? 
“We need justice for Armenians first if we are going to have justice in Syria.” -86 year old 
interviewee, March 2019, who was part of the first generation born in Syria after the genocide. 
 
While the quote above is not representative of the entire population of Syrian-Armenians 
interviewed (no quote can do that really) it does represent one of two categories of responses that 
this section can be generalized down to. The first is that justice for Syria is more important than 
justice for the genocide (typically concurrently influenced by the current/urgent nature of the 
Syrian conflict and a loss of hope for justice for the genocide). The second is in line with what 
the respondent has expressed above, maintaining that justice is more important for the genocide 
(typically influenced by ideas that they are Armenians first before Syrians, and that their families 
were harmed more/lost more during the genocide than during the conflict in Syria, thereby 
making it a more pressing claim for justice). 
The first opinion: Those who believed that justice in Syria was more important than 
justice for the genocide often referenced the fact that “Armenia is already back on its feet, so we 
should be focusing our efforts on Syria.”175 These people tended to choose nothing besides 
“official recognition” for the genocide, while choosing a range of options for the justice for Syria 
question (#45 on annex A), including Syrian government support for repatriation, financial 
compensation for rebuilding from the external actors who contributed to the war, and more. The 
fact that the conflict in Syria was still ongoing seemed to make these people more hopeful for 
justice in Syria than for the genocide. Conversely, there were many respondents who felt more 
hopeful that justice for the genocide would be granted, or at least desired it more than justice for 
the Syrian conflict and this largely came down to the idea that: “This war is not an Armenian’s 																																																								175	Survey	Respondent.	
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war. The Armenians were just unfortunately caught in it. This is not an Armenian’s justice to 
obtain.”176 In line with this, some Armenians did not feel the need to worry about their place or 
rights in post-conflict Syria because the government supported them. In stark contrast to the 
genocidal policies implemented by their own government back when they were living in the 
regions under the control of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians in Syria generally feel “the 
government has us in their arms. When they get the opposition out of the places that were 
destroyed by the enemy, they will rebuild.”177 As is evidenced by the quote, some people feel 
greatly comforted by the government and it appears that this allows for a less demanding stance 
on post-conflict redress. 
Another reason for increased emphasis on the Armenian genocide was often due to the 
difference in recognition and knowledge of the conflicts. One respondent says, “It is important 
for the world to know the truth about the genocide because it was a huge thing, 1.5 million 
Armenians killed in the midst of WWI and the world doesn’t know about it. Justice for the 
Armenian Genocide is more important than justice for Syria because the truth should be known 
internationally. The world already knows the truth about Syria.”178 The last difference that 
seemed to make justice for the genocide more pressing than justice for the Syrian conflict for 
many respondents was the subjective difference regarding what was lost in each conflict. Many 
participants expressed the feeling that justice for the genocide was more important for them 
because they felt they had lost more. Many say that in leaving historic Armenia the Armenian 
community lost “everything.” It lost lives, homes, land, its identity, sanity, and ability to live and 
be connected to the homeland.  In Syria, while the loss of many of these material resources are 
																																																								176	Survey	Respondent.	177	Survey	Respondent.	178	Survey	Respondent.	
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mentioned as well, including properties, economic losses and workplaces/factories, respondents 
didn’t tend to emphasize the notion of losing “everything” as much as they did for the post-
genocide period.179  
However, one caveat here is that the most commonly expressed sentiment among almost 
all participants was the feeling that the strength of the Armenian community in Syria had 
diminished greatly as a result of the war, and this seemed to greatly affect their answers 
regarding justice, but more importantly, their hopefulness for it. While some did express a 
hopefulness that the Armenian community would be able to rebuild itself because their ancestors 
were able to do so in the wake of a more damaging atrocity for the Armenian people, many 
others placed a huge emphasis on the fact that Armenian community and identity lost during 
genocide was never fully recovered and that made many worry that it would be lost once more. 
In light of this preoccupation with the weakening of the Armenian community in Syria, 
regardless of whether they felt justice for the genocide or for Syria should be a greater priority, 
the majority of respondents expressed a tendency to feel less hopeful about justice for the current 
Syrian conflict given the fact that there has not yet been justice for the Armenian genocide 
(question 48 of Annex A). These respondents shared that they were less demanding with what 
they chose for reparations in Syria because they felt it was unlikely they would receive any of 
what they felt was necessary for redress. Thus, they said they “went easier” on justice for Syria 
because of this.  
c. Themes for Syria  
Table 11: Priorities for Syria 
																																																								179	It	would	be	interesting	to	try	to	determine	if	the	fact	that	these	Armenians	settled	in	Armenia	where	they	already	shared	a	language	and	culture	impacted	their	ability	to	integrate,	thereby	making	them	feel	like	they	did	not	have	to	“start	from	scratch,”	a	sentiment	that	is	often	invoked	when	discussing	the	creation	of		Armenian	diaspora	communities	after	the	genocide.	
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Which of the following do you believe should currently have the Syrian government’s 
attention? (circle all that apply and rank) The column with the lowest sum is the highest 
priority* 
 *It should be noted that there were problems with this system though and it is not 
comprehensive data. This flaw has been elaborated upon in the challenges and limitations section 



























86 38 111 82 114 89 61 
  
 As for the current Syrian conflict, here are the themes. As expanded upon at the 
introduction of this section, the three themes for desired reparations in Syria are expressed 
individually in the chart above, and once categorized together, they include: 1) Rebuilding 
infrastructure and improving economic prosperity, 2) Protecting the human rights and liberties of 
all citizens, including protecting minority communities, and 3) Unifying Syria (which includes 
ending the war; stopping armed opposition/disarming factions; and securing order and peace 
among opposing factions).   
Theme 1: Ensuring Safety and Stability  
“It’s hard to believe that everything will recover even if there is justice. Man fought against man, 
so even if there’s justice, it won’t help. We need to improve the conditions of living. The justice 
in courts doesn’t reach the people on the ground.” - 23 year old female, March 2019 interview   
 
Q: How do you envision members of your community dealing with the suffering caused by the 
war and displacement upon return?  
A: “Many people wouldn't need much help because all they need is peace; the rest they can 
manage. For others, I'd suggest that NGOs help restore the infrastructure in communities.”180  
  
One of the simplest ways to understand what displaced communities need or want to see 
in any post-conflict setting is to ask if they would like to return, and if so, what is stopping 																																																								180	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	
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them.181 As similar consultations carried out by groups like the ICTJ182 and the Syria Justice and 
Accountability Centre (SJAC)183 have shown, ensuring safety and stability in the region is a 
necessary prerequisite for the return of many displaced Syrians. However, what safety and 
stability entail is different for each community and thus should be understood within the context 
of each group’s history in Syria. As for the Syrian-Armenians, safety and stability is intricately 
linked to the presence of a strong Armenian community, and that is evidenced by many of the 
suggestions of Syrian-Armenian respondents in questions 41-44 of the survey tool (found in 
Annex A) for rebuilding Syria and reintegrating in Syria. Many of these suggestions come from 
what the Armenian community of Syria feels they lost.  
a. Rebuilding the Community 
“We had already built a motherland in Aleppo. We have our churches, theatres, schools, 
everything. I’d like to go back to Aleppo, I’ve missed Aleppo very much--the environment, my 
friends, I really miss it. If Aleppo were the Aleppo it used to be, I wouldn’t stay in Armenia for a 
minute. I’d take my children and leave.”184 -Jirair Halvajian, 66 
 
Perhaps the most commonly stated opinion amongst my informants was that the 
Armenian community in Syria has been negatively affected and the Armenian community would 
need to “come back,” (both physically with people returning, and institutions being restored), if 
they were to feel like they could return, integrate, resettle, and begin to rebuild their lives in 
Syria.185 Rebuilding cultural heritage sites, including churches and other Armenian sites, as well 
as rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, were amongst the top five most commonly selected 
desired reparations (see table 9 in annex C). Some sites that were referenced by survey 
respondents that should be rebuilt include Syrian history, like in Palmyra, as well as Armenian 
																																																								181	Phone	Conversation	with	Human	Rights	Watch	Syria	Researcher.	182	“ICTJ-Briefing-Syria_Documentation-2018.pdf.”	183	Shamnam	Mojtahedi,	Skype	interview	with	SJAC	employee,	December	4,	2018.	184	Rerooted	archive	185	Additionally,	as	you	can	see	in	table	9	of	the	results	charts	in	annex	c,	31	and	32	respondents	said	rebuilding	cultural	heritage	sites	and	destroyed	infrastructure	respectively,	would	be	indications	of	justice	in	post-conflict	Syria	
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centers, like churches, Aleppo’s antique center, and the genocide memorial in Der Zor. In light 
of the historical context provided thus far for this community, this concern is almost predictable 
being that “community,” comprised of Armenian institutions, people, and language, is what 
allowed them to live at the intersection of their Armenian and Syrian identities for the past 
century. As discussed earlier in section three, both nationalities and allegiances are part of the 
Syrian-Armenian identity and a Syria without (or with weakened) avenues to preserve and 
cultivate Armenian ethnicity, culture, religion, and overall identity, seemed unacceptable to 
almost all informants.  
Another element that adds a worrisome amount of validity to this fear of a weakened 
Armenian community is the reality of Armenians in neighboring Lebanon, and the memory of 
the fate of their Armenian communities in the aftermath of the Lebanese civil war. In Lebanon, 
reconstruction necessitated the re-engagement with the question of how to organize relations 
between the state and ethno-cultural groups within the country. In this process, one of the key 
questions for Armenians was whether or not they could restore the guaranteed spaces for the 
community’s public participation. This proved to be challenging for many reasons. First, the 
decrease in the number of Armenians in Lebanon negatively impacted their political presence in 
the country and, as Migliorino observes, the community appeared “hardly able to formulate a 
long term sustainable strategy for the preservation of Armenian diversity in Lebanon.”186 
Additionally, because Armenian institutions, like schools, were negatively impacted, in the 
aftermath of the war and in the reconstruction period, “the educational opportunities that 
offer[ed] more chances of success tend[ed] to involve deeper integration with the non-Armenian 
environment or some sacrifice of certain aspects of Armenian socialization.”187  Unfortunately, 
																																																								186	Migliorino,	184	187	Ibid.,	199	
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this is the reality that many informants in the present study saw for Syrian-Armenian life as well 
in a post-conflict Syria. While deeper integration in the non-Armenian community was not in 
itself a problem for the informants, they expressed that the implications of such a phenomenon 
(less contact with the Armenian community and thus potentially negative effects on language 
learning and cultural preservation, etc.) were.  However, I must acknowledge that while they are 
similar, the Armenian communities of Syria and Lebanon have many differences and while it 
might be wise for the Armenians of Syria to look to the Armenian community of Lebanon for 
cues of what to do and not to do in a post-conflict Syria, ultimately, their ability to rebuild their 
communities is largely dependent on the government and its political contexts, things which can 
never be identical in any situation. Thus, while we cannot predict the Armenian community’s 
ability to rebuild itself and grow stronger in Syria by solely looking at Lebanon, we can further 
delve into this topic of community rebuilding by looking at the strength and importance of 
Armenian institutions in Syria. 
Armenian institutions are critical entities in Syrian-Armenian life because in many 
instances they have acted as a “safety net” for the community in times of the country’s poor 
economic conditions. Just as an example, in such times these institutions have provided medical 
services, housing, and support to the disabled, elderly, and poor.188 They directly and indirectly 
contributed to the preservation of Armenian ethno-cultural diversity and provided “spaces for 
Armenian socialization and offered structural, constant connections with the resources of the 
Armenian Diaspora outside of Syria.”189 Today in Syria, informants from this study who are in 
touch daily with community members back in Aleppo say that,  
“The main thing holding the community together is the Tashnagsutiun (the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation, or ARF). The Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) 																																																								188	Ibid,	200	189	Ibid.,	200	
71		
is mainly helping with schools but the ARF is keeping the churches safe and when there 
was more fighting during wartime, they were holding the areas safe with Armenians 
sitting around the areas at night keeping them safe.”190  
 
This touches on a greater point I’d like to make later in a subsection under theme three of this 
section regarding trust in the international Armenian community to rebuild Syrian-Armenian 
institutions. However, the main take-away from the quote above at this point is that the 
Armenian institutions are still existent in Aleppo, however, many informants see them as weak 
and limited. Educational institutions are seen as having suffered a great deal. There are many 
examples of schools that have experienced debilitating consequences as a result of this urban 
warfare. One example can be seen in the Karen Jeppe school where enrollment has decreased 
from around 1200 to around 400 students.191 Mortars landed on the school and for three years 
students were relocated to another school in a safer part of the city where they were taught in 
shifts.192 In another example, the Armenian national elementary schools were united a few years 
ago.193 The four primary schools: Haygazian, Sahagian, Zavarian, and Gulbenkian, became one 
as: Azkayin Miatsial Varjaran, (or the United National Academy). There were too few students 
and too much damage to the schools for them to continue running independently. In addition to 
the tangible effects this has on community members who perhaps greatly valued the diversity in 
the missions or approach to education of the schools, it creates far-reaching ripples in the 
common perception of the strength of the Armenian community of Aleppo. As discussed above 
in section three and throughout this study, preserving a strong Armenian education has been a 
main priority for the Armenians of Syria and to see its strength deteriorate is not a strong sign 
that the community will be repaired; it produces a great amount of hopelessness. One informant 
																																																								190	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	191	“Return	to	Aleppo:	‘I	Never	Expected	Such	Destruction,’”	Middle	East	Eye,	accessed	May	8,	2019,	http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/return-aleppo-i-never-expected-such-destruction.	192	ibid.	193	(For a comparison with what it used to be, look back to table 2 in section 3 for the chart referencing the 40+ schools in Syria in 1929).	
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shares, “In losing properties, material things, friends, family, our shop, our home, and so much 
more in Kessab, the worst thing I lost was hope. We lost hope for a better future, staying there, 
rebuilding our life there. I cannot go back there anymore. I cannot.”194 It seems clear then that 
institutions must regain their strength before people come back. This section will culminate with 
a description of how the community has already begun to rebuild, but before doing so, it is 
important to discuss the critical role of one specific institution amongst all Armenian institutions 
in Syria and that is the Armenian Church.   
a1. The importance of churches 
“Anywhere an Armenian goes they build a church. With the destruction of churches, Armenian 
people were already left in terrible conditions.”195 
 
 Within the efforts of rebuilding a community, churches have played a critical role in the 
last 100 years for Armenians in Syria. While it would be beyond the scope of this study to delve 
into an analysis of the importance of religious institutions in re-establishing communities, there 
are many studies that do demonstrate that when you rebuild or restore the functioning of 
religious institutions, or places of worship, people tend to return.196 While Armenians have a 
unique tie to Christianity (in 301 AD Armenia was the first nation to adopt Christianity as its 
official religion), for the Armenian community in Syria, the churches played, and continue to 
play, a much larger role than solely promoting and preserving religion.  Among the first 
institutions the Armenians built after the genocide were Armenian churches.197 By 2003, the 
Armenian community of Syria had 45 different functioning churches: 11 Armenian Evangelical 
churches, 13 Armenian Catholic churches, and 21 Armenian Apostolic churches.198 Throughout 
the changing regimes and policies the churches undoubtedly played the main role in preserving 
																																																								194	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	195	Survey	Respondent.	196	Robert	Saliba,	Urban	Design	in	the	Arab	World:	Reconceptualizing	Boundaries	(Routledge,	2016).	197	Migliorino,	(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,	47.	198	Ibid,	196	
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the Armenian community. For example in the mid 1960s when the political evolution of Syria 
affected Armenia education, Armenian schools had to abandon their names and adopt Arab 
names (refer to table 3 of section 3 to see this change), and there were further restrictive policies 
that would have forced the Armenian community to relinquish all control over its schools and 
subsequently eliminate the teaching of Armenian language and culture. However, the Armenian 
religious leadership was able to reach a compromise with the government and thus, acting as the 
“main agents of the process of expansion and consolidation of the Armenian educational 
system,” the Armenian religious leaders helped the Armenian community survive.199  
Furthermore, when the government policies severely limited the freedom of association, 
imposing restrictions on many Armenian associations like the Hamazkayin cultural association 
and the Tashnagsutiun, the churches played a key role in shielding these associations because 
they could “offer some degree of protection to the community’s cultural needs.” 200 Overall, in 
this tumultuous time when education was becoming nationalized, and parties and associations 
were being severely restricted, the churches protected Armenian diversity and became the 
“custodians of communal property.”201 Under President Hafez Al-Assad, the Armenian church 
expanded its role as liaison between the state and the Armenian community. This continued with 
current Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. While the Assad regime was largely concerned with 
ethnic homogeneity (stressing the importance of ‘Kulna Suriyyin:’ all being Syrian), it was more 
tolerant of religious diversity.  
Article 35 of Syria’s 1973 Constitution maintained that the State would guarantee 
freedom of belief and continue to grant religious communities a set of autonomies on questions 
																																																								199	Ibid.,	115,	121	200	Ibid.,	133	201	Ibid.,	160	
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of personal status.202 This allowed for substantial freedoms granted to the Armenian churches 
which aided its role in preserving Armenian diversity and serving as important spaces of 
communal interaction. Within the context of the “tacit agreement” referenced earlier in section 
three, selective concessions were made to the Armenian community under the guise of being 
within the concern of the religious sphere, rather than acknowledging that these concessions 
largely had to do with preserving Armenian ethnic and cultural identity. Some of these 
concessions were, establishing a summer camp for the Armenian boy scouts, authorizing a 
publication, and constructing community centers.203 It should be clear then that the Armenian 
church played an incredibly enriching and important role in Syrian community and it can help us 
understand why the destruction of churches is a sign for many Armenians that the Armenian 
community will not regain its strength, or even be a place they will consider returning to until the 
churches are rebuilt.  
When I asked one informant why she feels rebuilding churches is important to Armenians 
of Syria, her response was as follows: 
“It is important because people used to hang out there, the youth, which was the heart of 
Syrian-Armenian society, would treat it as their agump.204 It was part of our society, so 
it’s important, and now that the youth has left, and the churches have been destroyed, we 
lost hope, hope for a better future. There’s no reason to go back.”205 
 
Another woman, Zarouhi, explains how, upon arriving in Armenia, she tried to rebuild her old 
community by simulating a Syrian-Armenian church community from back home. Upon arriving 
in Armenia as refugees, she and a few friends went to the priest of Zoravor Asdvadzazin Church 
in Yerevan and managed to create a separate service on Friday mornings for anyone who wanted 
to worship, and it was mostly women from Aleppo attended the services. The church is small and 																																																								202	Ibid.,	193	203	Ibid.,	161	204	community	center		205	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	
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the typical Sunday services were overcrowded, she explained, so she worked with the priest to 
find a way to have a service for the Syrian-Armenians. There was a strong urge to recreate a 
small Aleppo Armenian community within Armenia, and the church was the first place she 
thought to do that. When they started, there were 14 or 15 people in attendance. Now, three years 
later, 100 women attend each Friday. Zarouhi explains, “We pray and then we join in the church 
hall to drink coffee together. It is a huge happiness for me to see how many people I have 
brought together. Thank God.”206  
The current situation of the Armenian churches in Syria is varied.  Many churches remain 
intact and continue with their services. However, many others were destroyed like: the Der Zor 
Armenian Genocide Memorial Church,207 the St.Rita Tilel Armenian Church in Aleppo,208 the 
Forty Martyrs Church in Aleppo, 209 the Armenian Church of the Holy Cross in Tal Abyad,210 
and the Armenian Evangelical church in Kessab,211 just to name a few. With the churches still 
serving their function as “pivotal identity-markers and identity-custodians, able to offer 
accessible ways of reconnecting with the communities’ spiritual and historical origins,” it is 
understandable that many people feel the community is lacking something essential without the 
full strength of the church.212 In addition to their emotional and symbolic significance, the 
churches regulated a great deal in Syrian-Armenian life; they remain the “quasi-exclusive 
authority in charge of issues regarding family law, they are important centers of organization of 
social life, they manage schools, charities, promote Armenian cultural activities,” and so on.213 
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Thus, it is clear that these institutions will need a great deal of attention and resources as these 
religious institutions tend to act as the glue holding the community together.  
Although I cannot presently draw any direct links between statements and future action, 
there is an interesting trend I observed that could provide some insight into what kind of impact 
the rebuilding of the churches in Aleppo (and Kessab) has on the population’s desire to return. 
Almost every informant who told me that they felt the Armenian community would be able to 
rebuild and would regain its strength, also referenced both the rebuilding (through Syrian 
government funding) of the Forty Martyrs Church,214 (which had its first service this past Easter) 
and the president’s promise to the rebuild Der Zor Church, as signs that the community will 
flourish once more.215 The general impression gained in these interviews was that the rebuilding 
of these churches has had a profound effect on the hopefulness and willingness for Syrian-
Armenians in Armenia to return. As I’ve explained the importance of the church to the 
community, it seems fair to assert that their satisfaction with the restoration of the churches is 
really a satisfaction regarding the belief in a positive future for the Armenian people in Syria.  
As for Armenian institutions other than churches, their growth and strength is critical to 
return as well. While earlier in this section I wrote of the damaging consequences Armenian 
schools in Syria have faced, Armenian schools in Syria do still function, including the Cilician 
school of the Hntchakian party, the Grtasirats school, the AGBU school, and the Karen Jeppe 
Armenian national college. There are also schools in Latakia and Damascus that are functioning. 
With regard to political organizations, the main Armenian political institutions throughout Syria 




Hunchakians, Armenian Relief Society, and the three church heads/seats. As institutions, they 
are alive, as is the Kantsasar Armenian newspaper of Aleppo.216 This provides great hope that 
the Armenian community is regaining its strength, and Armenian political leaders in Aleppo are 
emphasizing this fact more frequently in their speeches that reach the diaspora, because they 
(along with the government, but this is a separate point that will be made under theme 2b) know 
that this is a priority for the Armenian community thereby making it one of their greatest avenues 
for encouraging repatriation.  
Armenian officials like Syrian parliament member, Jirair Reisian, anticipate positive 
action for restoring national structures in 2019, building off the momentum of 2018. According 
to Reisian, “we expect 2019 to be a peaceful year for the world. A restoration process has 
commenced after the liberation of Aleppo and we can say that life has returned to a peaceful 
process.”217 He then goes on to explain that “the Syrian government has commenced these 
works,” referring to the restoration process that is happening within the Armenian community, 
and outside of it.218 He shares that the Armenian National Sanctuary of Aleppo, the buildings of 
the Karen Jeppe College, as well as two Armenian churches and the Cilician College of Aleppo 
have already been restored last year.219 The general impression gained through my interviews 
and the collected surveys was that this news was greatly inspiring for many people and 
particularly impacted those who had previously been doubtful of their ability to return, but now, 
in light of these new reconstructions, have reconsidered their decisions to reject the possibility of 
moving back to Syria. Reisian also provides hopeful news for those Syrian-Armenians displaced 
throughout the diaspora in sharing that “business operators in Aleppo are actively resuming their 
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activities, with stores being reopened, and this includes Armenian stores too.”220 Ultimately, he 
seems to suggest that the industrial sector and economy of Aleppo are gradually being restored, 
and as per many of my interviews, this was a critical element of justice for the Armenian 
community and their ability/willingness to return (which I will explore in the subsection below).  
In addition to infrastructure being rebuilt and Armenian institutions regaining their 
strength as an impetus for return, Reisian emphasizes the fact that Armenians who left the city 
earlier are returning and that life has returned to its normal course. This notion of restoring 
normalcy is an incredibly important part of post-conflict restoration, and also in this particular 
context, another very common answer regarding what people hoped post-conflict Syria would 
look like. One woman shared, “We were very happy and we were living good lives in Syria. For 
me justice is the life before the war.”221 Before I prompted informants to elaborate, I would 
estimate that close to ⅔ of survey participants said that a “repaired Syria” would be “one that 
made things go back to the way they were before the conflict.”222  This was also a very common 
answer to my surveys for what justice in Syria would look like. This kind of answer is cited in 
the TJ literature as a typical notion of justice for grave crimes. People often imagine things 
returning to the way they were, a status quo ante, as a measure of the attainment of justice,223 
however, it is unattainable. This popular notion of retrospective justice seeks to approximate a 
reversal of the wrong, “a restoration as far as possible of the status quo ex ante,”224 and thus it 
makes sense that Armenian officials in the Syrian government, like Reisian, would stress the 
return to normalcy in Aleppo when addressing Syrian-Armenians in the diaspora who could 
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of his statement is that it was made on April 14th, 2018, as a response to the missile strikes 
delivered on Syria overnight by the US, UK, and France.225 Reisian explains, “Of course, the 
situation is concerning, and everyone wants full peace, but this missile strike caused no change 
in our activities. We continue living normally and residents are engaged in their daily 
activities.”226 This type of statement tends to be common for Reisian as he has previously, in 
2017, expressed his confidence that the number of Syrians returning will increase with time, as 
will the number of restorations to what has been lost and destroyed, clearly appealing to his 
public, understanding what is important to them.227 All of this cannot be analyzed though, 
without the context of the Syrian government’s support for this restoration and repatriation of the 
Armenian community. As per Reisian, “the Syrian government is making every effort so that the 
country’s population returns to normal life within a short period of time.”228 Without reading too 
much into these statements, it is important to note the delicate balance that has been struck here 
(possibly unintentionally and just as a result of years of living at the intersection of both the 
Armenian and Syrian realities) between appealing to the Armenian community’s needs. On one 
hand, there is this idea of preserving the Armenian elements of the community and, as explained 
in depth; that is done through rebuilding and strengthening Armenian institutions. On the other 
hand, the statement references the Syrian government’s support and care for this community, 
something that has been denied to the Armenian community in more hostile governments, 
thereby negatively affecting the preservation of their communal identity. This will be very 
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that the government support for the Syrian-Armenian community is, and has been for at least the 
past century, a subject of great concern for these people. Thus, by including both of these 
elements in his statements, (strengthening of the institutions/return to normalcy, and the 
government support) Reisian does the best he can in encouraging the Armenian community to 
come back to Syria. However, certain challenges still exist and one of the greatest obstacles to 
return is a lack of essential commodities in Syrian life.  
b. Reinstituting Adequate Standards of Living  
“The country is yet to be safe. It is in a crisis. Everything is expensive. Gas, electricity, and 
water resources are limited. The Syrian government is making efforts to fix these. The UN helps 
a lot. There are local NGOs and Unions helping too. But still more needs to be done.”  
  
 In one of the above-cited reports from MP Reisian, he says, “Infrastructure, including 
water and power supply, are also restored in the city, and all public services are operating 
normally.”229 While that may have been true for the most part last year in 2018, accounts from 
the ground suggest differently. One informant currently living in Yerevan says that “the situation 
in general this year for people in Aleppo is not as good as it was last year, because everything 
was good with electricity and water last year but this year not as much. They’re cutting 
electricity more and that’s why people aren’t as comfortable.”230 For almost every one of my 
respondents, they felt the quality of life is still below normal in their hometowns and this is the 
first obstacle that needs to be removed should they return, or for many of them, even consider 
returning. One informant told me that in order to consider returning, the conditions on the ground 
would have to be improved. I asked him what that would look like, would it include giving 
people new houses? He responded, “No, the basics. Electricity is a luxury there now. Gas and 
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petrol are luxuries, not basic things. We need to make those basic again.”231 This is a low 
standard to meet however in a war-ravaged country it is understandable that such things are 
lacking. Other informants expressed similar concerns. For example, one 63-year-old woman 
from Der Zor says, “My husband’s doctors had all fled from Syria, and he has heart problems. 
What else could we do at our age? At that point, we could be satisfied with just a piece of 
bread.”232 Perhaps we can take a moment to reflect upon what the situation must have been like 
to make expectations so low.  
In addition to restoring these basic elements to society, many participants expressed that 
justice for the Armenians in Syria would be served when they are able to return and continue 
working in Syria. While, once again, this may seem like a simplistic request for something as 
conceptually large as justice, the truth is that many of these Armenians from Syria were 
successful business people, selling jewelry to other Middle Eastern countries, or Turkey, and 
running factories, also dependent on trade and exporting.233 However, upon arrival in Armenia, 
one of the greatest hardships expressed by the 100+ interviewees I have spoken with is finding 
work in Armenia.234 Perhaps ¼ of the interviewees in the Rerooted archive mention that they, or 
a family member, still travel back and forth from Armenia to Syria to be able to run their 
businesses, make money, and support their families in Armenia. They put their lives at risk just 
to be able to live a very simple life, typically in worse conditions than they were living in Syria 
before the war, and so it is understandable that justice for many of them is the ability to work and 
make money once again, enabling them to support themselves, their families, and live a life of at 
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Lastly, shelter is another basic element that about half of my informants mentioned as a 
condition which they felt would be necessary for them to be able to return to, and rebuild, their 
lives in Syria. This, again, can be linked to the fact that in Armenia (where all my informants had 
resettled), paying for housing is perhaps the primary problem Rerooted interviewees mention 
when describing the greatest challenge faced when resettling in Armenia.235 Largely tied to the 
previous paragraph’s problem of lack of jobs, which then produces little to no income, the 
problem of housing is one that severely affects the quality of life in Armenia for many Syrian-
Armenians who have resettled in Armenia. Most often, the problem is that the rent is too high, 
and it is exacerbated by the fact that, as explained, finding a job, especially for those who are 
middle-aged or older, is extremely difficult. However, the prospects for housing in Syria are 
often no better, and this is because many of their houses were destroyed in the crossfire of 
shellings, and many others are being occupied by Syrians who have left their homes in other 
towns seeking refuge and safety as well. One of the basic hopes for a post-conflict Syria then, is 
housing; as one informant puts it: "a repaired Syria would be if everyone who wants to return to 
sell their properties are able to."236 Providing adequate housing and returning previously owned 
property to Syrians who wish to return will need to be a part of the Syrian government’s plan for 
reconstruction. Some Syrian government policy has already attempted to address property 
concerns, however, these policies have been largely criticized by organizations like Human 
Rights Watch.237 In law No. 10 of 2018, what was established as an urban planning law which 
supposedly did not affect property rights, in effect did affect property rights by allowing 
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authorities to seize property without due process or adequate compensation.238 The most relevant 
part of this law for this study is that it would create a significant obstacle to return.239 Not only 
does the Armenian community hesitate to return without homes or property to return to, but a 
significant segment of a surveyed refugee population said they were unlikely to return, according 
to a study done by the Carnegie Endowment of Peace.240  
If it is important to provide a legal argument for the re-installment of these basic elements 
of an adequate standard of living, we can look to Article 11 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).241 Syria acceded to this Covenant in 1969 thus 
providing some potential legal ground to ensure Syrian citizens attain an adequate standard of 
living for “himself, and his family, including food, clothing, and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.”242 Perhaps this can be an avenue through which returnees 
work with lawyers and policy makers to re-establish basic elements for an adequate standard of 
living in Syria.  
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Theme 2: Protecting the rights and liberties of all citizens 
“I can't know what justice is or will be. We can only hope for fair treatment for Syrians all over 
the world without discrimination.”243 
 The second theme that captures the general trends of Syrian-Armenian desires for post-
conflict reconstruction in Syria is protecting the rights and liberties of all citizens. When asked 
“what would justice for the Armenians in Syria look like to you,” a significant number of 
participants responded with both, “the same as others living in Syria,” and “for the Armenians to 
get back their rights.”244 This duality emphasizing both a special need for the Armenian 
community and a desire for non-distinction between the Armenian and non-Armenian Syrian 
community is what has largely defined so much of Armenian life in Syria for the last century. 
One informant responded to the abovementioned question regarding justice for Armenians by 
saying, “justice for Armenians would be imposing the same regulations on them as the other 
citizens. It would make no exceptions to any group.” That same day, a different informant 
answered this question saying,  
“Justice for Syria would be going back to having different religious communities  
peacefully living together. Justice for the Armenians would be the same as that, plus  
continuing to have Armenian churches and schools. If conditions became like they were  
before 2011, Armenians would have their rights back and this would be justice.”245   
 
Now, getting “back” one’s rights implies that such rights were taken away from the community, 
or that they do not presently maintain such rights. Thus, I will attempt to first explain what rights 
they are likely referring to, and while tying that into the incredibly important historical context of 
being minorities in Syria, I will expand upon why having their rights and liberties protected is an 




a. Analysis of which rights have been violated 
“Justice for the Armenians would be more access and freedom to express the Armenian 
life. We want Armenians to have the same rights, just like other native Syrians, we are all equal, 
we should be treated fairly by the government and the whole world. Give Armenians rights, like 
the ability to take loans from the government, so they can rebuild their homes and 
communities.”246 
 
While the anecdotal pieces demonstrate a very broad understanding of what “rights” are, 
their vagueness serves the understanding that asking for “rights” typically amounted to seeking 
equal treatment--to not be discriminated against as minorities. The numbers I have included in 
the annex charts with the results from my surveys are not concretely demonstrative of any data 
generalizable to the entire Syrian-Armenian population, however table 5 of Annex C partially 
demonstrates an understanding of the conflict. The questions from the table I would like to 
highlight are the ones regarding the Syrian government and whether or not the informant 
believed the government had violated basic human rights in Syria before and during the conflict. 
The majority of the participants with regard to both questions disagreed; they did not believe that 
the Syrian government had violated basic human rights in Syria neither before the conflict nor 
since its start. Section B below will help parse out why members of the Armenian community 
might have felt this way, however, what is important to mention here is that upon further 
questioning regarding what constitutes a violation, many participants (still not the majority 
though) did acknowledge that violations of basic human rights likely took place, but that they did 
not personally know of them (again, this will be elaborated upon in the next section). The human 
rights abuses they acknowledged were two-fold, most were abuses they recognized were 
committed by the present government, but others were abuses felt by the Armenian community 
committed by the Syrian government before the Assad regime came to power. I will now delve 
into an explanation of the former and the latter will be part of the discussion in section b.  																																																								246	Survey	Respondent.	
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Within the past eight years of the conflict in Syria there have been numerous human 
rights abuses and countless violations of international humanitarian law.247 Arrests, forced 
disappearances, indiscriminate attacks, torture, the use of outlawed weapons, and attacks on 
civilian objects all constitute just a fraction of the violations and human rights abuses committed 
in Syria.248 Even before the conflict though, it is important to point out the types of restrictions 
the Syrian government placed on its people, severely limiting their human rights. One of the 
most notable features of the Assad regime before the conflict was the lack of freedom of 
expression and the absence of political opposition. There were many crackdowns on political 
Islamic groups in the 80s and that continued through the rest of the century. The number of 
political prisoners and the authoritarian policies help add weight to the validity of what this one 
young Armenian had to say: “There was no freedom. You were not allowed to express yourself 
in any way. You couldn’t say anything bad about the regime, about the figures of the regime. 
They were controlling everything within the country, everything.”249 Upon elaboration of the 
question, “What would justice in Syria look like,” one informant said: “freedom of speech, 
having different political parties, democracy,” while another maintained, “a democratic 
government where people can exercise their basic human rights.”250 Thus, while Armenians may 
not have felt as though they experienced a lack of basic rights with the Assad regime, at the very 
least many recognized that such violations were being carried out against others.  
Notable in this section also is the fact that at least one fifth of Armenian informants in 
this study expressed disdain for, or at least an acknowledgement of, the fact that the Kurdish 
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about the Kurds because they are another minority community and thus they were more attentive 
to their treatment as a point of comparison to their own, or perhaps they are just a notable 
community because of the distinct treatment they receive. Whatever the reason, the points made 
are important indicators that many members of the Armenian community of Syria did 
acknowledge the mistreatment of other communities throughout the Assad regime and, as will be 
shown in theme three of this section regarding unity, they include the Kurdish population as an 
important part of a unified Syria. As for the content of these descriptions of discrimination, one 
informant notes that President Hafez Al-Assad stripped many Kurds of their citizenship, and 
another explains that, “after 1973, Armenians started to enjoy more freedom, but for example, 
Kurds still didn’t have a right to their language or any classes in school.”251  In attempting to 
explain why the treatment might have been worse for the Kurds, one student explains, “the 
Kurds always complained. They wanted to separate from Syria. Armenians live peacefully. We 
don’t want anything. We didn’t demand anything else. We complied with the laws.”252 While 
there is a lot to unpack in this statement, the important takeaway here is the understanding that 
other groups did suffer abuses by the government, and the perception that compliance with the 
law brings protection. This is a perception that, I would argue, has been created by many years of 
fear that governmental policies would be abusive and the best way to avoid that, was to comply. 
This will largely be the content of section b below.  
While the Armenians consider themselves a part of the larger Syrian community and do 
believe in rights being restored for the whole country, their emphasis on protecting the rights and 
liberties of all citizens seems to me not to be because they feel they have currently lost 
something, but rather, a fear that they could lose certain rights in a post-conflict Syria. This fear 
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is inspired by the very recent history many of them lived through as the regimes changed in Syria 
and their rights were constantly tied to the policies of the government. Thus, a new Syria is 
another change for them and along with that, comes the uncertainty of the fate of their rights. 
Being ethnic and religious minorities in Syria has been a source of discrimination and hostility 
for the Armenians at times, and thus their visions for a post-conflict Syria must be understood in 
the context that the uncertainty of change impacts their views greatly.  
b. The Syrian Government’s “Protection” of Minorities  
“All the world thinks that the regime is helping the minorities, actually, the minorities protected 
the regime. That’s the truth.”253  
 
Perhaps the most important part of this entire analysis is this section. I struggle in finding 
a way to include everything I feel is relevant to this discussion, and in no way do I wish to do 
disservice to this community by overgeneralizing or leaving something out. Thus, please, in your 
reading of this section, understand that it is difficult to capture trends in perceptions and that one 
study of 50 informants cannot accurately assess an entire community of 100,000+ people. That 
being said, let us delve into how perceptions of protection have become an integral part of the 
Armenian community’s understanding of their place in Syria, and how it informs their desires for 
justice and visions of repair for a post-conflict Syria. 
Decades without protection 
Throughout the last century, the Armenians in Syria, in one way or another, have been 
the subjects of restrictive government policies. At different points in their history they were 
either facing repressive policies by Islam being tied in some way to the government, or they were 
facing restrictions on their institutions and freedoms to associate and ability to preserve their 
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diverse identity by authoritarian regimes with Arab nationalist policies.254 During the earlier 
authoritarian regimes, the development of Armenian associations “suffered a number of halts, 
backlashes, and restrictions...as a part of a strategy to undermine any form of potential organized 
opposition.”255 This affected their ability to preserve their Armenian-ness and also subjected 
them to a climate of hostility towards foreign and non-Arab cultures that had pervaded the State. 
As has been described many times above, there were restrictions placed on associations, schools, 
publishing, and many outlets of expression that were cut off and still haven’t recovered in the 
modern day.256 The support for the Armenian schools from the international diaspora was 
subject to governmental control at one point, they lost their parliamentary representatives, their 
political parties were banned, their Armenian education was restricted, and due to all of this, they 
“virtually disappeared from public life.”257 Overall, the restrictive policies that suspended civil 
freedoms and tangibly impacted the ethno-cultural diversity of different minority communities in 
Syria had a significant influence on the way the Armenian communities have evolved and 
thereby, on their perceptions of a safe and secure Syria.258  
 Protections under the Al-Assad regime: the strategic importance of minorities 
“I never felt injustice in Syria towards Armenians.”259 
Albeit just one person’s perspective, the view expressed in the quote above seemed to be 
a shared sentiment amongst the majority of the informants in this study. Table 5 of Annex C 
demonstrates that more than 4/5ths of my survey respondents felt that one of the successes of the 
Syrian government was the protection of minorities. (This same fraction believed that one of the 
successes of the Syrian government was the maintenance of a unified Syria, but that will be 																																																								254	Migliorino,	(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,	110.	255	Ibid.,	131	256	Ibid.,	210	257	Ibid.,	109	258	Ibid.,221	259	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	
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discussed in theme three of this section below). This is likely a result of the fact that the Al-
Assad regime helped to redefine the spaces and conditions of co-existence of ethno-cultural 
groups in Syria and offered minority communities opportunities to persevere their unique 
identities.     
While officially denying their relevance, the Al-Assad regime has continued to use ethnic 
and sub-ethnic allegiances as a strategic political resource. This context has created for the 
Armenians (as for other social groups) some protected spaces where the community could 
continue to preserve its diversity. Hafez al-Assad had a strategy to broaden the regime’s bases of 
support through the creation of a strong, centralized state, promoting a distinct Syrian national 
identity within the wider pan-Arab nation.260 In simpler terms, his priority was the consolidation 
of the regime and the Armenian community was an important source of support for that plan. 
Thus, what Migliorino calls the tacit agreement between Assad and the Armenian community of 
Syria was born. At the official level, the state disregarded confessional and communal identities, 
however, Assad was aware that “the communal solidarity characterizing minorities like the 
Armenians represented an important asset and could play an important role in providing the new 
leadership with support.”261The tacit pact allowed state control over the communal activities of 
the Armenians to be relaxed as long as the government received the Armenian community’s 
support and acquiescence.262  
This brought certain rights and protections to the Armenians, many of which had been 
restricted through the previous governments. Under Assad, the Syrian government has 
consistently minimized interference in Armenian schools, and allowed for a liberal interpretation 
of the restrictive rules. This aforementioned tacit pact and “the sense of trust the regime has 																																																								260	Migliorino,		(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,	156.		261	Ibid.,	156	262	Ibid.,	156	
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developed for the Armenians has contributed remarkably to expand the area of cultural freedom 
enjoyed by the community, particularly when the consumption of Armenian culture takes place 
within Armenian spaces: the family, cultural association, club, etc.”263 However, the protections 
they were granted, though so done on the basis of genuinely established networks of trust, were 
ultimately dictated “primarily by the needs of legitimacy and stability of the state itself, the 
political system, or of the political leadership, rather than by  a recognition of the value of 
cultural diversity per se.”264 This is a great indication of why the Armenian community of Syria 
might be so worried about a new government, and why they preserve their allegiance to the 
entity that is protecting them, especially in Syria, because since the ideas and respect for cultural 
diversity are not actually ingrained within the governmental system, change can bring about 
severe violations and abuses for them. Many Syrians recognize that. For example, one young 
student from Aleppo says, “Bashar gave us this illusion that we would lose our rights if we 
disconnected from him.”265 Another participant said, “The world thinks the regime is protecting 
minorities, but they used us as an image. They said to the world, ‘see, there are Armenians here, 
Turkmen here, Kurds here, we are protecting them from the others,” but it was not like that. We 
were hard working people, that’s why we survived there, not because of the regime protecting us, 
no.”266  
 This is an important perspective because it demonstrates the fact that many people do see 
the political undertones of the situation, (also keep in mind that these were both young men 
under the age of 30 speaking, so perhaps they don’t fully know the same oppressive reality of the 
past that their parents and grandparents might remember and thus be influenced by). At the same 
time, it is also important to understand why the Armenian community members would want to 																																																								263	Ibid.,	209	264	ibid.,	222	265	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	266	Survey	Respondent.	
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further the belief that the government is generally helping all of its citizens under the belief that 
all Syrians are united (a concept we will delve into further in the section on unity below in theme 
three). This is demonstrated by the following interaction. When I asked one informant if he felt 
that there should be a different kind of repair or justice for the Armenian community of Syria as 
compared to other Syrian communities he immediately rejected such an idea. He said: 
“No no no this is not a good idea to suggest. No. Forget about thinking about Armenians 
as a minority. We are a member of the Syrian nation. We have to be, we must be treated, 
just like any Muslim, Kurdish, Alawite, any of us must be treated equally. This was the 
policy of the government, and it is the policy of the government even up until now.”267  
 
This comment is critical because it demonstrates the relative success of previous 
government agendas in Syria to promote nationalism by inducing an element of fear in the 
Armenian community to admit their unique ethno-religious identities. However, the Armenian 
community is not devoid of agency as it is clear the Armenians comply with, and take on, this 
notion of seeming united. However, in order to preserve this, they must be seen as an indistinct 
part of the whole. They have mastered that well, but an important point to note is that it is not 
solely up to the Armenian community whether they will have rights or not (in other words, it is 
not solely determined by their compliance or non-compliance); it is largely dependent on the 
government. Thus, perhaps the most important point to take away from this entire subsection is 
that there is a widely shared perception amongst the Syrian-Armenian community interviewed 
that they would be threatened should there be any type of change in the government, especially 
any change towards removing its secular nature.  
c. The Importance of a Secular Syria  
“For Armenians, freedom is what we understand it is, like democracy. But for the opposition, it's 
to turn Syria into a Muslim state and get rid of the secular government.”268   
 																																																								267	Survey	Respondent.	(Also,	a	side	note:	this	person	spoke	in	English	so	I	kept	the	grammar	as	was)	268	Survey	Respondent.	
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As I hope has been made clear above, the prospect of a governmental change brings with 
it potentially damaging consequences. The current approach of the Syrian state towards ethno-
cultural diversity is ambiguous and the tacit agreements in place with Armenians (along with 
other minority communities) “appear both volatile and uncertain.”269 As Migliorino so perfectly 
explains, “as relations between the regime and a community like the Armenians are maintained 
at a merely informal level, they tend to offer no guarantees and they are potentially subject to 
sudden policy changes and to the consequences of a change of the regime.”270 This is such a 
critical point for understanding why so many Armenians in this study had no strong preference 
for a regime change, or at least did not emphasize it as much as is often emphasized as 
recommendations for a post-conflict Syria in reports published based on interviews with majority 
communities in Syria.271 A new government would necessitate a renewed discussion on ethno-
cultural diversity and it is possible that the Armenians in Syria would not be allowed to maintain 
their strong connections with Armenia and the Armenian diaspora through unrestricted access to 
Armenian culture, language, religion, and more. Ultimately, it is possible that spaces would not 
be preserved for Armenian identity, nor would the creation or preservation of such spaces 
receive encouragement or protection from the Syrian government. So, a key to understanding 
this desire for the government to remain secular is in recognizing the dangers and concerns that 
come with being a minority group that’s been oppressed in the past because of the very qualities 
that make them diverse. For most of my survey participants, these questions of preserving ethno-
cultural diversity comprise some of their greatest concerns about return and life in a post-conflict 
Syria, and ultimately inform their desire for there to be no large change in the post-conflict 
government. It is important to note that perhaps half of the survey participants do suggest 																																																								269	Migliorino,		(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,	156.	270	Ibid.,	223	271	el-Hariri,	“Unheard	Voices.”	
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important structural changes to certain governmental policies and an elimination of corruption, 
but it is not necessarily with the belief that the president should change. Some of the reforms 
they suggest are as follows: abandoning the draft, not bribing people, not misusing documents, 
promoting greater freedom of speech, and including a representative from each faction in the 
government. While these were suggestions compiled from different interviews, one respondent 
sums it up well: “the repaired country will be for the people, not government, to correct all the 
mistakes which were economic and political.”272 This being said, a significant portion believed 
President Assad should stay in power “not just for the protection of minorities, but for 
civilization.”273 However, whether they wanted President Assad himself to stay in power, or 
whether they solely wanted to preserve the policies he enacted for their protection, is an 
important distinction to draw. 
 In addition to the fact that, as explained above, the Assad regime provided reassurance 
that minority rights would be protected (whether true or just part of his political discourse is 
insignificant here), President Assad also constructed the perception that if he were not in power, 
religious extremists would control the government. This became particularly prevalent in the 
context of the current conflict and only fortified the perception that Assad was a protector of the 
minorities. The government disseminated information that suggested that if the country doesn’t 
unite, then Islamic extremists are going to take over.274 It was a type of widespread manipulation 
where the popular perception was that the government was the stronger and better option for 
protecting its population from extremists.275 However, I call it a manipulation because the Syrian 
government had themselves “helped incubate the extremism that led to the rise of the Islamic 																																																								272	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	273	Survey	Respondent.	274	“Syria’s	Minorities	and	the	Paradox	of	Neutrality,”	Syria,	accessed	May	8,	2019,	https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/community/2016/02/16/syrias-minorities-and-the-paradox-of-neutrality.	275	“Analysis:	Why	Assad’s	Propaganda	Isn’t	As	Crazy	As	It	Seems	—	Syria	Deeply,”	accessed	May	8,	2019,	https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2016/10/03/analysis-why-assads-propaganda-isnt-as-crazy-as-it-seems.	
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State and the further spread of jihadism in Syria.”276 In 2011 “the majority of the current ISIS 
leadership was released from jail by President Assad.”277 Although no one in the regime has 
admitted or explained why that might be so, Robert Ford, (the last US ambassador to Syria), 
maintains that Assad’s own regime released thousands of jihadists from the prisons after the 
uprisings against him began to destabilize the country in order to create an enemy so that 
President Assad could convince the West that he was a better choice than the rebels to help battle 
ISIS and jihadism.278 In other words, to garner national and international support, the 
government released jihadists from Syrian prisons knowing they would form the nucleus of 
Daesh and Al Nusra and that helped paint a mirage of the revolution and conflict having a 
sectarian nature, positioning Assad as the savior.  
These perceptions of division and Assad’s ability to protect its people reached far and 
deep into many communities’ understandings of the conflict. A greater in depth discussion 
regarding how these perceptions were crafted and how to untangle them will be a large focus of 
theme three below, however they serve as important contextual factors for understanding the 
opinions in this section and why there exists such a belief that if Assad leaves, a religious 
extremist will likely control the country. Secularism afforded Armenians equal treatment that 
doesn’t exist in neighboring countries and losing Assad became linked to losing secularism. 
 Upon asking one informant “When the conflict ends, do you think the president will stay 
in power?,” he responded: 
“No, no, it’s not will, we want him to. All the Syrian people want him to stay, because 
he’s a good solution. The whole picture of the country will change [if he leaves]. Syria 
will turn into Afghanistan. Christians won’t be able to live there. It’s not that I’m 
defending the Christians and the Armenians are part of it, I’m thinking about Syrian 																																																								276	Alexander	Griffing,	“How	Assad	Helped	Create	ISIS	to	Win	in	Syria	and	Got	Away	With	the	Crime	of	the	Century,”	Haaretz,	October	7,	2018,	https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/MAGAZINE-iran-russia-and-isis-how-assad-won-in-syria-1.6462751.	277	Simon	Speakman	Cordall	On	6/21/14	at	12:40	PM	EDT,	“How	Syria’s	Assad	Helped	Forge	ISIS,”	Newsweek,	June	21,	2014,	https://www.newsweek.com/how-syrias-assad-helped-forge-isis-255631.	278	ibid.	
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civilization. And we know, wherever the Muslim extremism comes, civilization is 
gone.”279 
 
While this perspective was not explicitly expressed by other participants as transparently, it was 
a commonly held attitude (to varying extremes) that was referenced in elaborations and shaped 
responses in different ways. In one way, it was tied to security and feeling safe in Syria. The best 
summary of these shared sentiments is in one woman’s very simple statement: “if a radical 
Muslim took over the country as leader, Armenians wouldn’t feel as safe.”280 In the context of 
all the protections described above granted to ethno-diverse groups within the secular 
governments in Syria, it becomes clear how statements like this, (based on the perception that 
extremism is a threat to a safe and secure life in Syria), form these communities’ realities. 
Furthermore, the fear that such a change would impact safety and security is also demonstrated 
by comments that suggest the involvement of external actors, particularly non-secular states, who 
aim to impose Islam as an official religion of the country, should the government collapse. If you 
look at table 6 in annex C, you can see that perceptions of responsibility for the conflict include 
many international actors, and upon elaboration, those who indicated responsibility for other 
Middle Eastern countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Iraq, Turkey, and the Gulf States in 
general) many informants expressed a fear that these countries want to convert Syria from a 
secular regime to a religious one, as it is an outlier amongst many of its neighbors in this regard. 
One participant expressed this in saying, “We need to teach people to have broader perspectives, 
but unfortunately, Arab countries prefer to be homogenous.” Once again, this is merely a 
perception, however, that is what this analysis is largely about- assessing how these perceptions 
inform participants’ beliefs that what is protecting Syria and its secularism is President Assad.  
																																																								279	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	280	Survey	Respondent.	
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In line with the comment above that mentions the need to teach people to have broader 
perspectives, many respondents suggested Syrian education reform. These respondents expressed 
that their belief that rampant extremism existed in the country was a key factor in their decision 
not to return, unless perhaps there was education reform. One informant said, “the mentality of 
the people in the country has changed a lot and this is problematic to return. We need more 
education activities/initiatives to change that mentality back.”281 This view that many of the 
people left in Syria have been “brainwashed”282 was fairly common and it was often noted as an 
obstacle to return and tied to the need to implement and reform education initiatives. Perhaps ⅕ 
of my participants expressed a concern that it was almost hopeless to return to Syria without 
education programs in place for tolerance and nonviolence. These participants shared the view 
that “the truth of the Syrian conflict is that other countries provoked it and the people became 
victims of uneducated radicals.”283 They worried that a large portion of society that remained in 
Syria and are now living in the cities were “from villages and weren’t educated enough, so you 
say something, and they believe it. That’s the main issue.”284  Often linking Islamic extremism 
with those from the villages as well, these same participants feared that, as a result of a multitude 
of factors (a. that villages are less diverse than cities and thus those from there were not often 
exposed to different viewpoints or religions/ethnicities, b. that many extremist movements 
started and grew in the villages, and c. that the quality of education is worse, or less 
comprehensive, in villages), the new generation of Syrians living in the cities would be intolerant 
of Armenians. Thus, unless there were education reforms for the children of those they felt were 
promoting intolerance in Syria, they would not feel safe to return. This point necessitates a 
deeper conversation of the very varied perceptions on all sides within the conflict, and that will 																																																								281	Survey	Respondent.	282	Survey	Respondent.	283	Survey	Respondent.	284	Survey	Respondent.	
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be the point of discussion in the next section, particularly with regard to truth commission-like 
efforts.  
Overall, the attitudes that informed the analysis in this section were largely tied to the 
notion that peace, stability, and a unified Syria could not come if there were a non-secular 
government. Within the last decade or so, largely as a result of the regime’s discourse, the 
commonly held perception has been that Islamic extremism was rampant in Syria.  It might be 
important to note here that Armenians especially started fearing radical Islam around this time 
because the groups they were victimized by included Daesh and other extremist groups. Before 
moving on, it is important to make absolutely clear that none of this context that I have provided 
is meant to justify the Armenian suggestions, or argue that President Assad should stay in power. 
He has committed many violations and while justice for one group might mean keeping him in 
power, for another it means removing him, and both of those perspectives should be taken into 
consideration when negotiations and mediations ensue for a post-conflict Syria. However, the 
helpful part of surveys like the one used in this study is that they go deeper than the surface 
comment that "Assad should stay in power." In understanding the context behind, "why" he 
should stay in power, we've understood that it is because Armenians of Syria tend to associate 
him with a secular government. Thus, perhaps the recommendation from this section and this 
part of the study is that, for the Armenians, and minority groups at large in Syria, it will be very 
important for them to have a secular government, should there be a regime change, and that is 
something I believe much of the Syrian society can support. 
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Theme 3: (Re)Creating a Unified Syria  
 Q; “What would justice in Syria look like to you?” 
 A:  “A unified Syria respecting the ethnicity, religion, and equality of others. Everyone 
living peacefully together again.”  
 
 This idea that Syria is not currently unified arguably began as a creation of the State, 
however, over the past eight years of the Syrian conflict, it has largely become a reality. Whether 
this was felt within certain communities though, seems to vary, and within the Armenian 
community particularly, there was a wide range in beliefs, as gathered from my interviews and 
survey responses. There were at least three questions on the survey form that aimed to gauge 
notions of unity within Syria. One question, (found in table 5 of annex C) asked participants to 
agree or disagree with the following statement: “One of the successes of the Syrian government 
was the maintenance of a unified Syria.” 41 people agreed and only 4 disagreed.  Another 
question (found in table 8 of annex C) asked people to agree or disagree with the statement: 
“Divisions created amongst Syrians during the conflict in Syria are now forgotten.” 34 
participants disagreed, while 8 agreed, and 9 said they didn’t know. The next question of interest 
(table 9 of annex C) asked participants to select all the options that would make them feel like 
there had been justice with regard to the Syrian conflict. 26 people selected, “unifying Syria so 
there are no more factions, and no divides amongst people for religion, ethnicity, etc.” Another 
option that 30 people selected was, “Syrian government support for those who wish to return to 
Syria,” and a follow up question to each of these people determined that they all believed this 
should apply to any Syrian who wishes to return, regardless of ethnicity.  Lastly, in response to 
this same question regarding justice in Syria, 24 people selected that “the symbols that indicate 
loyalty to the opposition should be removed from public places.”285  While this could be 
																																																								285	Numbers	like	26,	30,	and,	24	indicate	a	relatively	high	level	of	support	as	the	support	each	choice	received	ranges	from	between	5	and	37	
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interpreted as a preference for the regime over the opposition, the more relevant point here is 
that, as the term “opposition” includes all groups that are not the government, this response can 
also be interpreted as a desire for unity, and that is certainly how participants who selected it had 
elaborated upon it.   
More indirectly, open-ended “fill in” questions like, “what would justice or repair look 
like to you in post-conflict Syria,”286 had the potential to gauge opinions of unity as well. 
Without any prompting, unity very often came up as an element that people mentioned they 
needed in a post-conflict Syria, whether they anticipated returning or not. The majority of the 
answers of this type could be represented by these responses: “repair will be unity and bringing 
people together,” or “justice should be the same for all—not different based on religion or 
ethnicity.”287 These comments were so prevalent because at least half of the Syrian-Armenians I 
interviewed held the view that Syria was now divided and hoped for reunification processes. As I 
will explain shortly with reference to the principal of Kulna Suriyyn, many Syrian-Armenians 
truly did view Syria as united and it was a very important part to their successful dual existence 
in Syria as Armenians and Syrians. One Armenian man demonstrates this in saying: 
“The Armenian community in Syria is proud of the Arab people. We feel proud that the 
Arab people took us in. When we ran away from the Turks, Arabs looked after us. And for 
90, 95 years we lived peacefully with Arab people. We were proud to live together.”288 - 
Krikor Sahagian, 64 from Aleppo  
 
Getting along with Arabs and Alawites and Sunnis and Shia, etc., was partly a result of 
the gratitude they felt toward Syrians while also a critical component of the safety, stability, and 
preservation of their communities. Living in unity meant no divisive distinctions that would 
facilitate their discrimination, and with the tumultuous history of discriminatory policies towards 																																																								286	These	were	separate	questions	within	the	survey.	The	responses	above	come	from	questions	41-44	287	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	288	Rerooted	
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those who were different, a “united” Syria (where diversity was still privately respected and 
allowed), was a safe Syria.  Exemplifying this, one woman says, “Justice for Syria starts with 
peace and ends with respecting one another's ethnicity and religion.” Another informant says, 
“People should be more humane and there should be peace and tolerance.”289 One last quote that 
echoes these is, “repair would be to bring Syria back to how it was when people didn’t 
discriminate and everyone gets their rights back. The Government should treat all the same so 
that they can unify the country.”290  
This idea of a unified country is something that many Syrian-Armenian informants 
expressed they felt was the status quo in Syria.  Some informants did not believe Syria was ever 
divided. They said, “We were never divided, we all just lived in different neighborhoods,” or, 
“Syria has always been unified. It was international actors who brought the war into Syria.”  
Another way this was expressed was in saying, “Christians and Muslims don't have issues. 
intervening countries have problems with each other and with Syria.”291 Religious tolerance 
seemed to be a very commonly held component of unity. One respondent suggests that, “we 
should go back to having different religious communities peacefully living together.” So where 
did these ideas of unity originate and why does unification seem so important to them? Kulna 
Suriyyn can help answer that. As explained above in section three, the formula “Kulna Suriyyn” 
meaning, “we are all Syrians” helps provide an understanding of the importance of unity.  
Still today (and definitely around 2008 when Migliorino’s book was published), the 
question of ethnicity “remains one of the most persistent taboos in Syrian official discourse.”292 
While the regime may privately grant an ethnically diverse community certain freedoms in 
																																																								289	Survey	Respondent,	Interview..	This	was	translated	as	“unbiasedness”	but	I	think	proper	substitutes	would	be	tolerance,	or	non	discriminatory	policies.		290	Survey	Respondent.	291	Survey	Respondent.	292	Migliorino,	(Re)	Constructing	Armenia	in	Lebanon	and	Syria,	110.	
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exchange for support, publicly, it downplays the existence of such allegiances. Nevertheless, it is 
no secret; “Syrians are generally well aware of the diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious makeup 
of their towns and villages, and of the role that ethnicity plays in Syrian politics, but so are they 
about the regime-imposed red lines concerning discussion on the issue in public spaces.”293 So, 
as seen in the quotes above that some people maintained there were no distinctions among the 
people and communities in Syrian society, those comments were likely a preferred way of 
viewing the reality, than actually believing that to be the reality. As Migliorino explains, “both 
the regime and the society at large appear to be aware of the gap, and often find it convenient to 
resort to a neutral and still not untrue formula: Kulna Suriyyn: ‘we are all Syrians.’ ”294  
 While it is hard to generalize from my results what the tendencies were amongst different 
generations since the sample size was so small, this formula of Kulna Suriyyn can potentially 
help explain why the younger generation was more likely to openly tell me in interviews that 
there were divisions amongst different communities, whereas the older generations who lived 
through the creation of this kind of tacit agreement and understanding of Kulna Suriyyn were 
less likely to point out those differences. For those members of the older generations who were 
more likely to feel that Syria was more divided now, than before, it is possible they didn't see, (or 
chose not to see), those differences in the past, due to this principle. An important point to 
highlight here is that when Syrian-Armenians say they felt Syria was united, it makes sense that 
it probably comes from the Syrian government’s strategic formula, however, I would argue that 
it was also a strategy the Armenians adopted at times so that their freedoms would not be 
infringed upon when other political groups or ethnic institutions were being shut down due to the 
belief they were a threat to society if they were opposed to the government. While the 
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103		
government needed to propagate this narrative for their own ends of promoting a nationalistic 
Syria, the Armenians needed to take it on at times too to demonstrate they were not a threat, and 
ultimately, many really came to believe it.  
Given the explanation that Kulna Suriyyn helps provide an understanding for why 
unification held so much weight in Syria for the Armenians, it is important to explore how these 
perceptions of unification have begun to disappear. While many felt that the country was unified, 
others believe ties amongst different communities have been severed and, for some, they are 
revealing their belief that such ties never existed in the first place. One respondent says, “justice 
would be to go back to a normal, peaceful life. For me, my childhood in Syria was peaceful. I 
couldn’t say I was different as an Armenian than any local Syrian person.”295 This study 
represented some of the different perceptions and attitudes people in the Syrian-Armenian 
community hold about the unity of the community. Some were ignorant of the divisions, either 
because they left Syria early, did not keep up with the unfolding of the conflict, or only paid 
attention to matters within strictly Armenian circles. Others believed that President Assad had 
already mended the divisions (a perception that is likely as a result of government-produced 
media in Syria), while a smaller group understood the political realities of this false narrative. 
This latter group, undoubtedly the minority of those in this survey, expressed with confidence 
their belief that “There were no divisions in the first place. This division was framed for the 
conflict.”296 The variation in perceptions of unity was further elaborated upon by two informants 
who explained their understanding of the evolution of the situation in greater detail: One student 
explained that in a post-conflict Syria: 
“First of all, they should stop fighting. There is a lot of hate among people. You cannot 
forget that now. That’s a huge part of the situation. Alawites and Sunnis hate each other. 																																																								295	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	296	Survey	Respondent.	
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They hated each other since the Mohammed days. But it’s obvious now. There’s a lot of 
blood involved now, they killed/massacred each other and it’s not easy to forget all that. 
Peace can’t come until these divisions are melded.”297  
 
In another participant’s response about the Syrian conflict and what repair should look 
like in a post-conflict Syria, unity is also referenced heavily in an enlightening way: 
“What is democracy? It’s not this democracy and civilization that America and Europe 
are pretending to give us.  It’s not just judging the people; it’s living in harmony with 
multi-cultures. This is democracy. We used to live in democracy. Syrian people used to 
live in democracy, breathe democracy, they have democracy in their blood. We lived in a 
multi-culture as one. In Syria we used to live with each other. Muslim, Christian, Alawite. 
Ten years ago, I used to think of Muslims as brothers. We didn’t have any conflict with 
them. We used to even celebrate Ramadan with them. I remember myself I stayed one 
month fasting with my friends. We used to like each other. But the Muslim religion in 
Syria used to be moderate. 
 
Anybody who knows about the ABC’s of the conflict knows that it is the Christian-Muslim 
relations that need to be repaired first. Then the Alawite-Sunni relations. It wasn’t that 
perfect before, but it was somehow going well. Those are the main relations which were 
destroyed and we have to think about rebuilding that because if we are thinking about 
rebuilding the country with multi-culture, Orthodox, Muslim, Christian, Alawite, 
Catholic, Druze, whatever it is, we have to think about the religious relations between 
them. Another perspective on what relationships have been broken and need to be fixed 
are Sunni and Shia. Also, Kurds need to be reintegrated into a united Syria.”298  
 
This perspective so perfectly lays out the views held by the majority of my respondents 
regarding the perceptions of a previously unified Syria, how the conflict has altered that, and the 
renewed need for unification and bond-strengthening across many different communities. One 
question still remains unanswered though—where did these perceptions of non-unification come 
from? When did the shift occur from believing there was a unified Syria to feeling division? This 
is the subject the next section will explore.  
a. Sectarian Syria: from Government Creation to Reality 
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An analysis of primary sources from the government and other news outlets in Syria, as 
well as external reports from transnational media networks will demonstrate how the government 
created sectarian divides that eventually became the lived reality on the ground. An important 
implication of the fact that society is divided is the notion that this would necessitate transitional 
justice processes for a change in government because “a divided society does not typically go 
away unless the structure is changed. Thus, the reality of such divisions adds weight to the claim 
that transitional justice is the healthier, long-term approach for change in this conflict.299   
For at least the past century in Syria, the government has created sectarian divisions in 
order to gain the most support possible from different communities in Syria. This is perhaps one 
of the nuclei of the problem in Syria—the heart of the conflict—as privately capitalizing on 
diversity while publicly limiting it has been a core element of successful Syrian governments and 
presently, both approaches are largely non-existent. However, trying to regain that allegiance 
with the communities it had lost has been a primary aim of the Syrian government for the past 
eight years and the techniques undertaken to do this demonstrate the all too familiar need for the 
government to control all segments of society if it is to remain in power. The Assad regime 
knows this well and so, while backwards seeming, it is widely believed that they crafted a plan to 
create division to ultimately spur and re-instill unity.  
Assad’s Creation: 
As explained above in theme two, to garner national and international support, the 
government released jihadists from Syrian prisons knowing they would form the nucleus of 
Daesh and Al Nusra and that helped create an illusion of the revolution and conflict having a 
sectarian nature, positioning Assad as the savior.  How this perception was crafted, and then 
actualized, is the topic of this subsection. One Syrian woman with whom I spoke who is 																																																								299	phone	conversation	with	HRW	IJ	researcher		
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currently working with the IIIM shared her belief that "the regime has vilified anyone who is not 
on their side. They use sectarian language, and publish propaganda in magazines and newspapers 
created by the Syrian government. There is no free media.”300 In line with these comments, it 
seems that the regime has perpetuated the conflict by inciting sectarian differences and violence. 
It is widely believed by many experts that Assad “concocted a legitimizing narrative [which] 
portrayed the oppositionists as violent, foreign, sectarian Islamists...in the hope that only 
jihadists and his regime would be left for Syrians and the world to choose from.”301 President 
Assad wanted to garner support in creating such division and an example of the success of his 
efforts can be seen in comments like that from the quote above where the interviewee says “the 
Muslims in Syria used to be moderate.” This perception of intolerant Islam was arguably created 
by Assad himself, as suggested earlier in theme two. 
When people (like the Armenians cited above) say that they feel Syria is not united, 
perceptions aside, they are factually correct. Since the beginning of the conflict, Syria has 
experienced massive fragmentation. Even just two years into the conflict, by 2013, the Red Cross 
identified that the rebels had split into hundreds of groups.302 By 2018, the Carter Center 
indicated that there were more than one thousand groups.303 This is unprecedented. Up until that 
point the Lebanese civil war was the conflict with the most factions with a paltry 35 groups. The 
division in Syria resulted from the government’s creation of a market place within the opposition 
where they fought for international aid. Groups had to compete with each other to get access to 
resources. Preference over time was given to those with more Islamist ideologies and this created 
a shift away from the focus on the Free Syrian Army (FSA) toward other groups, alongside the 																																																								300	IIIM	contributor,	Phone	conversation.	301	Griffing,	“How	Assad	Helped	Create	ISIS	to	Win	in	Syria	and	Got	Away	With	the	Crime	of	the	Century.”	302	“Syria’s	Rebels	Split	into	Hundreds	of	Groups,	Red	Cross	Officials	Says,”	Washington	Post,	accessed	May	8,	2019,	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-rebels-split-into-hundreds-of-groups-red-cross-officials-says/2013/05/13/42568602-bbdf-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html.	303	Kenneth	R.	Rosen,	“There’s	Been	a	Global	Increase	in	Armed	Groups.	Can	They	Be	Restrained?,”	The	New	York	Times,	August	31,	2018,	sec.	Magazine,	https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/magazine/armed-groups-increase-sudan-icrc.html.	
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simultaneous massive fragmentation of the armed opposition.304 This division was critical for 
President Assad’s success, especially because it helped create a Syria where a settlement without 
him remaining in power was out of the picture.305 The regime’s success had always been based 
on very personal sets of relationships that Hafez Al-Assad set up with the Sunni middle class, 
Alawites, and other groups, which Bashar then took over. President Assad put himself at the 
center of these relationships and within this massive fragmentation of Syrian society, a Syria 
without Assad seems likely to only bring more chaos and disruption to the unity of the nation. 
Thus, for those who valued unity, which arguably much of the society did through the formula of 
Kulna Suriyyn, President Assad remaining in power seemed a reasonable and desirable option.  
b. Divided Perceptions and Implications for Domestic Responsibility 
“Imagine a cake. Syria is a cake. It is a very rich country; it has everything. It’s a big cake and 
all the big countries want to share from this big cake.” -26 year old male, Kessab, March 2019 
 
“The FSA and Daesh are silhouettes. They are puppets of the international actors.” -March 
2019 
 
 One of the most notable features of my survey responses and interviews is the divided 
perceptions in the understanding of the conflict, including why it started, who is responsible, and 
why it is still ongoing.  As is evidenced by table 6 in annex C, perceptions of responsibility vary 
fairly evenly between FSA, terrorist groups, and international actors, with the USA and Turkey 
being the two most highly mentioned contributing/responsible external actors. The Syrian 
government also was commonly selected as a responsible actor, however not as often as the 
others. Questions gauging what the “truth” of the conflict was demonstrated that the truth is 
incredibly complicated and even within the Armenian community, there is no consensus.  
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However, there were many trends, especially having to do with placing culpability on external 
actors instead of those within Syria.  
 When asked what they felt was the cause of the war in Syria, many of this study’s 
respondents referenced external, international actors as the cause for blame. Some of the 
different explanations include, “greediness of powerful countries”; “other people provoked it and 
the people became victims of uneducated radicals”306; “Syria was too strong of a country in the 
Middle East and presented a threat”; and the most common explanation is exemplified in this 
powerful metaphor: “Syria is a cake and everyone wants a piece.” Whether that was in reference 
to its oil, land, strategic location, lack of debt, or something else, many Syrian-Armenian 
participants felt that the conflict was brought in externally by those who wished to “destroy the 
resources, unity, and people of a rich country that had no debt.”307 In line with this, one 
researcher at the International Peace Institute says, “looking at it geopolitically, Syria is at the 
heart of the Middle East, everything is running through it,” which helps validate the claims that 
there was indeed something of interest in the country for the intervening nations.  Although there 
was variation in the perceptions of the cause of the conflict, one thing was commonly believed, 
that if those international actors left Syria alone, it would be able to repair itself and progress just 
as it had been doing before the conflict. This perception affected notions for reparations by 
creating internationally focused demands, like demanding financial compensation from external 
actors responsible for the damage.  
 However, as one Syria researcher at HRW makes clear, this is a common pattern in 
conflicts like the Syrian one. She explains,  
“Usually what happens is that both parties to the conflict and communities that are under them 
will say, ‘oh if ISIS is gone everything will be better, or all of these people are terrorists funded 																																																								306	Survey	Respondent,	Interview.	307	Survey	Respondent.	
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by Qatar, Turkey, and US and once they leave and pay the price, our country will be better.’ 
Generally, states use this as a way to deflect from themselves. Communities use this because it’s 
much easier than looking at the community structure. In transitional justice efforts, I would 
strongly push back against those kinds of arguments. Even if Russia, and the US have had a role 
that’s less than constructive in the conflict, the people you’re talking to can do very little about 
it, so the conversation should be redirected to what they can do.”308 
 
These are critical points and one important reason for looking to the communities themselves to 
change is because if they don’t, then how can one ensure these communities will avoid getting 
involved in more human rights violations in a post-conflict setting? How does one avoid future 
cycles of violence if the survivors aren’t paid much attention and the community structures that 
produced such violence aren’t restructured or at least reconsidered/re-thought-out?  This is a 
compelling argument for the need to recognize internal responsibility and act upon it in a post-
conflict setting. In terms of Syrian-Armenians, many of their responses regarding who should be 
responsible and involved in aiding Syria in its reconstruction phase were nuanced and diverse, 
and thus merit discussion.  
In light of these considerations of external blame and international culpability, it is 
important to expand upon one divided opinion amongst the Syrian-Armenian respondents. The 
opinion was divided evenly with half of the participants who felt the international community 
should help, and the other half who felt that only Armenian institutions should be involved in 
helping rebuild the Armenian community; as one man put it, “Each community should help its 
own community. Do you look after your own kids or your neighbor’s kids?”309 Other reasoning 
for the Armenian community helping other Armenians was because some felt that “international 
organizations should not be involved in rebuilding communities and infrastructure because they 
would ruin more.” The aid should come from the countries that were with Syria, not against 
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it.”310 It’s possible that many Armenians in Syria look to other Armenians today to help rebuild 
their communities because that has been the general pattern in Syria for the last century.311 When 
Armenian churches and schools were becoming part of the urban landscapes of the new 
Armenian quarters in Aleppo and other important Syrian cities, the international Armenian 
community was supporting these efforts. Organizations like the Calouste Gulbenkian foundation 
and AGBU helped the communities grow and develop. The US branch of the AGBU, for 
example, organized a fund-raising campaign to support Armenian schools and within two years 
the AGBU was allocating funds from a collected amount of about $250,000 for the replacement 
of old school buildings.312  
Conversely, the argument in favor of international aid for Syria maintains that Syria is 
not strong enough to rebuild the country on its own. One respondent says, “Syria can’t spend $6 
billion worth to rebuild. If the international community leaves, who is going to rebuild the 
country?”313 Another respondent says, “the country is not as stable as it was before the conflict 
so I don’t think it would be good for all the international actors to leave the conflict.”314 As for 
direct aid, many interviewees echoed the following sentiment regarding the type of aid that 
should be given:  
“All the international figures involved in the war should give reparations to the Syrian 
government in order to rebuild the infrastructure of the country, that’s the most 
important thing. Rebuild all the homes that were lost during the conflict so that people 
can go back and live their ordinary lives like before the conflict. I’m not talking about 
just the Armenians, I’m talking about all the Syrians, all the 50 million people who fled 




The difference in desire for international aid or non-international involvement stems from many 
different arguments and lines of reasoning, however, one of the most important types of aid that 
can be brought in and can be implemented by both international and national actors are justice 
mechanisms like truth commissions that can help advance the unification process, while not 
centering the focus (either for assigning or escaping from culpability) on external actors, but 
rather allowing the Syrians to be the center.   
  
 c.  A Proposed Unification Process  
“My house is destroyed and if I return to Syria I will be emotionally destroyed. For redress, 
anyone guilty should be punished first, and society should come back together because if they 
rebuild without justice, it will all be destroyed again.”315   
 
The quote above is critical because it foreshadows a worrisome reality in which when 
divisions are ignored and impunity defines a nation, the pillars of society are arguably weakened, 
and thus, without a strong foundation the fabric of communities can easily tear once more. One 
of the most promising ways to strengthen this fabric is through leveling the perceptions and 
ensuring everyone is living in the same reality. As of now, with the thousand factions in Syria, 
the “truth” is non-existent. As we’ve seen, the narratives that exist are the ones that different 
groups would like one to believe, but a deeper exploration of the truths beyond propaganda is 
necessary if Syria is to be unified once again. One way to achieve this is through truth 
commissions.  
A Syrian researcher at Human Rights Watch agreed with the need for bridging perceptions, 
however she disagreed that a truth commission would be the most effective option for this. She 
explains:  
“If you move in Syrian post-conflict circles everyone will tell you that a truth commission 
would not be efficient because of the amount of independent documentation there has been, 																																																								315	Survey	Respondent.	
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and the subsequent impact it has had on peoples’ perceptions. There’s a perceived bias in the 
way that each party to the conflict and each side controls the narrative and each entity does 
not take any other seriously.  
 
In a situation like this, an official truth commission wouldn’t be very effective. More 
effective, and what we’ve seen happen, in much smaller examples where there has been more 
success in creating social cohesion in the community, are these kinds of exercises where you 
bring together people from different narratives and get them to go through their experiences 
together (maybe some grassroots organization, exposing groups to one another without 
necessarily going through what they went through in the conflict. In these settings narratives 
come out in a more organic exchange and they are far more effective than a top down 
commission or any top down initiative at this point because authorities are formal entities 
and have very little interest in closing the gap. These smaller initiatives allow for social 
coherence and that is what we need now.”316 
 
The points made in the researcher’s extensive response are critical for implementing a successful 
type of unification effort in post-conflict Syria. In fact, in a sense many Armenians expressed 
similar doubt and hesitation about such processes. For example, one respondent said: “a truth 
commission wouldn’t work because people will lie. Historical dialogue is a good idea but it 
would end in a fight. So, none of these are good for finding the truth in Syria.”317 Another 
respondent shared his similar belief that “a truth commission is pointless because no one will tell 
the truth. Both the opposition and government sides would lie.”318 It seems clear that taking into 
account both the lack of trust in a truth commission process, and the greatly expressed desire for 
unification, some type of unification process through civil society that fosters social cohesion, as 






VII. Implications, Recommendations, and Conclusion  
“Justice is very important to us because we can’t create a democratic structure for the country 
to go forward without justice.  Yes, there are still violations on the ground, but that doesn't mean 
we cannot start looking into justice mechanisms now. Having a few trials could let all the 
violators on the ground know they can't get away with murder. Unless we show them some signs, 
we can't stop what they're doing. Restoring order and peace to the country is just as important to 
me as punishing the people responsible, but the main reason why everyone has to be punished 
for their crimes is so that it does not happen again within Syria.”319 
 
The quote from one respondent above helps put into perspective much of what has been 
discussed and assessed in this study. While much of the first section of this study was about the 
history of the Armenians in Syria along with a discussion of general transitional justice 
mechanisms, the latter half aimed to tie those frameworks together for an analysis of the 
Armenian perspective on justice in Syria, situated within a larger notion of justice across 
different Syrian communities. As was discussed at length in section six, the three overarching 
objectives for justice for Syrian-Armenians in a post-conflict Syria were: ensuring safety and 
stability, protecting the rights and liberties of all citizens, and (re)unifying Syria. In my analysis, 
I proposed these goals could be achieved in a variety of ways. For safety and stability, I 
suggested that rebuilding important community structures that entice dispersed Syrian-
Armenians to return to Syria would undeniably increase the strength of the Armenian community 
and restore hope that a safe and stable future for the Armenians in Syria is possible. As for 
protecting the rights and liberties of all citizens, I suggested that government policies in a post-
conflict Syria do not discriminate against certain groups by limiting their rights based on their 
ethnic or religious background. This was a foundational requirement of Armenian prosperity in 
Syria and repatriation/strong social cohesion can only be attained if everyone is equal. Lastly, on 
this point of unity, I suggested that in light of the divisive propaganda that is disseminated today 
throughout Syria, there will be a need for some type of mechanism to mend the society and bring 																																																								319	Ibid.	
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it together once more. As the HRW researchers cited earlier have suggested, a ground-up process 
for strengthening social cohesion by increasing exposure to other groups (instead of necessarily 
speaking of what happened in the conflict or different perceptions of responsibility) can help 
unify the country and its people once more. 
In assessing various Syrian communities, other research has found similar suggestions to 
what I have proposed. For example, the Carnegie Middle East Center has produced reports that 
put forward suggestions for conducive policy measures to create the conditions Syrians 
expressed they’d “need” in order to “return home.” The measures they suggest are in line with 
the themes explained above and thus help support the idea that it is not possible to separate the 
Syrian-Armenian experience from the Syrian experience at large. Armenians were, and still are, 
an integral part of Syrian life and thus, their hopes and aspirations for a reconstructed Syria 
should, and often do, take into consideration the views and necessities of other Syrian 
communities. Additionally, they are in line with what is best for the society as a whole in the 
most generalized prescription in order to attain peace and security (as far as the specifics go, of 
course their perspectives do differ). The first suggestion of the report is that safety and security 
be created through inclusive governance mechanisms, which facilitate reintegration, 
demilitarization, and access to justice.320  This is almost exactly the same as my first suggestion. 
Another recommendation is that efforts to prepare refugees for a return should begin now, 
including preparing Syrian lawyers and paralegals to inform refugees of their rights and help 
resolve the anticipated local disputes.321 Something that I’d like to highlight about this 
suggestion is that it is in line with the idea that many Syrian-Armenians shared with me that 
justice should be dealt out by either Syrians alone, or Syrians in conjunction with the 
																																																								320	ibid.		321	ibid.		
115		
international community, but it should not be the sole undertaking of the international 
community. Although I did not get a chance to explore the responses regarding Syrian-Armenian 
perspectives for retributive justice for Syria, table 10 of Annex C shows the numerical results. 
However, anecdotally, I can briefly explain that many who rejected the idea of a purely 
international justice system for Syria felt that this would lead to more problems that have already 
been caused by the international community’s “meddling” in Syrian affairs. However, an 
interesting counter-point is that in speaking with the IJ researcher at HRW, she shared that 
hybrid-courts, or courts including solely Syria would likely not be feasible since many of those 
Syrians who would be responsible for running the courts are implicated in the crimes they would 
be trying. This makes it very unlikely that they would provide credible justice that is not solely 
one-sided. These two factors combined make it difficult for there to be retributive justice in Syria 
if these conditions are respected.  
The last analysis that merits a brief mention here is the similarity between the HRW 
researcher’s described elements for a workable post-war Syria, and that which the generalized 
trends and data from my surveys demonstrated the Syrian-Armenians might prefer. The three 
HRW themes for a workable post-conflict Syria were: (1) Ensure refugees and all other displaced 
have a home to return to, (2) Reveal what happened to the disappeared, and (3) Progress on 
justice. While neither of us put forth tangible recommendations for how these goals can be 
achieved, I believe that might have been out of scope of the present study. The purpose of this 
study was to assess the attitudes of Syrian-Armenians toward redress in Syria and their 
perspectives of what satisfactory justice might be. A promising observation is that it seems the 
Armenian perspectives are in line with those of the Syrian community at large. In line with point 
(1) above from HRW, the Armenians in Syria feel that having a home to return to is an essential 
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part of feeling that justice has been done and that Syria is safe for them to live in once again. A 
whole discussion was given to this in section six under theme 1b. Additionally, while the 
Armenian community did not suffer as many disappearances as other communities may have, 
their constant desire for seeking the truth and for equal rights for all in Syria would suggest to me 
that their aims are in line with goal 2 of HRW. Lastly, although my respondents defined justice 
in many different ways, it is undeniable that the Syrian-Armenians seek progress on justice. 
Whether it was through their proposed governmental reforms such as loosening restrictions on 
freedom of speech, or financial compensation from the government to rebuild infrastructure, or 
memorialization and a reunification of Syria with its lands and people, it is clear that justice is 
the ultimate goal for many who wish to return, and it is the lack of justice for many of them that 
hinders their return.  
Overall, this study highlighted the perspectives of a community not often included in the 
current effort of planning for justice in a post-conflict Syria. While this study provided valuable 
insight into this community, it is important to emphasize that any consultation like this with a 
small sample of community members on the ground with diverse and nuanced perspectives, is a 
very imperfect exercise, because it will never provide a generalizable answer for an entire 
community. However, one might see some trends emerge and this is valuable to at least guide the 
initiatives in a direction that is at least preferred by some. This kind of data helps to define the 
contours even if it doesn’t provide one with a blueprint for how the community can move 
forward. At the very least though, one can draw some conclusions from this kind of exercise and 
that is what I did in this study. In collecting opinions and perspectives for redress from the 
Armenian community of Syria today, I sought to analyze how their notions of justice could be 
understood. Through which lenses can we better understand what this community sees for justice 
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in post-conflict Syria, and why is that the case? I drew conclusions about how the lack of justice 
for an atrocity over a century ago impacted the expectations of justice in the conflict today. I also 
explored how the dynamics of minorities in the Syrian state impacted the Armenian experience 
and continues to influence their perspectives on justice for modern-day Syria. I discussed notions 
of the duality of a homeland, the importance of community, and presented in depth the possible 
justice mechanisms that could be used in Syria today. Through an assessment of which 
mechanisms this community would prefer to use, and overall, what elements are essential to 
them to create a “repaired Syria,” I hope I have contributed at least one piece to the greater 
puzzle of justice for the Syrian conflict, helping the image come into greater focus as we 
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A. English Survey  
Survey # _______   Date: ______________ 
 
Important Note: This survey will be kept confidential and your name will not be linked to it in any way. Even 
so, please know that you are free to skip any question you do not feel like answering, and if at any point you 
decide you would like to stop completing the survey and turn it in incomplete, you may do so. Furthermore, if at 




1. Which of the following do you hold? (Please circle all that apply) 
a. Armenian Citizenship   b. Syrian Citizenship   c. Refugee status   d. Temporary residency status  
e.  Other: (please write in) ________________________ 
 
2.     Which city are you from in Syria?  Please write in: ___________________________________________ 
 
3.     Gender: 
a.     Male           b.     Female 
 
4.     Age:   _______________ 
 
5. With which ethnicities do you identify? (Please circle all that apply) 
a.    Armenian 
b. How proud do you feel to be Armenian? 
a. Very proud   b. Proud    c. A Little Proud   d. Not Proud At All    e. I prefer not to 
answer  
c.     Syrian 
 d. How proud do you feel to be Syrian? 




e.     Other: (please write in) _____________________ 
f. How proud do you feel to be this ethnicity? 
a. Very proud   b. Proud    c. A Little Proud   d. Not Proud At All    e. I prefer not to 
answer  
 
6. When did your ancestors arrive in Syria? ___________________________________________________ 
 
7. What was your occupation in Syria? _____________________________________________________ 
 
8. When did you leave Syria?  ____________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Do you plan to go back to Syria?  
a. Yes    b. No   c. I don’t know yet but I’d like to  d. I don’t know yet but I would not like to  e. Prefer not 
to answer  
 
10. When did you arrive in Armenia? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
11. What is your occupation in Armenia? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
12.     What is your highest level of education: 
a.     Primary/middle school   b.     High school   c.     University degree    d.     Graduate school 
 
13. Did you serve in the Syrian armed forces? 
a.     No   b.     Yes:    If Yes, when? ______________________________________________________                     
If you answered No, please skip question 14. 
 
14. Why did you join the armed forces? 
a.     Mobilization/draft    b.     Voluntarily    c.     Other ____________________________________ 
 
II. FAMILY HISTORY/GENOCIDE  
15. Did you lose any family members during the Armenian Genocide?  
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a. No     b. Yes:   If Yes, please indicate their relationship to you ________________________________ 
 
16. How often does your family speak about the Armenian Genocide?   
a. Very frequently   b. Frequently   c. Not so frequently    d. Never     e. I prefer not to answer  
 
17. How much attention would you say was given to the Armenian Genocide in your school?  
a. A lot   b.  Somewhere in the middle, neither a lot nor a little   c. A little   d. None  e. I  Prefer not to 
answer  
 
18. Do you feel like your family was victimized during the Armenian Genocide? 
a. Yes    b. No opinion    c. No   d. I prefer not to answer  
 
19. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following phrases:  
 
1. The memory of the Armenian Genocide is very much alive in the memories of Armenians  
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. I don’t know   e. Prefer not to answer  
 
2. The memory of the Armenian Genocide is very much alive in your memory  
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. Prefer not to answer  
3. The divisions created between Armenians and Turks are now forgotten  
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. I don’t know   e. Prefer not to answer  
 
       4. Armenians have gotten justice for the genocide 
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. I don’t know   e. Prefer not to answer  
 
       5. It is important for the world to know the truth about the Armenians Genocide 
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. Prefer not to answer. 
 
20.  Do you feel that what you have experienced in Syria is similar to what your ancestors experienced during 
the Armenian Genocide? 
a. Yes, a lot   b. Somewhat   c. A little   d. Not at all   e. Prefer not to answer  
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 21. Did your memories of your ancestors’ experience through the genocide impact your decisions for leaving 
Syria?  
a. Yes, a lot   b. Somewhat   c. A little   d. Not at all   e. Prefer not to answer  
 














25. What do you feel the Armenian community in Syria lost, if anything, as a result of this conflict? _________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Do any of your family members still live in Syria? 
a.     Yes    b.     No        c.  I prefer not to answer      d.   I don’t know 
 
27. Did you lose an immediate member of your family as a result of the war? 
a.     Yes     b.      No       c.  I prefer not to answer      d.   I don’t know               
 
28.  Was a member of your family seriously affected by the conflict?   
a.     Yes      b.     No      c.  I prefer not to answer        d.   I don’t know 
 
29. Do you feel like you and/or your family has been victimized during the conflict in Syria?  
a. Yes         b.   No       c.  I prefer not to answer        d.   I don’t know 
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30. Do you feel that Armenians have been victimized during the conflict in Syria?  
a. Yes         b.   No       c.  I prefer not to answer        d.   I don’t know 
 
IV. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN SYRIA  
31. From what you know or can remember, has your family typically been supportive of the Syrian 
government?  
a. I don’t know    b. I prefer not to answer   c. Yes   d. No; if No, who did they support? _____________ 
 
32. When the Syrian conflict started, with whom did you sympathize most?  
a. The Government   b. The Opposition   c. I didn’t sympathize with anyone or any side.   d. I don’t 
know 
d. I prefer not to answer    e. Other ____________________________ 
 
33. Do you now sympathize with someone different than when the conflict in Syria started? 
 a. Yes    b. No     c. I don’t know    d. I prefer not to answer      e. Other _________________________ 
 
34. Could you please tell me if you are in agreement or disagreement with the following statements?  
 1. One of the successes of the Syrian government was the maintenance of a unified Syria. 
a. Agree    b. Disagree    c. I don’t know    d. Prefer not to answer  
 
 2. One of the successes of the Syrian government was the protection of the minorities  
a. Agree    b. Disagree    c. I don’t know    d. Prefer not to answer 
 
3. Before 2011, the Syrian government had violated basic human rights in Syria  
        a. Agree    b. Disagree    c. I don’t know    d. Prefer not to answer 
 
4. Since 2011, the Syrian government has violated basic human rights in Syria 
a. Agree   b. Disagree    c. I don’t know    d. Prefer not to answer 
 
 
35. How often does your family speak about the conflict in Syria?   
       a. Very Often       b. Often        c. Not so Often      d. Never       f. I prefer not to answer   
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE WAR:  
36. What do you think was the cause of the war in Syria? ___________________________________________   
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 





38. Which group(s) do you believe was responsible for starting the conflict in Syria? (Please circle all that 
apply) 
a. I don’t know    b.  I prefer not to answer     c. The Free Syrian Army    d. The Syrian Government  
 
e. Terrorist groups    g. International actors; if so, which particularly? ______________________________ 
 
f. They all have responsibility     
 
VI. JUSTICE AND REDRESS FOR THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE  
a. Restorative: 
39. What would make you feel like the Armenian people have received justice with regard to the Armenian 
Genocide?  Please circle all which you think would contribute to this: 
a. An apology for the Genocide by Turkey 
b. Official recognition of the Genocide by Turkey  
c. Official recognition from the countries that currently don’t recognize the Genocide  
d. Memorialization: Establishing museums and plaques in the places of destruction in Western Armenia 
e. Infrastructure: Rebuilding destroyed churches in Western Armenia  
f. Inclusion of the genocide in school textbooks around the world  
g. Making education about the genocide mandatory in school textbooks in Turkey  
h. Removal of the symbols that indicate loyalty to Ataturk and his regime from public places  
i. Financial compensation 
j. Return of land  
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k. The establishment of a truth commission: A forum where people tell their stories (victims and 
perpetrators both tell their stories in order for the entire community to get a broader sense of what 
actually happened and how it all happened). 
l. Historical Dialogue effort: Turks, descendants of Armenian survivors, and historians coming together 
to discuss the events 
m. Support from the Turkish government for Armenians in Turkey 
n. Support from the Turkish government for Armenians around the world whose ancestors were 
displaced due to the genocide   
o. Proper burial sites/graveyards, even if it is merely symbolic, for those whose bones are scattered 
throughout the deportation routes.  
p.  Judicial proceedings: taking this to a court or tribunal of any kind for formal justice 
q. Other ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
VII. JUSTICE AND REDRESS FOR THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 
40. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following phrases:  
1. The memory of the experiences from the conflict in Syria is very much alive in the memories of Syrians 
a. Agree    b. Disagree   c. I don’t know   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
2.  The memory of the experiences from the conflict in Syria is very much alive in your memory 
a. Agree    b.  Disagree   c. I don’t know   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
3. The divisions created amongst Syrians during the conflict in Syria are now forgotten  
a. Agree    b. Disagree   c. I don’t know   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
 4. Syrians will get justice for what is happening to them 
a. Agree    b. Disagree   c. I don’t know   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
 5. The world knows the truth about the Syrian conflict  
a. Agree    b.  Disagree   c. I don’t know   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
  6. It is important for the world to know the truth about the Syrian Conflict   
a. Agree    b. Disagree   c. I don’t know   d. Prefer not to answer  
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41. What types of conditions do you feel would be necessary for you to be able to return/integrate/resettle and 
begin to rebuild your life and community in Syria? ________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
42. What would it look like to you for Syria to be repaired? _________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
43. What would justice in Syria look like to you? __________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
44. What would justice for the Armenians in Syria look like to you? ___________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a.  Restorative:   
45. In a post-conflict Syria, what would make you feel like there has been justice with regard to the Syrian 
Conflict?  Please circle all which you think would contribute to this:  
a. An apology; if so, from whom 
_______________________________________________________________ 
b. Official recognition of harms endured; if so, from whom 
___________________________________________ 
c. Memorialization: Establishing museums about the conflict throughout Syria and placing plaques in places of 
destruction  
d. An apology, official recognition, and aid, from the countries that contributed to the violence  
e. Rebuilding cultural heritage sites, including churches and other Armenian sites. If so, what in particular? 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
f. Rebuilding destroyed infrastructure  
g. Awareness about the conflict: Educating those in Syria and the world about the conflict  
h. Financial Compensation. If so, from whom and for what? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
i. Return of land.  If so, from whom and for what land? 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
j. Amnesty for all involved in any part of the conflict: A policy of forgive and forget. The country would 
essentially not deal with this conflict in any way, disregarding culpability for a chance to move forward.  
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k. Truth commission: A forum where people tell their stories (victims and perpetrators both tell their stories in 
order for the entire community to get a broader sense of what actually happened and how it all happened).  
l. Historical Dialogue effort including all parties to the conflict: Free Syrian Army, Government officials, all 
minority groups, any other group involved, and historians, coming together to discuss the events 
m. The symbols that indicate loyalty to the government should be removed from public places  
n. The symbols that indicate loyalty to the Opposition should be removed from public places  
o. Syrian government support for Syrians in Armenia  
p. Syrian government support for those who wish to return to Syria 
q. Syrian government support for Syrians around the world who were displaced due to the war 
r. Unifying Syria so there are no more factions, and no divides amongst people for religion, ethnicity, etc. 






 46. Which of the following do you believe should currently have the Syrian government’s attention? (circle all 
that apply)   
a. Securing order and peace among opposing factions      
b. Ending the war         
c. Rebuilding infrastructure         
d. Protecting human rights and liberties of all citizens      
e. Improving economic prosperity        
f. Protecting minority communities        






47. Would you support a Syria-wide program to provide reparations to victims in Syria regardless of their 
ethnicity? 
a. Yes    b.  No     c. I don’t know     d. I prefer not to answer  
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48. If you believe Armenians have not gotten justice for the Armenian Genocide, how does that impact your 





49. Could you please tell me if you are more in agreement or disagreement with the following phrases?   
1. The armed opposition members who violated human rights during the conflict should be brought to court 
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
2. The government authorities who violated human rights during the conflict should be brought to court 
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
3. Members of terrorist groups who violated human rights during the conflict should be brought to court  
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. Prefer not to answer    
 
4. A tribunal should be created to trial anyone guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria. 
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. Prefer not to answer  
5. If a tribunal is created, you would want to be present at the proceedings 
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
6. If a tribunal is created, you would want to testify at the proceedings 
a. Agree    b. Neither agree nor disagree   c. Disagree   d. Prefer not to answer  
 
 50.  How do you envision members of your community dealing with the suffering caused by the war and 
displacement upon return/integration/resettlement? What types of networks, organizations, or institutions could 








If there is anything else that I did not ask but you would like to say about your expectations/ideas for repair and 
justice in Syria, specifically for the Armenian community, please feel free to use the space below to express any 
additional thoughts. Thank you for your participation in this survey! I look forward to sharing the results with 









Հետազօտութիւն թիւ՝_______, Թուական ________________ 
 
Կարեւոր ծանուցում. այս հետազօտութեան գաղտնիւթիւնը կը պահպանուի եւ ձեր անունը որեւէ կերպ 
չ’առնչուիր անոր հետ: Այնուհանդերձ իմացէ՛ք, որ դուք ազատ էք չպատասխանելու որեւէ հարցումի, որ 
անյարմար կը գտնէք: Որեւէ պահու, եթէ որոշէք չշարունակել հարցազրոյցը եւ անաւարտ յանձնել այն, ապա 
դուք կրնաք վարուիլ այդպէս: Բացի այդ, որեւէ պահու, եթէ որոշէք, որ անյարմար է ձեր պատասխաններուն 
ձայնագրումը՝ կրնամ ջնջել զանոնք տուեալներու հաւաքածոյէս:  
 
Ա. ԺՈՂՈՎՐԴԱԳՐԱԿԱՆ 
1. Հետեւեալէն ո՞ր մէկը ունիք: (Հաճեցէ՛ք շրջանակի մէջ առնել բոլոր համապատասխան տարբերակները): 
ա. Հայաստանի քաղաքացիութիւն 
բ. Սուրիոյ քաղաքացիութիւն  
գ. փախստականի կարգավիճակ  
դ. ժամանակաւոր կացութեան կարգավիճակ 
ե. այլ (հաճեցէ՛ք նշել)՝ __________________________________ 
 
2. Սուրիոյ ո՞ր քաղաքէն էք: Հաճեցէ՛ք նշել. __________________________________ 
 
3. Ձեր սեռը՝  ա. արական  բ. իգական 
 
4. Ձեր տարիքը՝ __________________________________ 
 
5. Ո՞ր ինքնութիւններուն հետ կը նոյնացնէք դուք ձեզի: (Հաճեցէ՛ք շրջանակի մէջ առնել բոլոր 
համապատասխան տարբերակները): 
ա. Հայկական  
բ. Որքա՞ն հպարտ կը զգաք ձեր հայ ըլլալով: 
ա. Շատ հպարտ   բ. հպարտ   գ. քիչ մը հպարտ   դ. բնաւ ոչ հպարտ   ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
գ. Սուրիական 
դ. Որքա՞ն հպարտ կը զգաք ձեր սուրիացի ըլլալով:  
ա. Շատ հպարտ   բ. հպարտ   գ. քիչ մը հպարտ   դ. բնաւ ոչ հպարտ   ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
ե. Այլ (հաճեցէ՛ք նշել)՝ __________________________________ 
զ. Որքա՞ն հպարտ կը զգաք ձեր այս ինքնութեամբ:  
ա. Շատ հպարտ   բ. հպարտ   գ. քիչ մը հպարտ   դ. բնաւ ոչ հպարտ   ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
6. Ե՞րբ ձեր նախնիները Սուրիա հասած են: __________________________________ 
 
7. Ի՞նչ էր ձեր զբաղմունքը Սուրիոյ մէջ: __________________________________ 
 
8. Ե՞րբ լքեցիք Սուրիան: __________________________________ 
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9. Մտադի՞ր էք ետ Սուրիա վերադառնալ: 
ա. Այո    
բ. ոչ    
գ. տակաւին չեմ գիտեր, բայց կ’ուզեմ    
դ. տակաւին չեմ գիտեր, ոչ ալ կ’ուզեմ    
ե.  կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
10. Ե՞րբ ժամանեցիք Հայաստան: __________________________________ 
 
11. Ի՞նչ է ձեր զբաղմունքը Հայաստանի մէջ: __________________________________ 
 
12. Ի՞նչ է ձեր բարձրագոյն կրթութեան մակարդակը:  
ա. Նախակրթարան/միջնակարգ դպրոց 
բ. երկրորդական վարժարան 
գ. համալսարանական վկայական 
դ. յետ համալսարանական (մագիստրոս եւ աւելի բարձր) 
 
13. Ծառայա՞ծ էք Սուրիոյ բանակին մէջ:  
ա. Ոչ բ. այո: Եթէ՝ այո, ապա ե՞րբ: __________________________________ 
Եթէ «ոչ» պատասխանեցիք, ապա անտեսեցէ՛ք 14-րդ հարցումը: 
 
14. Ինչո՞ւ գացիք բանակ: 
ա. Զինուորագրուեցայ 
բ. կամաւոր գացի 
գ. այլ՝ __________________________________ 
 
Բ. ԸՆՏԱՆԵԿԱՆ ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹԻՒՆԸ / ՑԵՂԱՍՊԱՆՈՒԹԻՒՆԸ 
15. Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան ատեն ձեր նախնեաց ընտանիքի անդամներէն որեւէ մէկուն կորսնցուցա՞ծ էք: 
ա. Ոչ բ. այո: Եթէ՝ այո, ապա նշեցէ՛ք ձեր ազգականական կապն անոր հետ՝ __________________________ 
 
16. Որքա՞ն յաճախ ձեր ընտանիքը կը խօսի Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան մասին: 
ա. Շատ յաճախ     բ. յաճախ     գ. ոչ այդքան յաճախ     դ. բնաւ     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
17. Որքա՞ն ուշադրութիւն դարձուած է Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան, ձեր կարծիքով, ձեր դպրոցէն ներս: 
ա. Շատ     բ. միջին. ոչ շատ, ոչ քիչ     գ. քիչ     դ. բնաւ     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
18. Կը կարծէ՞ք, որ ձեր ընտանիքը տուժած է Հայոց ցեղասպանութենէն: 




19. Հաճեցէ՛ք նշել ձեր համաձայնութեան մակարդակը հետեւեալ հարցերուն վերաբերեալ: 
1. Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան յիշատակը վառ է հայերուն յիշողութեան մէջ: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. չեմ գիտեր     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
2. Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան յիշատակը վառ է ձեր յիշողութեան մէջ: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
3.  Հայերուն եւ թուրքերուն միջեւ գոյութիւն ունեցած բաժանումներն այժմ մոռցուած են: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. չեմ գիտեր     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
4. Հայերը ցեղասպանութեան արդար հատուցում ստացած են:  
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. չեմ գիտեր     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
5. Կարեւոր է, որ աշխարհը գիտնայ ճշմարտութիւնը Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան մասին:  
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
20. Կը զգա՞ք, որ Սուրիոյ հակամարտութեան ընդմէջէն անցուցած ձեր փորձառութիւնները նոյնանման են ձեր 
նախնիներուն ապրած փորձառութիւններուն Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան ժամանակ: 
ա. Այո, շատ     բ. որոշ չափով     գ. քիչ մը     դ. բնաւ     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
21. Ցեղասպանութեան ընդմէջէն անցած ձեր նախնիներուն յիշատակը ազդեցութիւն ունեցա՞ւ Սուրիան լքելու 
ձեր որոշումը կայացնելուն վրայ: 
ա. Այո, շատ     բ. որոշ չափով     գ. քիչ մը     դ. բնաւ     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 






















26. Ձեր ընտանիքի անդամներէն ոեւէ մէկը տակաւին Սուրիա կը բնակի՞: 
ա. Այո     բ. ոչ     գ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել     դ. չեմ գիտեր 
 
27. Պատերազմի հետեւանքով ձեր անմիջական ընտանիքի անդամներէն ոեւէ մէկը կորսնցուցի՞ք: 
ա. Այո     բ. ոչ     գ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել     դ. չեմ գիտեր 
 
28. Հակամարտութեան պատճառով ձեր ընտանիքի անդամներէն ոեւէ մէկը լուրջ տոյժ կրե՞ց: 
 ա. Այո     բ. ոչ     գ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել     դ. չեմ գիտեր 
 
29. Կը կարծէ՞ք, որ դուք եւ կամ ձեր ընտանիքը տուժած է Սուրիական հակամարտութենէն: 
ա. Այո     բ. ոչ     գ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել     դ. չեմ գիտեր 
 
30. Կը կարծէ՞ք, որ հայերը տուժած են Սուրիական հակամարտութենէն: 
ա. Այո     բ. ոչ     գ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել     դ. չեմ գիտեր 
 
Դ. ՍՈՒՐԻՈՅ ԿԱՌԱՎԱՐՈՒԹԵԱՆ ԵՒ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹԵԱՆ ՆԿԱՏՄԱՄԲ ՎԵՐԱԲԵՐՄՈՒՆՔԸ 
31. Ձեր գիտակցութեամբ կամ յիշողութեամբ, ձեր ընտանիքը ընդհանրապէս աջակի՞ց էր սուրիական 
կառավարութեան: 
ա. Չեմ գիտեր     բ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել     գ. այո     դ. ոչ: Եթէ՝ ոչ, ապա որո՞ւ կ’աջակցէր 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. Երբ սուրիական հակամարտութիւնն սկսաւ, դուք որո՞ւ համակիրն էիք: 
ա. կառավարութեան     բ. ընդդիմութեան     գ. ոչ մէկուն     դ. չեմ գիտեր     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
զ. այլ _______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. Արդեօք հիմա մէկ ա՞յլ կողմի համակիրն էք, քան այն ատեն երբ նոր սկսած էր հակամարտութիւնը: 
ա. Այո     բ. ոչ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել     ե. այլ ________________________________ 
 
34. Հաճեցէ՛ք նշել ձեր համաձայնութեան մակարդակը հետեւեալ հարցերուն վերաբերեալ: 
1. Սուրիական կառավարութեան յաջողութիւններէն մէկը՝ Սուրիոյ միասնականութեան պահպանումն էր: 
ա. համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
2. Սուրիական կառավարութեան յաջողութիւններէն մէկը՝ փոքրամասնութիւններու պաշտպանումն էր: 
ա. համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
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3. Մինչեւ 2011 թուականը, սուրիական կառավարութիւնը խախտած է մարդկային հիմնական 
իրաւունքները Սուրիոյ մէջ: 
ա. համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
4. 2011 թուականէն սկսեալ, սուրիական կառավարութիւնը խախտած է մարդկային հիմնական 
իրաւունքները Սուրիոյ մէջ: 
ա. համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
35. Որքա՞ն յաճախ ձեր ընտանիքը կը խօսի Սուրիական հակամարտութեան մասին: 
 ա. Շատ յաճախ     բ. յաճախ     գ. ոչ այդքան յաճախ     դ. բնաւ     ե. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
Ե. ԸՄԲՌՆԵԼ ՊԱՏԵՐԱԶՄԸ 








38. Ո՞ր խմբաւորում(ներ)ը, կը կարծէք, որ պատասխանատու էին Սուրիական պատերազմի սկզբնաւորման: 
(Հաճեցէ՛ք շրջանակի մէջ առնել բոլոր համապատասխան տարբերակները): 
ա. Չեմ գիտեր      
բ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել      
գ. սուրիական ազատ բանակը      
դ. սուրիական կառավարութիւնը     
ե. ահաբեկչական խմբաւորումները      
զ. միջազգային դերակատարները: Եթէ՝ այո, ապա ով/որոնք. _____________________________      
է. բոլորն ալ պատասխանատուութեան բաժին կը կրեն 
 
Զ. ՀԱՅՈՑ ՑԵՂԱՍՊԱՆՈՒԹԵԱՆ ԱՐԴԱՐ ՀԱՏՈՒՑՈՒՄԸ 
ա. Վերահաստատում 
39. Ինչպէ՞ս կը կարծէք, որ հայ ժողովուրդը արդար հատուցում կը ստանայ Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան: 
(Հաճեցէ՛ք շրջանակի մէջ առնել բոլոր համապատասխան տարբերակները): 
ա. Ցեղասպանութեան համար ներողութիւն խնդրելը Թուրքիոյ կողմէ 
բ. Ցեղասպանութեան պաշտօնական ճանաչումը Թուրքիոյ կողմէ 
գ. Ցեղասպանութեան պաշտօնական ճանաչումը այն երկրնեու կողնէ, որոնք մինչեւ հիմա չեն ճանչցած 
դ. Յիշատակում. թանգարաններ հիմնել եւ ցուցանակներ տեղադրել բնաջնջման վայրերուն մէջ՝ Արեւմտեան 
Հայաստանի մէջ 
ե. Ենթակառուցում. վերականգնել քանդուած եկեղեցիները Արեւմտեան Հայաստանի մէջ 
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զ. Ցեղասպանութեան ներառումը ողջ աշխարհի դպրոցական դասագրքերուն մէջ 
է. Ցեղասպանութեան ուսուցումը պարտադիր դարձնել Թուրքիոյ դպրոցական դասագրքերուն մէջ 
ը. Աթաթուրքին ու անոր վարչակարգին հաւատարմութիւն ցուցաբերող խորհրդանշանները վերացնել հանրային 
վայրերէն 
թ. Դրամային հատուցում 
ժ. Հողերու վերադարձ 
ի. Ճշմարտութեան յանձնաժողովի ձեւաւորում. հարթակ մը, ուր մարդիկ կը պատմեն իրենց պատմութիւնները 
(ընդ որում ե՛ւ տուժածները ե՛ւ յանցաւորները կը պատմեն իրենց պատմութիւնները, որպէսզի ողջ համայնքն աւելի 
լաւ պատկերացնէ, թէ ինչ եւ ինչպէս տեղի ունեցած է ամէն ինչ իրականութեան մէջ) 
լ. Պատմական երկխօսութեան ստեղծում. թուրքերը, հայ վերապրածներու սերունդները, ինչպէս նաեւ 
պատմագէտները կը հաւաքուին՝ միջադէպերը քննարկելու 
խ. Աջակցութիւն Թուրքիոյ կառավարութեան կողմէ՝ թուրքիաբնակ հայերուն 
ծ. Աջակցութիւն Թուրքիոյ կառավարութեան կողմէ՝ աշխարհացրիւ հայութեան, որոնց նախնիները 
տեղահանուած են Ցեղասպանութեան ժամանակ 
կ. Պատշաճ գերեզմանոցներ յատկացնել, թէկուզ եւ խորհրդանշական, անոնց, որոնց աճիւնները ցրուեցան 
տեղահանութեան ճանապարհներուն վրայ:  
հ. Դատավարութիւն. խնդիրը բարձրացնել դատական ատեան կամ որեւէ պաշտօնական արդարադատութեան 
հարթակ 
ձ. Այլ _______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Է. ՍՈՒՐԻՈՅ ՔԱՂԱՔԱՑԻԱԿԱՆ ՊԱՏԵՐԱԶՄԻ ԱՐԴԱՐ ՀԱՏՈՒՑՈՒՄԸ 
40. Հաճեցէ՛ք նշել ձեր համաձայնութեան մակարդակը հետեւեալ հարցերուն վերաբերեալ: 
1. Սուրիական հակամարտութեան փորձութիւններու յիշողութիւնը վառ է սուրիացիներուն յիշողութեան 
մէջ: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
2. Սուրիական հակամարտութեան փորձութիւններու յիշողութիւնը վառ է ձեր յիշողութեան մէջ:  
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
3. Սուրիական հակամարտութեան ընթացքին ժողովուրդին մէջ ստեղծուած բաժանումներն այսօր 
մոռցուած են: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
4. Սուրիացիները արդար հատուցում կը ստանան՝ իրենց հանդէպ կատարուածներուն համար: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
5. Աշխարհը գիտէ ճշմարտութիւնը Սուրիական հակամարտութեան մասին: 




6. Կարեւոր է, որ աշխարհը գիտնայ ճշմարտութիւնը Սուրիական հակամարտութեան մասին: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. համաձայն չեմ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
41. Ինչպիսի՞ պայմաններ կը կարծէք, որ անհրաժեշտ են ձեզի, որպէսզի ի վիճակի ըլլաք վերադառնալու, 


















45. Յետ Սուրիական հակամարտութեան, կը կարծէ՞ք, որ արդարութիւն կայ Սուրիական հակամարտութեան: 
(Հաճեցէ՛ք շրջանակի մէջ առնել բոլոր համապատասխան տարբերակները): 
ա. Ներողութիւն խնդրել: Եթէ՝ այո, ապա՝ որմէ՞/որոնցմէ՞ _____________________________________________  
բ. Վնասներու պաշտօնական ճանաչում: Եթէ՝ այո, ապա՝ որո՞ւ/որո՞նց կողմէ ______________________________ 
գ. Յիշատակում. թանգարաններ հիմնել եւ ցուցանակներ տեղադրել կործանման վայրերուն մէջ՝ Ողջ Սուրիոյ 
տարածքին վրայ: 
դ. Ներողութիւն խնդրել, պաշտօնապէս ճանչնալ եւ աջակցութիւն ստանալ այն պետութիւններէն, որոնք 
խրախուսած էին վայրագութեան տարածման Սուրիոյ մէջ 
ե. Մշակութային ժառանգութեան վերականգնումը, ներառեալ եկեղեցիները եւ այլ հայկական կառոյցները: Եթէ՝ 
այո, ապա՝ ճիշդ ի՞նչ ______________________________________________________________________ 
զ. Կործանուած ենթակառուցուածքի վերականգնում 
է. Հակամարտութեան մասին գիտակցութեան մակարդակի բարձրացում. ուսուցանել այդ մասին Սուրիոյ եւ ողջ 
աշխարհի մէջ: 
ը. Դրամային հատուցում: Եթէ՝ այո, ապա որմէ՞/որոնցմէ՞ եւ ի՞նչ բանի համար _____________________________   
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
թ. Հողերու վերադարձ: Եթէ՝ այո, ապա  որմէ՞/որոնցմէ՞ եւ ի՞նչ հողատարածքներ __________________________   
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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ժ. Համաներում շնորհել հակամարտութեան մէջ ներգրաւուած բոլոր կողմերուն. ներելու եւ մոռնալու 
քաղաքականութիւն: Երկիրը պէտք չէ զբաղի այս հակամարտութեան հարցերով՝ անտեսելով յանցաւորութիւնը, 
յառաջ ընթանալու համար: 
ի. Ճշմարտութեան յանձնաժողովի ձեւաւորում. հարթակ մը, ուր մարդիկ կը պատմեն իրենց պատմութիւնները 
(ընդ որում ե՛ւ տուժածները ե՛ւ յանցաւորները կը պատմեն իրենց պատմութիւնները, որպէսզի ողջ համայնքն աւելի 
լաւ պատկերացնէ, թէ ինչ եւ ինչպէս տեղի ունեցաւ ամէն ինչ իրականութեան մէջ) 
լ. Պատմական երկխօսութեան ստեղծում, ընդ որում ընդգրկուած կ’ըլլան հակամարտութեան բոլոր կողմերը. 
սուրիական ազատ բանակը, կառավարութեան անդամները, փոքրամասնութիւններու ներկայացուցիչները եւ 
որեւէ ներգրաւուած խմբաւորում, ինչպէս նաեւ պատմագէտները՝ հաւաքուին եւ միջադէպերը քննարկեն 
խ. Կառավարութեան հաւատարմութիւն ցուցաբերող խորհրդանշանները վերացնել հանրային վայրերէն 
ծ. Ընդդիմութեան հաւատարմութիւն ցուցաբերող խորհրդանշանները վերացնել հանրային վայրերէն 
կ. Աջակցութիւն Սուրիոյ կառավարութեան կողմէ՝ հայաստանաբնակ հայերուն 
հ. Աջակցութիւն Սուրիոյ կառավարութեան կողմէ՝ բոլոր անոնց, որոնք կը ցանկան Սուրիա վերադառնալ 
ձ. Աջակցութիւն Սուրիոյ կառավարութեան կողմէ՝ աշխարհացրիւ սուրիացիներուն, որոնք տեղահանուեցան 
պատերազմի պատճառով 
ղ. Միաւորել Սուրիան, որպէսզի այլեւս բաժանումներ չըլլան ժողովուրդին մէջ՝ կրօնական, ինքնութենական կամ 
այլ գետնի վրայ 
ճ. Պատշաճ գերեզմանոցներ յատկացնել, թէկուզ եւ խորհրդանշական, այն անմեղ քաղաքացիներուն, որոնք զոհ 
դարձան կրակոցներուն ու ռմբակոծումներուն 




46. Հետեւեալէն ո՞ր մէկը կը կարծէք, որ սուրիական կառավարութեան համար այժմ առաջնահերթութիւն պէտք 
է համարուի: (Հաճեցէ՛ք շրջանակի մէջ առնել բոլոր համապատասխան տարբերակները): 
ա. Կարգ ու կանոն, խաղաղութիւն ապահովել հակամարտող կողմերուն միջեւ 
բ. վերջ դնել պատերազմին 
գ. վերականգնել ենթակառուցուածքները 
դ. պաշտպանել բոլոր քաղաքացիներուն մարդկային իրաւունքներն ու ազատութիւնները  
ե. բարելաւել տնտեսական բարգաւաճումը 
զ. պաշտպանել փոքրամասնութիւններու համայնքները 
է. կասեցնել զինեալ ընդդիմութիւնը, զինաթափել խմբաւորումները 




47. Կ’աջակցի՞ք համասուրիական ծրագրի մը իրականացման, որմով կ’իրագործուի տուժած սուրիացիներու 
հայրենադարձութիւնը՝ անկախ անոնց ինքնութենական պատկանելութենէն:  
ա. Այո     բ. ոչ     գ. չեմ գիտեր     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել   
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48. Եթէ կը հաւատաք, որ հայերը արդար հատուցում չեն ստացած Հայոց ցեղասպանութեան, ուստի ատիկա 
ինչպէ՞ս կ’ազդէ ձեր ակնկալիքներուն վրայ՝ Սուրիական հակամարտութեան արդար հատուցում 




 բ. Հատուցում 
49. Հաճեցէ՛ք նշել ձեր համաձայնութեան մակարդակը հետեւեալ հարցերուն վերաբերեալ: 
1. Զինեալ ընդդիմութեան անդամները, որոնք խախտեցին մարդկային իրաւունքները հակամարտութեան 
ընթացքին՝ պէտք է դատարան կանչուին: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
2. Կառավարական իշխանութիւնները, որոնք խախտեցին մարդկային իրաւունքները հակամարտութեան 
ընթացքին՝ պէտք է դատարան կանչուին: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
3. Ահաբեկչական խմբաւորումներու անդամները, որոնք խախտեցին մարդկային իրաւունքները 
հակամարտութեան ընթացքին՝ պէտք է դատարան կանչուին: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
4. Դատական ատեան պէտք է ստեղծուի, որ կը դատապարտէ բոլոր անոնց, որոնք մեղաւոր են 
պատերազմային եւ մարդկութեան դէմ յանցագործութիւններու մէջ՝ Սուրիոյ մէջ: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել  
 
5. Եթէ ստեղծուի դատական ատեան մը, դուք կը ցանկա՞ք ներկայ գտնուիլ դատավարութիւններուն: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
6. Եթէ ստեղծուի դատական ատեան մը, դուք կը ցանկա՞ք ցուցմունք տալ դատավարութիւններուն: 
ա. Համաձայն եմ     բ. ձեռնպահ եմ     գ. համաձայն չեմ     դ. կը նախընտրեմ չպատասխանել 
 
50. Ինչպէ՞ս կը պատկերացնէք ձեր համայնքի անդամներուն (որոնք կը դիմակայեն պատերազմի 
հետեւանքներն ու տեղահանութիւնը) վերադարձը, համարկումն ու վերաբնակումը: Ինչպիսի՞ ցանցերու, 










Եթէ որեւէ այլ բան կայ, որ չեմ հարցուցած, բայց դուք կը ցանկաք պատմել ձեր ակնկալիքներուն, 
գաղափարներուն շուրջ՝ Սուրիոյ վերակառուցման ու արդարութեան հատուցման մասին, մասնաւորապէս 
հայկական համայնքին վերաբերեալ, ապա ազատ զգացէ՛ք օգտագործելու ստորեւ յատկացուած տարածքը՝ 
յաւելեալ մտքեր արտայայտելու: Շնորհակալութիւն հետազօտութեան մասնակցելու համար, ես 

















C. Charts with survey data:  
 
Table 1: Demographics: 









37.83 2012 2012 Primary/Middle: 22 
High School: 14 
University: 16 
 
Table 2: Connection to Ethnicity 
 Armenian  Syrian 
Very Proud 36 22 
Proud 11 15 
A little proud 1 4 
Not proud at all 2 5 
 
Table 3: Syrian Conflict   
*the common expressed understanding of “victimized” largely referred to having to relocate 
 Do any of your family 
members still live in 
Syria? 
Did you lose an 
immediate 
member of your 
family as a result 




affected by the 
conflict? 
Do you feel like 
you and/or your 
family has been 
victimized* during 
the conflict in 
Syria? 
Do you feel that 
Armenians have 
been victimized 
during the conflict 
in Syria? 
Yes 41 9 27 40 41 
No 11 43 24 7 3 
 
 
Table 4: Genocide and Syrian Conflict Connection 
 Do you feel that what you have experienced in 
Syria is similar to what your ancestors 
experienced in the genocide?  
Did your memories of your ancestors’ 
experience through the genocide impact your 
decisions for leaving Syria? 
Yes, a lot 19 8 
Somewhat 24 10 




Table 5: Understanding of the Syrian Conflict:  
 One of the 
successes of the 
Syrian government 
was the 
maintenance of a 
unified Syria 
One of the 
successes of the 
Syrian government 
was the protection 
of minorities 
Before 2011 the 
Syrian government 
had violated basic 
human rights in 
Syria 
Since 2011 the 
Syrian government 
has violated basic 
human rights in 
Syria 
Agree 41 44 9 12 




Table 6: Perceptions of Responsibility  













If yes to 
international 
actors, which? 
USA: 18, Turkey: 17, Russia: 10, Saudi Arabia: 8, Israel: 7, Qatar: 7, The Gulf States: 
5, Afghanistan: 4, France: 2, Europe: 2, UAE: 2, The World: 2, Iraq: 1, China: 1, 
England: 1, Azerbaijan: 1, Germany: 1, Pakistan: 1, Chechens: 1 
 
 
Table 7: Genocide Reparations: What would make you feel like the Armenian people have received 
justice with regard to the Armenian Genocide? 
 
An apology for the 
Genocide by Turkey 
Official recognition of 
the Genocide by Turkey 
Official recognition 
from the countries that 
currently don’t 
recognize the Genocide 
Memorialization: 
Establishing museums 
and plaques in the 
places of destruction in 
Western Armenia 
(Modern day Turkey) 





churches in Western 
Armenia 
Inclusion of the 
genocide in school 
textbooks around the 
world 
Making education about 
the genocide mandatory 
in school textbooks in 
Turkey 
Removal of the symbols 
that indicate loyalty to 
Ataturk and his regime 
from public places 
24 25 22 16 
 
 
Financial compensation Return of land The establishment of a 
truth commission: A 
forum where people tell 
their stories (victims 
and perpetrators both 
tell their stories in order 
for the entire 
community to get a 
broader sense of what 
actually happened and 





and historians coming 
together to discuss the 
events 






Support from the 
Turkish government for 
Armenians in Turkey 
Support from the 
Turkish government for 
Armenians around the 
world whose ancestors 
were displaced due to 
the genocide 
Proper burial 
sites/graveyards, even if 
it is merely symbolic, 
for those whose bones 
are scattered throughout 
the deportation routes. 
Judicial proceedings: 
taking this to a court or 
tribunal of any kind for 
formal justice 




 Table 8: the Syrian conflict 









































for the world 




Agree 49 45 8 17 25 46 
Disagree 0 4 34 18 15 1 
I don’t know 1 2 9 14 8 0 
 
 
Table 9: Reparations for the Syrian Conflict: 
Question: In a post-conflict Syria, what would make you feel like there has been justice with regard 
to the Syrian conflict?  




harms endured; if 
so, from whom? 
Memorialization: 
Establishing 
museums about the 
conflict throughout 
Syria and placing 





aid, from the 
countries that 





churches and other 
Armenian sites; If 
so, what in 
particular? 



















Educating those in 
Syria and the 




so, from whom 
and for what? 
Return of land. If 
so, from whom 
and for what land? 
Amnesty for all 
involved in any 
part of the conflict: 




essentially not deal 
with this conflict 
in any way, 
disregarding 
culpability for a 
chance to move 
forward. 




A forum where 
people tell their 
stories (victims 
and perpetrators 
both tell their 
stories in order for 
the entire 
community to get 
a broader sense of 
what actually 
happened and how 












any other group 
involved, and 
historians, coming 
together to discuss 
the events 
The symbols that 
indicate loyalty to 
the government 
should be removed 
from public places 
The symbols that 
indicate loyalty to 
the Opposition 
should be removed 
from public places 
Syrian government 
support for Syrians 
in Armenia 




support for those 
who wish to return 
to Syria 
Syrian government 
support for Syrians 
around the world 
who were 
displaced due to 
the war 
Unifying Syria so 
there are no more 
factions, and no 
divides amongst 
people for religion, 
ethnicity, etc. 
Proper burial sites 
(even if it is 
merely symbolic) 
for innocent 













Table 10: Retributive justice for the Syrian Conflict 












































to be present 
at the 
proceedings 




to testify at 
the 
proceedings 




1 3 0 3 11 8 
Disagree 2 6 2 0 16 22 
Prefer not to 
answer 




Table 11: Priorities for Syria 
Which of the following do you believe should currently have the Syrian government’s attention? (circle 
all that apply and rank) The column with the lowest sum is the highest priority*  
 *It should be noted that there were problems with this system though and it is not comprehensive data. 


























86 38 111 82 114 89 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
